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Abstract 
 
The report presents a summary of international perceptions and beliefs about US nuclear policy, 
focusing on four countries – China, Iran, Pakistan and Germany – chosen because they span the 
spectrum of states with which the United States has relationships.  A paradox is pointed out:  that 
although the goal of US nuclear policy is to make the United States and its allies safer through a 
policy of deterrence, international perceptions of US nuclear policy may actually be making the 
US less safe by eroding its soft power and global leadership position.  Broadly held perceptions 
include a pattern of US hypocrisy and double standards – one set for the US and its allies, and 
another set for all others.  Importantly, the US nuclear posture is not seen in a vacuum, but as one 
piece of the United States’ behavior on the world stage.  Because of this, the potential direct side 
effects of any negative international perceptions of US nuclear policy can be somewhat 
mitigated, dependent on other US policies and actions.  The more indirect and long term relation 
of US nuclear policy to US international reputation and soft power, however, matters immensely 
to successful multilateral and proactive engagement on other pressing global issues. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The US seems to be sending a message across the world – do as we say, not as we 
do. 
-- Ghazala Yasmin, a Pakistani security scholar, 
writing about the 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review 
This paper examines how various actors in the international community – including allies, 
developing states and potential adversaries – perceive US nuclear policy.  It should be 
emphasized that the analysis presented here is not the “objective truth” about US nuclear policy, 
but a summary of international perceptions and beliefs about US nuclear policy.   It fills a 
vacuum in the current debate about the future of US nuclear policy and the future of the US 
nuclear complex.  It examines how various states responded to the last change in US nuclear 
posture, to see what lessons might be obtained for proposed future changes.  Indications of the 
last change include the allegedly leaked version of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the 
Bush Administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the 
decision to ramp up the National Missile Defense (NMD) program, and the recently ratified 
nuclear energy deal between India and the United States.  This paper points out a paradox:   
although the goal of US nuclear policy is to make the United States and its allies safer through a 
policy of deterrence, international perceptions of US nuclear policy may actually be making the 
United States less safe by eroding its soft power and global leadership position.   
This paper examines international responses in four countries – China, Iran, Pakistan and 
Germany.  These four countries were chosen because they span the spectrum of states with 
which the United States has relationships:  (1) China is a declared nuclear weapons state in the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and is often viewed by the US as an emerging peer 
competitor; (2) Iran is a “rogue state” that is allegedly trying to develop nuclear weapons, 
bucking the NPT; (3) Pakistan is a strategic partner for the United States in its “global war on 
terrorism,” and it possesses nuclear weapons outside of the NPT; and (4) Germany is a core 
European ally, under the US nuclear umbrella, which lacks nuclear weapons itself but could 
easily develop them if it chose.   
 
China 
 
China is the only state in this analysis that is a declared nuclear weapons state under the NPT, 
and for this reason, we might expect it would be particularly concerned with US nuclear policy.  
In general, however, China views US nuclear policy as only one small part of the wider bilateral 
relationship.  China views its own nuclear policy as holding the moral high ground, given its 
declared no first use (NFU) policy), and thus US nuclear policy is often viewed in contrast to the 
Chinese position.  Given its self-identity as the “responsible” nuclear weapons state, China’s 
discourse about US nuclear policy has focused on the perception of double standards, as well as 
the perceived increase in the role of nuclear weapons in US security policy.  Given its own 
reliance on nuclear weapons for retaliation, China appears to be most concerned with US plans 
for national missile defense, as a functioning NMD system could undermine China’s own 
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deterrence posture. Nonetheless, official Chinese reaction to recent changes in US nuclear policy 
has been relatively mild, probably because China does not want to jeopardize its focus on 
internal policies like economic development.  Since China is dependent on other countries to 
help build up its economy, it believes it must conform to the will of the international community 
to avoid harming its overall interests. Thus, if international reactions to US nuclear policy have 
been muted, China appears to believe its own reactions should be mild as well. 
 
Iran 
 
Iran’s perception of the US nuclear posture is inseparable from its view of all other US 
international policies.  Iran has felt victimized and persecuted by the US and its allies since its 
1979 Revolution resulted in its relative global economic and diplomatic isolation.  More 
recently, US policies in the Middle East – including the campaign against Iran’s own nuclear 
program – have aggravated Iran’s perception of the US as an untrustworthy, regional security 
threat, and as a specifically anti-Iranian troublemaker.  Iran thus views US nuclear posture 
through this lens of persecution.  US nuclear policies are seen as hypocritical and a permanent 
threat to Iran’s security.   Tehran claims that US nuclear policy is hypocritical and that it 
implements a double standard when it comes to nuclear dealings with friends or “rogues.”  This 
double standard is cited in US nuclear-related interactions with Israel, India, and in view of the 
NPT agreements.   
 
Pakistan 
 
Because it does not compete directly with the United States as China and Iran do, Pakistan views 
US nuclear policy through a different lens – one that is always conscious of the strategic rivalry 
between Pakistan and India.   Pakistan views US nuclear policy as hypocritical. In fact, US 
hypocrisy and double standards are its most common references to US nuclear policy.  While 
Iran’s concern with the double standard focuses on the US’ behavior towards nuclear friends 
(such as Israel and India) versus nuclear foes (such as North Korea and Iran), Pakistan’s concern 
with the double standard focuses on the United States’ own nuclear policies.  In other words, 
Pakistan is most upset by its perception of US nuclear policies as demonstrating that the United 
States believes itself powerful enough – and thus exceptional enough – to behave independently 
of international norms.  Pakistan also believes that US actions are undermining its stated goals 
for global nuclear non-proliferation.    
 
Germany 
 
Germany provides an interesting counterpoint to the other countries considered here, because it 
is both one of the United States’ closest allies and a non-nuclear weapon state.  Defenders of the 
current US nuclear posture often argue that Germany would seriously consider renouncing its 
non-nuclear status if the nuclear umbrella is weakened beyond its present state, but the evidence 
presented here does not support that argument.  Germany takes pride in its identity as a non-
nuclear weapon state and as a steward of international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament 
regimes.  This identity accords with Germany’s wider worldview which values multilateral, 
institutional solutions to global problems including arms control.  It is not surprising that 
Germany is critical of US nuclear policies. But like the other countries examined here, Germany 
 8
does not view US nuclear policy in a vacuum.  Thus, despite their differences of opinion on a 
variety of issues, Germany acknowledges the importance of its friendship with the United States, 
which often leads Germany to try to influence US policy from within the relationship and their 
common institutional networks.  In other words, there is a tension for Germany between its dual 
identities as a leading non-nuclear state and as a member of a nuclear-based alliance, NATO.  
These dual identities provide the filter through which it perceives US nuclear policy. 
 
Although nuclear policy is arguably an important signaling device in the international system, 
this analysis finds that: 
 
• Each of these states views US nuclear policy through the prism of other aspects of its 
bilateral relationship with the United States, as well as the prism of its own nuclear 
posture.   
• US nuclear policy is relatively unimportant by itself.  Instead, US nuclear policy is just 
one factor in how these states perceive and respond to the United States.  Moreover, US 
nuclear policy cannot be separated from historical and current political contexts. 
• US nuclear policy, by itself, only seems to matter if it directly affects another state’s 
regional security and stability.  For example, the US nuclear energy deal with India 
matters greatly to Pakistan, because from Pakistan’s perspective, it has altered the 
strategic balance of power in the region. 
• Most importantly, US nuclear policy is not seen in a vacuum, but as one piece of the 
United States’ behavior on the world stage.  These states generally argue that the United 
States is hypocritical in its nuclear policy, and that the nuclear realm is simply one more 
area where the United States exhibits exceptionalism in the international system. 
 
Despite the differences in these four states – in terms of their respective relationships with the 
United States as well as their own nuclear postures – all four appear to agree on some basic 
beliefs about the United States.  The evidence in this paper suggests that these states believe that 
the United States is hypocritical and that its actions demonstrate double standards – one set for 
the US and its allies, and another set for all others.  This perception of hypocrisy has eroded US 
soft power and the legitimacy of US global leadership.   
 
This finding has three implications, and these implications point out the difference between 
material and perceptual effects.  Material effects are tangible and measurable; they manifest 
changes in the physical world.  Perceptual effects are not tangible and measurable in the physical 
world in the short term, but if left unattended over the longer term, they will create material 
effects.  In other words, a change in the perceptual relationship will eventually materialize as a 
change in the material relationship.   
 
With this in mind, there are three implications of the findings presented above.  First, because 
these states do not treat US nuclear policy in a vacuum, it is unlikely that small changes in US 
nuclear policy will have a drastic material effect on US relations with these states, unless the 
policy changes are perceived as being congruent with other US policies and actions.  Put another 
way, a change in nuclear policy with a change in the same “direction” (more cooperative or more 
confrontational) of policy in another issue area could manifest as a material change in the 
relationship.  Otherwise, nuclear policy is unlikely to lead to a material change by itself.  Second, 
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the evidence suggests that US nuclear policy would matter even less – in terms of the material 
relationships with other states – if it was perceived to diverge from other policies or actions.   
 
Perceptual relationships, however, are another matter.  The third implication of this research is 
that nuclear policy matters immensely for the United States’ international reputation.  Such 
reputation effects can have significant impact in terms of gaining international cooperation in 
addressing global issues that require multilateral solutions – and given the interdependent nature 
of the world today, most issues fall into this category.   In contrast to a state’s “hard power” 
(military and economic might), “soft power” (a state’s culture, values and institutions) provides 
an indirect way to influence others.  Soft power is an invaluable asset to:  (1) keep potential 
adversaries from gaining international support and winning moderates over to their causes; (2) 
influence neutral and developing states to support US leadership; and, (3) convince allies to 
support and share the international security burden.  The United States needs soft power assets 
(including “the moral high ground”) to solve these problems multilaterally and proactively. 
For example, one of the “wicked problems” (problems having complex, adaptive, unpredictable 
components) that US nuclear policy and posture is trying to address is global proliferation of 
WMD.  Yet, WMD proliferation is not a problem that the United States can address effectively 
alone.  To address global proliferation concerns, the United States needs the rest of the world to 
participate in the process.  Given how complex the WMD proliferation problem is, this requires 
not only other international actors to commit to solving the “problem” with us but that they have 
a similar understanding of what the “problem” is.  This common problem definition is not 
possible when the rest of the world has negative perceptions of the United States, when US 
policies and actions (in the nuclear and non-nuclear arenas) are perceived as unilateral and 
hypocritical.  Indeed, this paper suggests that many international actors appear to view US policy 
and actions as one of the contributors to the WMD proliferation problem.  In other words, US 
actions actually affect how other states define the problem, and how they define the problem 
affects what they believe the “right” solution is.  Given their different understanding, it is not 
surprising that the “wicked” problem becomes even thornier to address.   
In short, how other international actors perceive US policies and actions matters a great deal in 
their decisions about how much they will cooperate on the US policy goal of non-proliferation.  
The tragic irony is this:  US nuclear policy and actions, which have the objective of trying to 
“solve” the global proliferation problem, may actually be making other international actors feel 
less secure.  Their increased sense of insecurity lessens international security overall and 
reverberates back to the US as a heightened insecurity as well.   
 
Although this analysis suggests that the four nations studied view US nuclear policy specifically 
(and its international behavior more generally) as hypocritical, it is neither possible – nor 
recommended – for the United States simply to take these criticisms to heart and unilaterally 
disarm.  Indeed, it would be incredibly imprudent to simply bow down to what everyone else 
wants.  Instead, this analysis has three benefits.    
 
First, it allows US policymakers simply to know and understand what everyone else wants, 
which creates the space for negotiation.  If other states did not receive the message we were 
intending to send, we still need to know what message they did receive.  This will allow us to 
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send our message more clearly in the future.  This paper recommends that the US needs to do a 
better job at articulating US nuclear policy, so that other actors are not left to draw their own 
conclusions, or worse, so that other actors cannot articulate US policy for us through the lens of 
their own agendas.  
 
Yet, this is not to imply that the US is simply being misunderstood and if it were to send the 
message more clearly, all of the disagreements would evaporate.  From the perspective of these 
other countries, US hypocrisy and double standards are not just a matter of perception, but is also 
conditioned by logic and their own national interests.  For example, why is it acceptable to build 
light water reactors in North Korea but not Iran?  Why does the US sanction Pakistan’s weapons 
program only when it is convenient for the US?  Why doesn’t the US press Israel, widely 
believed to have nuclear weapons, to become party to the NPT?  Why is the US overturning 30 
years of nonproliferation policy to sell nuclear technology to India, which doesn’t have to 
eliminate nuclear weapons, sign the CTBT or accept full-scope IAEA safeguards?  Some 
legitimate disagreements do exist, and the US needs to respond to these disagreements 
appropriately – if only to agree to disagree. 
 
Therefore, the second benefit of this analysis is to help US policymakers understand where other 
states are coming from with more clarity, in order to illuminate places of common interest and 
create opportunities for cooperation.  By seeking to narrow gaps between the US’ and other 
states’ positions, US policymakers can buy “breathing room” for those areas where US vital 
interests cannot be compromised.  At the very least, sustained strategic dialogue with allies and 
potential adversaries can sow the seeds for new perceptions of the US as being willing to listen 
to others. 
 
Finally, this analysis helps policymakers understand how (mis)perceptions of US nuclear policy 
may lead states to adopt countermeasures, which can create unanticipated consequences and 
harm the US ability to promote these and other policies abroad.  As explained above, US nuclear 
policy and actions, which have the objective of trying to “solve” the global proliferation 
problem, may actually be making other international actors feel less secure.  Strategic dialogue 
with these actors could help to reduce their uncertainties about US intentions, while simply 
acknowledging some of their concerns about perceived hypocrisy could help to rebuild US soft 
power.  Both actions could improve US security immeasurably.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For a decade following the end of the Cold War, the US nuclear posture was largely 
neglected.  What once had been high policy was relegated to the back burner, an inevitable result 
of the reduced threat from Russia, the emergence of other pressing security issues, and the 
complexity of reevaluating the purpose of the nuclear arsenal in a new threat environment. With 
the Moscow Treaty, the US and Russia agreed to limit the deployment of strategic nuclear 
warheads.  During the last decade, the US has emphasized maintaining the reliability and safety 
of its legacy stockpile without underground testing, particularly via the creation and 
implementation of the stockpile stewardship program.  However, over the same time, the 
facilities and skilled personnel needed to develop, produce, test, operate and maintain nuclear 
weapons began to atrophy. 
 
Although the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) allegedly set forth in 2001 a major change 
in the broad direction of strategic policy, attention to strategic forces at high levels of 
government has been scant and sporadic.  Following the NPR, the Bush Administration proposed 
several new initiatives, including enhanced test readiness, exploratory development of a new 
nuclear earth penetrator, a program to explore advanced weapons concepts and a modern 
plutonium pit production facility.  None of these initiatives have been well received by Congress.  
The one initiative that has survived is the concept of a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), 
emphasizing greater reliability and surety, ease of maintenance, broader design margins, and use 
of safer materials.  Congress has been amenable to allowing a study of RRW design concepts, 
but has specifically limited the allowed scope to existing military capabilities and missions. 
In the last two years, there have been two outside panels to examine the current US 
nuclear posture and the nuclear weapons complex:  the Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Nuclear Capabilities and the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board’s Nuclear Weapons Complex 
Infrastructure Task Force.  Both reports made broad recommendations about the need to refocus 
attention on the nuclear mission and overhaul the nuclear complex to revitalize the stockpile and 
adjust to the post Cold War threat environment.  With those reports as backdrop, and in 
consultation with the Department of Defense (DoD), the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) has just issued its own Complex 2030 strategic vision for stockpile and 
Complex transformation.  NNSA has established an Office of Transformation to invigorate such 
changes, while two competing designs for the RRW are awaiting a green light for further 
development.  These efforts have also been joined by a recent flurry of conferences and 
workshops calling attention to the languishing nuclear policy arena. 
What has been lacking among all of these efforts is any systematic or rigorous attempt to 
think through what the international response to any of these proposed changes to the stockpile 
or the nuclear complex might be.  Indeed, the deeper issue of how allies, neutral states and 
potential adversaries look at and will respond to US moves to reduce or reconfigure the 
stockpile, overhaul the Complex or begin new initiatives had not been examined until very 
recently, with a study commissioned by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).1  With 
                                                 
1 Lewis A. Dunn et al, Foreign Perspectives on US Nuclear Policy and Posture:  Insights, Issues and 
Implications, DTRA Report TI-18-05-21 (4 December 2006).  The project’s products include a short 
essay about the implications of the analysis and a long Power Point briefing report.  
 13
the important exception of this project, there is virtually no analysis about how other countries 
perceive US nuclear policy.  This is a crucial oversight, since one of the most – if not the most – 
important roles that nuclear weapons play in the international system today is that of signaling 
device.   
This paper attempts to fill this void.  Obviously, any discussion of how states would react 
to proposed future changes in US nuclear policy would be purely speculative.  Therefore, this 
paper will examine how various actors in the international community – including allies, 
developing states and potential adversaries – responded to the last change in US nuclear policy, 
to see what lessons might be obtained for proposed future changes.  For the purposes of this 
analysis, the last change includes the allegedly leaked versions of the 2001 NPR, the Bush 
Administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the 
decision to ramp up the National Missile Defense (NMD) program.2  In addition, where data 
exist, this paper examines responses to the proposed reliable replacement warhead and the 
recently ratified nuclear energy deal between India and the United States, in which the United 
States will provide access to its nuclear technology for the Indian civilian nuclear program, in 
exchange for India opening its civilian program to monitoring by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). 
 This paper examines responses in four countries – China, Iran, Pakistan and Germany.  
These four countries were chosen because they span the spectrum of states with which the 
United States has relationships:  (1) China is a declared nuclear weapons state in the NPT, and is 
often viewed by the US as an emerging peer competitor; (2) Iran is a “rogue state” that is 
allegedly trying to develop nuclear weapons, bucking the NPT; (3) Pakistan is a strategic partner 
for the United States in its “global war on terrorism,” and it possesses nuclear weapons outside 
of the NPT; and (4) Germany is a core European ally, under the US nuclear umbrella, which 
lacks nuclear weapons itself but could easily develop them if it chose.   
 
 Although nuclear policy is arguably an important signaling device in the international 
system, this analysis finds that: 
 
• Each of these states views US nuclear policy through the prism of other aspects of its 
bilateral relationship with the United States, as well as the prism of its own nuclear 
policy.   
• US nuclear policy is relatively unimportant by itself.  Instead, US nuclear policy is just 
one factor in how these states perceive and respond to the United States.  Moreover, US 
nuclear policy cannot be separated from historical and current political contexts. 
• US nuclear policy, by itself, only seems to matter if it directly affects another state’s 
regional security and stability.  For example, the US nuclear energy deal with India 
                                                 
2 This paper has only relied on the unclassified allegedly leaked versions of US 2001 Nuclear Posture 
Review and public reporting on the allegedly leaked versions. See, for example, “Nuclear Posture 
Review excerpts,” (8 January 2002), available at 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm; US Department of Defense, “Special 
Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review,” news transcript (January 9, 2002), available at 
http://defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi; and Amy F. Woolf, “Nuclear Weapons and US National 
Security:  A Need for New Weapons Programs?” Congressional Research Service Report RS21619 
(September 15, 2003).  The author has not seen or read the classified version of the NPR.  
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matters greatly to Pakistan, because from Pakistan’s perspective, it has altered the 
strategic balance of power in the region. 
• Most importantly, US nuclear policy is not seen in a vacuum, but as one piece of the 
United States’ behavior on the world stage.  These states generally argue that the United 
States is hypocritical in its nuclear policy, and that the nuclear realm is simply one more 
area where the United States exhibits exceptionalism in the international system. 
 
This finding is very similar to the conclusions of the DTRA study cited above, which 
examined foreign responses from a broader perspective.  In their survey of nearly 50 countries, 
the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) study team – led by Lewis A. Dunn – 
found that “other countries view US nuclear policy through the lens of an overall perception of 
US foreign and defense policies, widely viewed as entailing US unilateralism as well as a US 
pursuit of absolute security and military primacy.”3  The DTRA report’s findings will be 
discussed in more detail in this paper’s conclusion.  Here, it is important to note how 
complementary these two projects are:  the SAIC study team chose breadth, while this paper 
chose a more narrow focus to examine fewer cases in depth.  The fact that these two studies, with 
very different analytical methodologies, reached similar conclusions gives us confidence in the 
finding’s robustness. 
 
 This finding has four implications, and these implications point out the difference 
between material and perceptual effects.  Material effects are tangible and measurable; they 
manifest changes in the physical world.  Perceptual effects are not tangible and measurable in the 
physical world in the short term, but if left unattended over the longer term, they will create 
material effects.  Perceptual effects are often discounted because they cannot be seen, and as a 
result, observers tend to think events happen at one single moment rather than as a build-up or 
trend over time.  Yet the perceptual effects are real and cumulative, and will eventually manifest 
as material effects if unchecked.  For example, in the case of a person with a disease, anti-bodies 
are present in that person’s body over time, but it is only after a certain point that physical 
symptoms are observable.  This does not mean the person was healthy before the gross 
symptoms were present; it means, instead, that the observer was not aware of the smaller 
changes occurring over time that lead to the gross manifestations of the disease. 
 
Thus, a change in a material relationship between two states would be measurable as a 
change in the behavior of either or both of the states in the short term, while a change in the 
perceptual relationship between two states might not register as changed behavior in the short 
term, but is likely to lead to changed behavior over the long term.  In other words, a change in 
the perceptual relationship will eventually materialize as a change in the material relationship.   
 
With this in mind, there are four implications of the findings presented above.  First, 
because these states do not treat US nuclear policy in a vacuum, it is unlikely that small changes 
in US nuclear policy will have a drastic material effect on US relations with these states, unless 
the policy changes are perceived as being congruent with other US policies and actions.  For 
example, if the US were to announce it was building new nuclear weapons, and that policy 
change occurred simultaneously with other threatening policies or actions – such as blocking 
Chinese exports to the US or publicly increasing support for Taiwanese independence – then it is 
                                                 
3 Dunn et al, “Executive Summary,” p. 2.  
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possible the relationship between the two countries would degrade materially.  In the same way, 
if the US were to take steps towards shrinking its stockpile, and that change occurred 
simultaneously with other cooperative policies, then it is possible the relationship between the 
two countries would improve.  Otherwise, however, nuclear policy by itself is unlikely to affect 
the material relationship between the two countries.  Put another way, a change in nuclear policy 
with a change in the same “direction” (more cooperative or more confrontational) of policy in 
another issue area could manifest as a material change in the relationship.  Otherwise, nuclear 
policy is unlikely to lead to a material change by itself.   
 
Second, the evidence suggests that US nuclear policy would matter even less – in terms 
of the material relationships with other states – if it was perceived to diverge from other policies 
or actions.  For example, if the US were to take positively perceived steps towards shrinking its 
stockpile, yet simultaneously enacted other negatively perceived policies such as aggravating the 
conflict in the Middle East, increasing the size of its conventional military force or blocking an 
international agreement on global warming, other states would respond negatively to these other 
actions.  
 
 Perceptual relationships, however, are another matter.  The third implication of this 
research is that nuclear policy matters immensely for the United States’ international reputation.  
Such reputation effects can have significant impact in terms of gaining international cooperation 
in addressing global issues that require multilateral solutions – and given the interdependent 
nature of the world today, most issues fall into this category.   As the remaining global 
superpower, the United States is often held to a higher standard in most issue areas, including its 
responsibilities under Article VI and commitments made at the 2000 Review Conference of the 
NPT.4  Thus, given the remarkable agreement among the views of the four countries examined 
here, it is likely that any small changes in US nuclear policy that are perceived as moving away 
from disarmament will be judged harshly in the international community as hypocritical and 
increasing global nuclear danger. Sadly, even small US actions towards disarmament may only 
earn international respect if they are matched by cooperative policies in other issue areas.  In 
sum, the United States is unlikely to win the perceptual game as long as some of its policies 
and/or actions are perceived as unilateral and aggressive. 
Viewed another way, the “wicked problem” (a problem having complex, adaptive, 
unpredictable components) that US nuclear policy and posture is trying to address is global 
proliferation of WMD. 5   Yet, WMD proliferation is not a problem that the United States can 
                                                 
4 Article VI of the NPT states that “Each of the Parties of the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control.”  At the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear weapons states (including the 
United States) agreed to 13 “practical steps” including: ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT); full implementation of START II, conclusion of START III, and strengthening of the 
ABM Treaty; unilateral and irreversible reduction in nuclear arsenals; increased transparency regarding 
nuclear weapons as a voluntary confidence-building measure; unilateral reduction of non-strategic 
nuclear weapons; reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapons; and a diminishing role for 
nuclear weapons in security policies. 
5 A wicked problem is one in which an attempt to create a solution changes the understanding of the 
problem.  Thus, problem definition evolves as new possible solutions are considered and/or 
implemented.  As a result, a wicked problem cannot be solved in a traditional linear fashion – it is a 
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address effectively alone.  To address global proliferation concerns, the United States needs the 
rest of the world to participate in the process.  Given how complex the WMD proliferation 
problem is, this requires not only other international actors to commit to solving the “problem” 
with us but that they have a similar understanding of what the “problem” is.  This common 
problem definition is not possible when the rest of the world has negative perceptions of the 
United States, when US policies and actions (in the nuclear and non-nuclear arenas) are 
perceived as unilateral and hypocritical.  Indeed, this paper suggests that many international 
actors appear to view US policy and actions as one of the contributors to the WMD proliferation 
problem.  In other words, US actions actually affect how other states define the problem, and 
how they define the problem affects what they believe the “right” solution is.  Given their 
different understanding, it is not surprising that the “wicked” problem becomes even thornier to 
address.  How the United States and other actors define the problem affects which solution 
strategies will be considered.  Thus, perceptions can have important strategic consequences. 
In short, how other international actors perceive US policies and actions matters a great 
deal in their decisions about how much they will cooperate on the US policy goal of non-
proliferation.  This finding also accords with the SAIC study, which reported that US allies argue 
that “a greater US readiness to engage on nuclear disarmament issues would pay off in increased 
support from other third parties in pursing US non-proliferation objectives.”6  The tragic irony is 
this:  US nuclear policy and actions, which have the objective of trying to “solve” the global 
proliferation problem, may actually be making other international actors feel less secure.  Their 
increased sense of insecurity lessens international security overall and reverberates back to the 
US as a heightened insecurity as well.  Thus, if the US is trying to reduce proliferation in the 
world, it will not succeed by using its nuclear policies as its only lever.  Cooperative nuclear 
policies will have to be matched by cooperative policies in other areas, if the US wants “credit” 
for leading the world towards a reduced nuclear danger.  
 Finally, the implications of this analysis could be good or bad news for the US nuclear 
complex.  The bottom line is that US nuclear policy by itself is relatively unimportant, when 
viewed through the perspective of other international actors.  Thus, small changes in the US 
nuclear posture, such as transforming the complex or improving US weapon surety, are unlikely 
to create a huge international outcry, especially if they are counter-balanced by cooperative US 
policies in other issue areas.  The good news is that the US nuclear complex could “fly under the 
radar screen” with new nuclear initiatives, as long as the United States were acting cooperatively 
in other issue areas.  Alternatively, because US nuclear policy by itself (short of unilateral 
disarmament or escalated deployments) is relatively unimportant in US relations with other 
states, US policymakers may decide that spending political capital in this area is not worth the 
price.  In this case, the bad news is that US policymakers may view changes in nuclear policy as 
having steep domestic political costs (judging by Congressional resistance to existing initiatives) 
and providing very little benefit in relations with other states, and thus decide to leave the 
Complex to languish. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
complex, adaptive system with unpredictable outcomes.  For more on wicked problems, see H Rittel 
and M. Webber; "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," Policy Sciences, Vol. 4, (Amsterdam:  
Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 155-169. 
6 Dunn et al, “Executive Summary,” p. 3. 
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 This paper consists of six sections and a conclusion.  The first section grounds the 
analysis about international responses to US nuclear policy within a wider theoretical discussion 
about international cooperation and “wicked” problems. The second section provides an 
overview of the methodology of analysis.  The next four sections examine responses to US 
nuclear policy in the four countries of interest – China, Iran, Pakistan and Germany.  The 
conclusion suggests some common themes from the four countries and offers implications for 
the US nuclear complex. 
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US NUCLEAR POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES:  SOME THEORETICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
There has been much debate in policy circles about the effect of US nuclear policy on 
global nuclear proliferation.  Some observers, such as Ashton Carter and Keith Payne, argue that 
US nuclear policy has no effect on other states’ decisions to acquire nuclear weapons.  Rather, 
they argue, states decide to proliferate for domestic political or regional security reasons.  The 
problem with this argument is that US actions could have prompted or exacerbated the “regional 
security reason,” which suggests that there are very few “pure” regional reasons.  For example, 
the United States’ decision to include Taiwan under its extended deterrence nuclear umbrella 
affects China’s nuclear and conventional security posture in the Taiwan Straits.  Similarly, as 
will be discussed in the section on Pakistan below, the United States’ civilian nuclear deal with 
India significantly changes Pakistan’s calculus in the South Asia. 
Others argue that US decisions lead other states to be more inclined to acquire their own 
nuclear weapons.  These observers argue that US nuclear policy creates the perception of 
hypocrisy in light of the United States’ responsibilities towards eventual disarmament under 
Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  This view has most recently been 
espoused by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Hans Blix, the former 
chief United Nations weapons inspector.  In his introduction to the June 2006 commission report, 
Weapons of Terror:  Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, Blix argued 
that American unwillingness to cooperate in international arms agreements, its failure to ratify 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its missile defense program are undermining efforts to 
curb nuclear weapons.  Treaty-based disarmament is being set back by “an increased US 
skepticism regarding the effectiveness of international institutions and instruments, coupled with 
a drive for freedom of action to maintain an absolute global superiority in weaponry and means 
of their delivery.”  The report drew a direct link between the rise of individual action and the 
decline of cooperation, and thus “nuclear weapons states no longer seem to take their 
commitment to nuclear disarmament seriously.”  Blix clearly placed the blame at the feet of the 
United States:  “If it takes the lead, the world is likely to follow.  If it does not take the lead, 
there could be more nuclear tests and new nuclear arms races.”7
This debate about the effects of US nuclear policy on other nations’ willingness to 
cooperate with international non-proliferation regimes is a subset of a wider debate about 
cooperation in international relations.  On the one hand, realists argue that cooperation between 
states is always ephemeral, because the international system lacks an overarching world 
government to enforce agreements and states have to take care of themselves, by accumulating 
economic and military power.  In this zero-sum world, any attempts at international cooperation 
will always fail, because states can never trust other states to uphold their end of the bargain.  
Thus, even though all states would be better off if they could cooperate with each other, each 
individual state has an incentive to defect from the agreement first to gain a relative advantage 
                                                 
7 The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror:  Freeing the World of Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemical Arms (June 2006).  Blix quotes from Chairman’s Preface, pp. 13-15. 
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over its competitors. 8  Thus, realists would advise carrying a big stick and going it alone, since 
any attempts at multilateral cooperative policies are doomed to fail over the long run. 
 In contrast, liberal institutionalists argue that cooperation among states is possible, 
despite the lack of a world government to enforce agreements.  These scholars argue that states 
are less concerned with relative power gains over potential adversaries and more concerned with 
absolute gains in power.  To capture the potential gains from cooperation, states have created a 
number of institutions and regimes that increase transparency in the international system, lower 
transaction costs, make defection less likely through increased “audience costs”9, make 
reciprocity easier, and allow states to share the burden of providing security for themselves, thus 
freeing resources to be used in other ways.10  This cooperation is possible, theses scholars argue, 
because states take a longer view of the future than realists acknowledge.  States realize that with 
repeated interactions, cooperation is possible, because over time, states are most likely to 
respond with a “tit for tat” strategy – to treat other states as they are themselves are treated.11  
Therefore, if one side cooperates, the most rational and most likely response by the other side is 
to cooperate back.   
Liberal institutionalists also differ from realists in their understanding of power.  While 
realists view power more narrowly in terms of “hard power” (military and economic might), 
liberal institutionalists also look at a state’s “soft power” (a state’s culture, values and 
institutions).  Hard power can be used to incite others to change their positions through 
inducements or threats; in other words, hard power is coercive.  Soft power provides a more 
indirect way for a state to achieve the outcomes it desires by attracting other states to it and 
getting those states to want what it wants.  With soft power, others want to follow it, because 
they admire its values, emulate its example and aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. In 
other words, soft power is co-optive.12
                                                 
8 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Robert Jervis, 
“Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214. 
9 “Audience costs” are the international and domestic political costs that leaders face when they stake their 
reputation or credibility on a particular policy course.  If the leaders change course or back down from 
the policy, their reputation suffers and often leads to negative effects in domestic policies.  
10 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984); Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International 
Organizations, vol. 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 1-27; Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and 
Independence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977);  Keohane and Nye,  
“Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,” International Organization, vol. 25, no. 
3(Summer 1971), pp. 329-349;  Keohane and Nye, “Transgovernmental Relations and International. 
Organizations," World Politics, vol. 27, no 1 (October 1974), pp. 39-62; Keohane and Nye, “Two 
Cheers for Multilateralism” Foreign Policy, no. 60 (Autumn 1985), pp. 148-167; Keohane and Nye, 
“Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And So What?)” Foreign Policy, no. 118 (Spring, 2000), pp. 
104-119; Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security, 
vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51; Martin and Beth Simmons, “Theories and Empirical Studies 
of International Institutions,” International Organization, vol. 52, no. 4 (Autumn, 1998), pp. 729-757. 
11 Kenneth Oye, ed. Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Robert 
Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
12 For a longer discussion of soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 8-10; Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American 
Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), Chapter 2.  Nye builds on what Peter Bachrach and Morton 
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The foundation of US soft power is the values that the United States expresses in its 
culture and projects at home and abroad.  US soft power flows from the classical liberal values 
and institutional structures expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution – 
freedom, tolerance, a respect for an open society, and individual rights and equality before the 
law.  US soft power is embodied in the checks and balances and participatory nature of its 
democratic government and the openness of its market economy.   US soft power is embodied in 
its history as the only nation to win a world war and use its wealth and predominance to rebuild 
the defeated powers as open societies and to create and nurture a network of inclusive 
international institutions, including the United Nations, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the precursor to the World 
Trade Organization.  Most of all, it is embodied in the mythic sense of the United States as “The 
City on the Hill,” a moral beacon and refuge that has drawn people for centuries in search of The 
American Dream.  It is US soft power that is captured in Emma Lazarus’ poem mounted on the 
Statue of Liberty: 
Give me your tired, your poor,  
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,  
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,  
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,  
I lift my lamp beside the golden door! 
 Seen in light of this wider debate about cooperation and power in international relations, 
US nuclear policy can be framed in terms of its effects on US soft power rather than just 
traditional hard power framing.  Obviously, US nuclear policy aims to strengthen US hard 
power, but it also has effects on soft power.  This analysis suggests that US nuclear policy 
undermines US soft power abroad.  Given its status as a nuclear weapons state in the NPT, and 
its commitment in that treaty to eventual disarmament, the United States is faulted by other 
countries when its nuclear policies are perceived to be at odds with this disarmament goal.  For 
example, many states view the United States’ decisions not to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) and to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty to develop a national missile 
defense program – while simultaneously trying to block other states from developing nuclear 
programs – as very hypocritical.  The US hypocrisy is perceived to extend to other policy areas 
as well, including (for example):  agriculture, pharmaceuticals, relations with authoritarian 
leaders, and treatment of detainees. 
Perceptions about all of these US actions have corroded US soft power.  These 
perceptions have made other states – including allies – less inclined to cooperate with the United 
States.  These actions also appear to provide a basis for adversaries and others to call the 
American commitment to freedom and peace into doubt.   In other words, these actions as they 
are perceived abroad appear to demonstrate that the United States believes it is powerful enough 
– and thus exceptional enough – to behave independently of international norms.  As a Pakistani 
                                                                                                                                                 
Baratz called “the second face of power” in “Decisions and Non-decisions: An Analytical Framework,” 
American Political Science Review (September 1963), 632-642. 
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security scholar, Ghazala Yasmin, argued in an article about the US NPR, “The US seems to be 
sending a message across the world – do as we say, not as we do.”13
How important is soft power, anyway?  Given its vast conventional military power, does 
the United States even need soft power?  Some analysts argue that US military predominance is 
both possible and desirable over the long term, and thus soft power is not important.  But a 
growing consensus disagrees.  These analysts argue that soft power is critical for four reasons.  
First, soft power is invaluable for keeping potential adversaries from gaining international 
support, for “winning the peace” in Afghanistan and Iraq, and for convincing moderates to 
refrain from supporting extremist terrorist groups.  Second, soft power helps influence neutral 
and developing states to support US global leadership.  Third, soft power is also important for 
convincing allies and partners to share the international security burden.14  Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, given the increasing interdependence and globalization of the world system, 
soft power is critical for addressing most security threats the United States faces today.  Most 
global security threats are impossible to be countered by a single state alone.  Terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, failed and failing states, conflicts over access 
to resources, are not confined to any one state.  In addition, disease, demographic shifts, 
environmental degradation and global warming will have negative security implications as 
well.15  All of these potential threats share four traits: (1) they are best addressed proactively, 
rather than after they develop into full-blown crises; (2) they require multi-lateral approaches, 
often under the umbrella of an international institution; (3) they are not candidates for a quick 
fix, but rather require multi-year, or multi-decade solutions; and, (4) they are “wicked” problems.  
Given these four traits, soft power is critical for helping to secure the international, multi-lateral 
cooperation that will be necessary to address such threats effectively.  
If soft power is important in today’s security landscape, how important for regaining the 
“moral high ground” and repairing its soft power is a perceived US commitment to the non-
proliferation regime?  How do international actors perceive US nuclear policy and changes to 
that policy?  
Because of the nature of the weapons themselves, United States’ nuclear policy cannot be 
directed at just one actor or group of actors.  Any changes in US nuclear policy will send signals 
to multiple actors in the international system.  The actors most often considered are potential 
adversaries, including emerging peers, rogue states and non-state violent extremists.  However, 
the US posture also sends strong signals to allies, neutrals and other states in the system that may 
be considering acquiring nuclear weapons.  Depending upon its congruence with the NPT 
                                                 
13 Ghazala Yasmin, “Bush Administration’s Nuclear Weapons Policy,” Strategic Studies (Institute of 
Strategic Studies, Islamabad), vol. 24, no. 3 (Autumn 2004), available at 
http://www.issi.org.ok/journal/2004_files/no_3/article/6a.htm. 
14 For example, the United States has been having a difficult time convincing NATO allies to send more 
troops to Afghanistan.  See “Poland to Send 1000 Troops to Aid NATO in Afghanistan,” The New York 
Times (September 15, 2006), p. A10. 
15 Peter Chalk, Non-Military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Violence, Chaos, and Disorder on 
International Security (London: MacMillan, 2000);, Richard Matthew and George Shambaugh, “Sex, 
Drugs, and Heavy Metal,” Security Dialogue, vol. 29(June 1998), pp. 163-175; Michael Klare and 
Daniel Thomas, eds. World Security: Challenges for a New Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1994). 
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(especially Article VI), US nuclear policy also sends signals about US credibility in upholding 
other international agreements and acting as a global leader in international institutions.  Each of 
these reactions occurs simultaneously and interacts with each other, in turn affecting how the US 
responds to those reactions.  The strategic interaction is complex and incredibly difficult to 
model. 
 For example, French President Jacques Chirac’s January 2006 speech, memorializing the 
50th anniversary of French nuclear weapons, provides a glimpse into the complexity of 
addressing multiple international (as well as domestic) audiences simultaneously.  In this speech, 
Chirac suggested France would now target states that support terrorism and states that would 
consider the use of WMD.  The wording was arguably vague, but the speech spawned a variety 
of reactions and created a debate within France itself.  Some observers, especially in Middle 
Eastern states, took this to mean that France is adopting a preventive war doctrine similar to that 
of the Bush Administration.  (Some conservatives in the United States agreed with this 
assessment, arguing that the Muslim riots in Paris suburbs had the same impact on French 
strategic thinking as 9/11 had on the US.)  Observers in Iran took this to mean that they were 
being targeted directly, albeit not by name.  European observers criticized French grandstanding 
and were especially upset about the timing of the speech, given EU attempts to ameliorate the 
Iranian nuclear stand-off with the IAEA.  In short, the speech was perceived differently by 
multiple audiences, and the different reactions fueled further international and domestic debate 
about French nuclear doctrine.16
 
As this example suggests, international reaction to changes in US nuclear policy, and the 
US response to these reactions, are all symptomatic of a “wicked problem.”  From the US 
perspective, we do not understand our “nuclear posture problem” until we have developed a 
solution, yet as we commit to a solution, we are already changing the problem.  This is inherent 
in any strategic interaction.  Yet is it particularly poignant in the nuclear arena, because of the 
“Catch 22” nature of the nuclear weapon decades-long development timeline:  we cannot learn 
about the problem without trying solutions, yet every solution we try is expensive and locks us 
into decades of unintended consequences which are likely to spawn new wicked problems. 
 
Moreover, the US “nuclear posture problem” dovetails into the broader “wicked” 
problem of global WMD proliferation.  As discussed in the introduction, WMD proliferation is 
not a problem that the United States can address effectively alone.  To address this problem 
                                                 
16 For an overview of the debate in many countries and in France, see “Deterrence:  What did Jacques 
Chirac Really Mean?” Voltaire, International Edition (February 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.voltairenet.org; For other articles, see  “Chirac’s nuclear threat,” Arab News (21 January 2006); 
Jamey Keaton, “Update 3:  Chirac Nuclear Comments Draw Ire in Europe,” Associated Press ( January 20, 
2006); Emannuel Serot, “Chirac threatens nuclear weapons against ‘terrorist’ states,” Agence France-
Presse (January 19, 2006); “Iranian envoy reportedly warning West against threatening gestures,” Wiener 
Zeitung (Vienna Austria) (January 20, 2006); “Nuclear warning to ‘rogue’ regimes,” The London Times 
(January 20, 2006), p. 45; Julio Godoy, “Chirac Rattles the Nuclear Sabre,” Paris Inter Press Service 
(January 20, 2006); Ingrid Bazinet and Michel Sailhan, “Chirac’s Nuclear warning a signal to US,” Agence 
France-Press (January 20, 2006);  “Chirac claims right to go nuclear against terrorism,” Deutsche Press-
Agentur  (January 19, 2006); “Iranian speaker calls Chirac’s remarks ‘shame for French nation’,” Deutsche 
Press-Agentur (January 22, 2006); “German defense minister raps Chirac on nuclear threat,” Agence 
France-Presse (January 22, 2006); “Afghanistan cautions on Chirac nuclear threat,” Agence France-Presse 
(January 22, 2006).  
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effectively requires not only other international actors to commit to solving the “problem” with 
us but that they have a similar understanding of what the “problem” is.  This common problem 
definition is not possible when the rest of the world perceives US policies and actions (in the 
nuclear and non-nuclear arenas) as unilateral and hypocritical. As the analysis below will show, 
many international actors even appear to view US policy and actions as one of the contributors 
to the WMD proliferation problem.  In other words, US actions actually affect how other states 
define the problem, and how they define the problem affects what they believe the “right” 
solution is.  The tragic irony is that US nuclear policy and actions, which have the objective of 
trying to “solve” the global proliferation problem, may actually be making other international 
actors feel less secure.  Their increased sense of insecurity lessens international security overall 
and reverberates back to the US as a heightened insecurity as well.   
 After a quick explanation of the methodology of this analysis, the paper will turn to 
international responses to recent changes in US nuclear policy, with the goal of evaluating the 
effect that such policy shifts have had on US soft power, its claim to the moral high ground, and 
its resulting ability to lead non-proliferation efforts around the world. 
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METHODOLOGY 
This section will briefly explain the research design for this paper.  As outlined in the 
introduction, this paper will examine how four actors in the international community responded 
to recent changes in US nuclear policy.  In these changes, I include the allegedly leaked versions 
of the 2001 NPR, the Bush Administration’s decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and the 
decision to ramp up the NMD program.  In addition, where data exist, this paper examines 
responses to RRW and the recent nuclear energy deal between India and the United States.  By 
examining these responses to recent changes, we can see what lessons might be obtained for 
proposed future changes, and thus address the question of how important US nuclear policy is for 
US soft power more generally.   
 This paper examines international responses in four countries – China, Iran, Pakistan and 
Germany.  Such case selection is very appropriate for a first probe into international responses to 
US nuclear policy, for two reasons.  First, the United States perceives these states as falling into 
different categories in the international system, which affects how it relates to each of them.  
They span the spectrum, from the US perspective, from potential adversary to ally.  Second, 
there is significant variation in the nuclear policies of each of these states, both in terms of 
nuclear weapons possession and their status with regard to the NPT. 
 
 The analysis for these four states consisted of an English-language (and, where available, 
German-language) review of the following source types: 
 
• News and media reports from each target state  
• Journal articles and commentaries by scholars, scientists and government officials of each 
target state 
• Public statements by each target state’s government  
• Public opinion polls  
• News and journal articles by international observers about the target states and their 
perceptions of the United States 
 
 Relying on English translations may have limited the information available for the 
analysis, which has the potential to bias the results of the research.  First, as one scholar noted 
with regard to Iran, “The main sources of information for Western media are the statements and 
photographs that come from Iranian state media, or other Western journalists who go to Iran but 
cannot work freely in the face of government controls.”17  A similar remark could be made about 
China and Pakistan, as well.  Furthermore, relying on English translations may have increased 
the propaganda potential of the sources.  Many of these articles may have been deliberately 
constructed for domestic and international audiences.  For example, both the Chinese and Iranian 
governments have cracked down on their respective media such that most published materials 
must support the “party line.” In these cases, the news seems to be designed primarily to shape 
public opinion more than reflect it.  Fortunately, major newspapers in Iran and Pakistan publish a 
large number of articles in English as well as in Farsi and Urdu, facilitating digestion by 
                                                 
17 Khalaji, Mehdi, “Ahmadinezhad’s Popularity One Year On,” Policy Watch No. 1125 (Washington, DC:  
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 20, 2006), available at 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2490
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international sources.  Finally, the number of articles discussing US nuclear policy specifically 
was small, especially when compared with the number dealing with US policy more generally, 
such as current events in the Middle East. 
 
 Despite these limitations, there are reasons to believe the research has not been unduly 
biased or limited by language constraints.  Through the research, we discovered that articles 
written only in Farsi, Mandarin and Urdu, and translated by the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS/Open Source) or BBC Monitoring International Reports, voiced 
attitudes toward the US and its policies similar to those in the English- and German-language 
articles.  The inclusion of journal and newspaper articles about the four countries by international 
observers, some of whom have relied on a more diverse set of sources in the respective native 
languages, may have limited the impact of government-sanctioned propaganda in the analysis.  
These checks provide confidence that the analysis has not been overly biased by the English- and 
German-language research limitation. 
The next four sections of this paper examine the perceptions of the United States and its 
nuclear policy, from the perspective of the four target states.  For each country, the analysis 
proceeds as follows.  First, it briefly outlines the respective state’s general perceptions of the 
United States, followed by an overview of its nuclear policy, where appropriate.  A lengthier 
discussion of each state’s general perceptions of the United States, as well as an overview of its 
foreign policy, is included in the four appendices.  Second, it presents what evidence is available 
about the respective state’s position on US nuclear policies. In this analysis, it examines 
responses to the allegedly leaked versions of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush 
Administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the decision to 
ramp up the National Missile Defense program.  In addition, where data exist, it examines 
responses to the proposed reliable replacement warhead and the recently ratified nuclear energy 
deal between India and the United States.  Finally, teasing out the implications of these responses 
to recent changes in US nuclear policy, the analysis considers potential reactions in the 
respective state to proposals for future changes in US nuclear policy. 
 Admittedly, the empirical analysis in these next four sections is looking at perceptions of 
US nuclear policy out of context.  The very structure of this paper is putting international 
responses to US nuclear policy in a vacuum, even though (as explained above) these other states 
do not look at US nuclear policy that way.  Obviously, focusing exclusively on international 
perceptions of US nuclear policy runs the risk of making nuclear policy look extremely 
important.  Yet, with the space constraints of this paper, it is only possible to look at this one 
issue area.  Therefore, it will be helpful to keep in mind each target state’s general perceptions of 
the United States as much as possible when reading their more specific perceptions of US 
nuclear policy. 
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CHINA 
 
 China is the only state in this analysis that is a declared nuclear weapons state under the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and for this reason, we might expect it would be particularly 
concerned with US nuclear policy.  In general, however, China views US nuclear policy as only 
one small part of the wider bilateral relationship.  As will be explained below, China views its 
own nuclear policy as holding the moral high ground, given its declared no first use (NFU) 
policy, and thus US nuclear policy is often viewed by the Chinese in contrast to the Chinese 
position.  Given its own declared reliance on nuclear weapons for retaliation, China appears to be 
most concerned with US plans for national missile defense, as a functioning NMD system could 
undermine China’s own deterrence posture.  
 
 Admittedly, China’s history of belligerence and suppression of domestic dissent does 
make the Chinese “moral high ground” assertion ring somewhat hollow.  While there is no 
evidence to contradict that China is a “responsible nuclear power,” this could just be propaganda 
written by academics who work for state-run universities.  Moreover, this spin could simply be 
making virtue of necessity, because China does not believe itself to be in a position to challenge 
US predominance at this time.  In other words, the Chinese self perception as the “responsible” 
and “moral” nuclear weapons state, in contrast to the United States, could be conditioned by its 
realpolitik interests.  Yet, even with these caveats, the Chinese perception of the United States as 
hypocritical and unilateral still exists, and that perception still has strategic consequences for the 
bilateral relationship.   
 
Chinese Perceptions of the United States 
 
China holds a realistic view about the United States’ power in the international system.  
Chinese leaders also recognize that their country is still relatively weak by comparison, and thus 
they are willing to accommodate the hegemon – it is a pragmatic strategy that has been paying 
off while China focuses internally on economic development and domestic stability.  Yet the 
prevailing conviction is that the United States is deliberately using its power to destabilize the 
international system, as well as China’s domestic stability and rise to great power status. As 
Singapore scholar Kishore Mahbubani puts it, China realizes that “although there is almost 
nothing that China can do to disrupt the political stability of the United States, the United States 
can do plenty to destabilize China.”18
 
There is a growing conviction among Chinese policymakers that the United States is bent 
on curtailing China’s rise and looking for opportunities to destabilize China.  Observers cite at 
least four examples.  First, many Chinese remain convinced that the US missile attack on the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo War was deliberate.19  Second, Chinese 
leaders view American support of Taiwan as trying to thwart China’s highest foreign policy 
priority – reuniting Taiwan with the mainland.   Even though Washington officially opposes 
Taiwan’s independence and recognizes Taiwan and the mainland as one China, Chinese tend to 
view US policy towards Taiwan with suspicion – especially US arms sales to Taiwan, the 
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promise of protection under the US nuclear umbrella, and the US promise to intervene.20  Third, 
Chinese point to US sanctions of China after the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations in 
Tiananmen Square – as well as more recent American support of dissidents and religious groups, 
such as Falun Gong – as examples of intervening in China’s domestic affairs and upsetting its 
political stability.  Finally, China views US unilateralism in its foreign policy as very dangerous.  
The Chinese were profoundly troubled by the American use of NATO forces to attack Serbia in 
the 1999 Kosovo War, as well as the unilateral US invasion of Iraq in 2003.  In both situations, 
the US effectively bypassed the UN Security Council and intervened in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state. Given its own history of ethnic tensions with Tibetans and the Uighers of 
Xianjiang province, China is upset by the precedence for intervening in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state, fearing that the United States might consider similar actions on behalf of these 
minorities in China. 
 
Nonetheless, Chinese scholars have also noted that there is an upside for China to all of 
the United States’ destabilizing international behavior.  For example, Wang Jisi, the dean of 
Peking University’s School of International Affairs, has argued that the United States’ “soft 
power has been weakened” since 2001, resulting in “international isolation” from allies, Islamic 
countries and other great powers.  He concludes that this is good news for China:  “As long as 
the United States’ image remains tainted, China will have greater leverage in multilateral 
settings.”21  Or as Chong Zi argues, “The resistance against the US-led invasion of Iraq and the 
strong opposition to the war worldwide show us that the Big Stick is not always a magic wand in 
handling the [sic] international conflicts.”22
 
China is transitioning to great power status, and its foreign and nuclear policy is aligned 
with this goal.  In practice, this means that China is focused internally on economic development, 
domestic political security and military modernization, and its external relations are focused on 
helping to achieve this internal transformation.  This priority on internal policies means that 
China appears willing to accommodate the United States, as it realizes that a good working 
relationship with the US is important for its domestic focus.   To reduce widespread 
apprehension about the potential impact of China’s “rise,” Beijing has also engaged in a wide 
range of multilateral activities designed to demonstrate that China is a “responsible” member of 
the international community.   
  .   
China is intent on achieving great power status, but has a long-term strategy to avoid 
having its rise prove overly costly or contentious.23  The Chinese recognize that the United 
States currently has a preponderance of conventional and nuclear military power and so view 
direct confrontation with the US as ill-advised, if not suicidal.24  There is a widespread belief 
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among the Chinese elite that the arms race is what caused the Soviet Union to collapse and they 
are keen to avoid a similar fate. 25   Chinese leaders are eager to emphasize moderation and 
accommodation with the United States while preserving their core interests, because they 
recognize China as a relatively weak power vis-à-vis the US at this time.26  There appears to be a 
consensus within the Chinese foreign policy elite, military as well as civilian, that a good 
working relationship with the US is essential.  It provides flexibility and it has worked.27  As 
Wang Jisi has written, 
 
The United States is currently the only country with the capacity and the ambition 
to exercise global primacy…this means that the United States is the country that 
can exert the greatest strategic pressure on China….Yet the United States is a 
global leader in economics, education, culture, technology and science.  China, 
therefore, must maintain a close relationship with the US if its modernization 
efforts are to succeed.28
 
Chinese Nuclear Policy 
 
Turning more specifically to Chinese nuclear policy, China has a strategy of what 
Americans would call “minimal deterrence” or “minimum deterrence,” with nuclear forces to be 
used in retaliation only.  China views itself as taking the moral high ground in the realm of 
nuclear weapons, and often refers to itself as “the responsible nuclear weapons state.”  This 
“responsible” self-identity appears frequently in contrast to the United States, which is set up as 
the “irresponsible” foil.   
 
Chinese nuclear weapons are an important part of China’s foreign policy, albeit primarily 
as defensive weapons to prevent undue foreign pressure or influence.  This limited role for 
nuclear weapons has held true for the last several decades.  The Chinese are quick to assert that 
they decided to acquire nuclear weapons only as a response to repeated US and Soviet attempts 
to blackmail them with the possibility of nuclear attack.  Under Mao, China realized that it 
needed a nuclear retaliatory capability to maintain freedom of action.  In Mao’s words, “we must 
have this thing if we don’t want to be bullied by others.”29  Nuclear weapons are viewed as 
primarily a political instrument to be used at the level of grand strategy, not as a tool for actually 
winning military operations.  The military and political doctrines governing the use of nuclear 
force and preparation for nuclear conflict focus on prevention of and response to nuclear 
aggression, but there do not appear to be any plans for actually winning a nuclear battle.  
Although information on Chinese plans and intentions are inherently limited by the lack of 
transparency, uncertainty about the size and placement of China’s nuclear arsenal is considered 
critical to effectiveness of their retaliatory threat.  Nonetheless, China has always maintained a 
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small arsenal, focusing much of its research on ensuring a small, but survivable, second-strike 
capability.30 (Unofficial estimates of the Chinese arsenal were recently downgraded to 130 
operational warheads, with an additional 70 in storage.31)  China is modernizing and expanding 
its nuclear arsenal, but most Chinese scholars argue that this is not to acquire an offensive 
capability but rather to improve obsolete weapons in order to maintain the current nuclear 
balance.32
 
China views itself as taking the moral high ground in renouncing the policies of 
deterrence and extended deterrence (a nuclear umbrella over allies).  The Chinese draw a 
distinction between “Western deterrence” and their policy of nuclear retaliation.  One scholar at 
a university in Shanghai explained that this is partially due to the aggressive meaning of the 
Chinese characters used to translate the word “deterrence.”  But China sees its policy as purely 
defensive, and thus always had a no-first-use (NFU) policy and a policy of no-use against a non-
nuclear weapons state.  While a stated NFU policy could easily be overridden during a crisis, the 
vast majority of scholars and officials interviewed by Joanne Tompkins in 2002 “rejected the 
possibility of ever abandoning the pledge because they feel it gives China a great deal of political 
capital in the international community.”33
 
China’s nuclear policy has been remarkably consistent since it became a nuclear weapon 
state in 1964.  This policy has consisted of five points: no first use (NFU); security assurance to 
non-nuclear states and promotion of nuclear free zones; limited development of second-strike 
capabilities; opposition to extraterritorial weapons deployment; and, advocacy of complete 
nuclear disarmament.34  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 
affirms that China remains committed to the “complete prohibition of and thorough destruction 
of nuclear weapons.”  China has also signed a variety of protocols for nuclear weapons free 
zones in different regions and issued guarantees to specific countries, such as Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan, to get them to sign onto such agreements.35   
 
China has also committed itself to international arms control and non-proliferation 
regimes.  It has ratified the NPT and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and agreed to adhere to 
the basic tenets of the Missile Technology Control Regime.  In 1996, China unilaterally adopted 
a moratorium on nuclear testing and was one of the strongest supporters and first signatories of 
the CTBT.  Although the CTBT was submitted for ratification in 1999, the National People’s 
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Congress has not yet done so.36 (Despite this, China has begun construction of 12 International 
Monitoring System stations and has been active on the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT.37)  
China strongly opposes militarization of space and missile defense systems because it claims the 
resulting shift in the global strategic balance will lead to arms races, including a nuclear weapons 
race.  It sought to include language in the 2005 review of the NPT that would condemn missile 
defense programs38 and put pressure on the United States and Russia to drastically reduce their 
nuclear arsenals.39  China sees itself as upholding international non-proliferation agreements 
better than the other declared nuclear weapons states, and sees its NFU policy as coming closest 
to meeting the “spirit” of the NPT.  Perhaps for this reason, in response to North Korea’s recent 
nuclear test, China has even said it would support appropriate “punitive actions” against its 
isolated ally, which is a harsher step than it has been willing to take in the past.40  
 
China self-identifies as a “responsible” nuclear weapons state with a defensive nuclear 
posture and a commitment to international non-proliferation objectives.  As Chinese Vice 
Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui has argued, China’s policy in this regard “is consistent, firm and 
definitely not of an expedient nature.”41  This identity is often created in opposition to their 
perception of US behavior and policy.  For example, Pan Zhenqiang, a Chinese National Defense 
University professor, has argued that  
 
China is the most responsible nuclear weapons state while the United States is 
perhaps the least responsible.  Note the following facts: 
• China has consistently been self-committed to NFU, while the US has 
consistently rejected it even in the post Cold War era when it enjoyed 
unprecedented conventional capability. 
• China has offered negative security assurances to all the non-nuclear 
weapons states, while the US threatens to use nuclear weapons against 
states if it feels threatened by …weapons of mass destruction. 
• China has never deployed its nuclear weapons abroad while the US still 
deploys tactical nuclear weapons on the soil of European allies … 
• China has called for effective measures to prevent the weaponization of 
outer space, while the US has refused even to discuss the matter lest it 
hinder its efforts to develop missile defense and a new space capability for 
military purposes. 
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• China has urged the international community to strengthen the 
international non-proliferation regime through a multi-lateral cooperative 
and comprehensive approach, including the fulfillment of balanced 
obligations by all member states as stipulated in the NPT, while US non-
proliferation policy is characterized by unilateralism, a disdain of 
international organizations and double standards.42  
 
Similarly, echoing the theme of the US as the “destabilizing hegemon,” Chinese Col. Yao 
Yungzhu – who teaches at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science and translated China’s 2004 
National Defense white paper into English – has argued that if the US and other nuclear weapons 
states  
 
…want to share some regional and global security, peace and stability, they have 
to share a certain degree of insecurity first.  And that means accepting some 
vulnerability by pledging to a NFU policy, so as to form a multilateral deterrent 
relationship among the ‘haves’ and offering more security assurance to the ‘have 
nots’.43
 
In sum, Chinese scholars agree that China’s NFU policy is important for China’s 
international reputation, because – as Chinese scholar Shen Dingli argues – “it provides China 
with a less immoral image among all nuclear weapons states…. The NFU divides the ‘nuclear 
haves’ into two classes: a more moral group with no-first-use policies and a less moral group 
with first-use or conditional no-first-use,” and China is the only declared NWS in the first 
category.44  Or as Western scholar Bruce Blair concludes, China “set an example of moderation 
and prudence on the moral high ground, and seemingly proved its theory that small defensively 
oriented arsenals at once provided deterrence, reassurance and stability.”45
 
Chinese Reactions to US Nuclear Policy 
 
 Given its self-identity as the “responsible” nuclear weapons state, China’s discourse 
about US nuclear policy has focused on the perception of double standards, as well as the 
inferred increase in the role of nuclear weapons in US security policy.  China’s largest concern 
appears to be US plans to build national missile defense, as this creates the greatest risk for 
China’s policy of minimal deterrence.  Nonetheless, official Chinese reaction to US nuclear 
policy has been relatively mild, probably because China does not want to jeopardize its focus on 
internal policies like economic development.   
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The US Decision to Withdraw from the ABM Treaty and Build National Missile Defense 
 
 China has expressed strong opposition to the US decision to withdraw from the ABM 
Treaty and build a national missile defense program.  In China’s view, NMD would no doubt 
cause a reduction in China’s deterrent effects against US nuclear use.  China’s concerns about 
the treaty withdrawal and NMD are related, although the criticisms highlight different things. 
 
 Chinese scholars and officials have depicted the US decision to withdraw from the ABM 
Treaty as a “destabilizing action” that will encourage regional arms races.  Moreover, they view 
the ABM Treaty withdrawal decision as another example of US willingness to ignore or structure 
international arms control agreements for its own strategic interests, as with the decision not to 
ratify the CTBT and the 2002 Moscow Treaty.46  Indeed, some Chinese analysts believe China 
was duped into signing the CTBT before the US initiated its missile defense programs.47  
 
  Regarding the parallel to the Moscow Treaty, while Chinese experts in Shanghai view 
this as a positive step towards global arms control, the Beijing national security community holds 
a more cynical view.  They dismiss it as “merely symbolic with no substantial meaning” because 
it does not reduce the nuclear arsenals irreversibly, but merely “rearranges” them.   As Jin Yinan 
notes, “The motivation for this was very clear:  If one day they required them, these withdrawn 
nuclear warheads and their launch vehicles could be brought back at any time and redeployed.”48 
Tompkins argues that the Beijing community was quick to criticize the Treaty “for being only 
500 words long; for containing no destruction or verification clauses; and for stretching the 
timeline for the reductions so far as to make them insignificant.”49  Some scholars have also 
suggested that Russia got the poor end of the bargain, because it will not have the capacity to 
store the excess weapons, as the US can.50
 
Most importantly, from the Chinese viewpoint, the “real reason” for US withdrawal from 
the ABM Treaty is that it opens the way for the US to begin the weaponization of space, not to 
pursue a missile defense program as the Bush Administration has claimed.  As Tompkins 
discovered in her interviews with Chinese officials, some Chinese analysts believe this will give 
the United States “the ability to control the whole world through collection and control of 
economic information.”51  Beijing scholars also point to the Rumsfeld Commission Report on 
the organization of space and reports from American think tanks as reinforcing their suspicion 
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that the Bush Administration seeks the broader goal of controlling space.52  As a commentary in 
the Beijing paper Jienfangjun Bao argued, 
 
It is no exaggeration to say that today, outer space is full of smoke from 
gunpowder.  The increasingly aggravating arms race in outer space will inevitably 
lead to the use of outer space for military purposes on a large scale….When the 
weaponization of outer space develops to a certain degree, the missile defense 
system of the superpower will reach a perfect degree, and will form a ‘heaven 
shield’ in real terms.  Then it will be freer to launch a war whenever and wherever 
it likes.53
 
 Turning specifically to national missile defense, Chinese analysts and officials have 
focused on four criticisms.  First, observers have argued that if US national missile defense 
works, it would radically shift the strategic balance and the nuclear deterrent would be severely 
weakened.  Since China’s current nuclear strategy relies on survivable retaliatory capability, the 
fact that a US missile defense system could eliminate a Chinese second strike means that China 
could be completely defeated.  As Col. Yao has argued, “This very defensive shield – when used 
against the only flying dagger the opponent throws at it before taking the deadly blow – would 
be very offensive in nature…China has to think how to maintain a guaranteed retaliatory second 
strike capability in the face of a US BMD [ballistic missile defense] system.”54  Zhu Feng argues 
that US national missile defense is “an out-and-out Cold War mentality” that undermines 
international arms control and the positive direction of US-Russian nuclear disarmament.55
 
 Second, the Chinese are convinced that US NMD is targeted at them.  Tompkins argues 
that “very few Chinese scholars interviewed believe US assurances that the missile defense 
system is not targeted at China.  At best, they maintain, this is merely a declaratory policy that 
can be reversed at will.”56  The Chinese point out that North Korea does not have enough long-
range missiles to warrant a system that has 100 interceptors.  The Americans are spending too 
much money to build a system aimed just at Pyongyang and other rogue states.  As an editorial 
in the Beijing paper Xiandai Guoji Guanxi notes, “The number of interceptor missiles to be 
deployed in the first batch is exactly the same number of strategic missiles it thinks China may 
have.”57  Moreover, after North Korea’s unsuccessful Taepodong-2 missile tests in July 2006, 
Qiu Yongzheng argued that the United States “can no longer use the ‘DPRK long-range missile 
threat’ as an excuse” for building NMD.58
 
Third, China is also sensitive to any missile defense systems covering Taiwan, which the 
Chinese perceive as potentially emboldening the Taiwanese separatist movement. As Yao 
argues, even a limited missile shield “would relieve Americans of possible Chinese nuclear 
retaliation, permitting them to intervene more readily…it could encourage Taiwan to take more 
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provocative moves…[and] would signify semi-alliance relationship” between Taiwan and the 
US.59   Similarly, Shanghai scholar Chen Hongshou argues that this is creating a “paramilitary 
alliance” between the US and Taiwan.60  Tompkins also found in her interviews that some 
analysts view the transfer of advanced missile capabilities to Taiwan as a “form of foreign 
intervention” in China.61  Similarly, China has felt threatened by the possibility of a future joint 
deployment of missile defense between the US and Japan.  For example, some Chinese observers 
argue this is a way for Japan to increase its regional hegemony and become the “Far East 
England” with a tighter alliance with the United States.62  Overall, the US joint development and 
deployment of theater missile defenses with its East Asian allies “will inevitably lead” to missile 
proliferation in the region.63
 
 Finally, Chinese observers see significant parallels between China’s current situation and 
the Soviet overreaction to the US Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars).  As noted above, 
China attributes the fall of the Soviet Union to the arms race that was prompted by the Soviet 
response to the Star Wars program.  Therefore, many Chinese observers view the US national 
missile defense program as a trick to convince China to spend more on defense and thus 
bankrupt China as it did the Soviet Union in the 1980s.64  As a commentary in the Beijing paper 
Jienfangjun Bao argued, “a new arms race cannot be avoided…[and] a space arms race based on 
high technology will require huge amounts of money.”65  Or the commentary in the Beijing 
paper Xiandai Guoji Guanxi opined, 
 
This will undoubtedly trigger off another round of the arms race.  This will fit in 
exactly with the United States’ wishes.  Some US strategists believe it was the 
arms race deliberately evoked by the US in the cold war period and especially the 
“Star Wars Plan” launched by the Reagan Administration in he 1980s that lured 
the Soviet Union into spending huge amounts of money on the endless arms race 
with the United States which caused the economic collapse and political 
disintegration of the Soviet Union.  Now, the United States wants to play the same 
trick. 66
 
Chinese observers in this group point to the fact that NMD will not work, because US testing has 
not simulated realistic scenarios and that tests from 1999-2005 had “elements of false claims” in 
their list of successful hits.67  The Chinese media have also reported extensively about European 
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criticism of the US NMD system, especially its technical problems.68  Therefore, they argue, 
China should not invest large resources to counter the system.   
 
Without question, the US national missile defense program is having a significant impact 
on the internal Chinese debate about modernizing China’s nuclear arsenal.  While the majority of 
scholars and government and military leaders favor maintaining the status quo of minimal 
deterrence, there is a small minority that advocates ignoring the changing strategic environment 
and an even smaller minority that is arguing for a massive push towards parity with the United 
States.69  Although this last group is quite small, and may even be discounted as the radical 
fringe, it has become increasingly vocal in the past few years.  For example, Shen Dingli of 
Shanghai’s Fudan University has vehemently advocated expanding China’s nuclear deterrent and 
abandoning the NFU policy.70   
 
Despite these public comments by a handful of leaders, the prevailing strategy remains 
one of minimal deterrence.  China openly opposed the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and 
has continued to express muted concern about the policy shift towards building national missile 
defense, but has done very little to try to balance the deterrence ledger.  Official reaction has 
been mild.71  Despite this seemingly vital threat, China did not take drastic steps, such as a crash 
course in missile development or even preemptive action against the US or its allies.  Instead, 
China appears to have acknowledged its dependence on the US for accomplishing its domestic 
economic development goals, and decided that the ability to accomplish internal goals is more 
important.  As the Chinese proverb suggests, “when you are weak, swallow your bitter medicine 
and prepare to be strong.” 
 
The 2002 US Nuclear Policy Review and 2001 National Security Strategy 
 In its response to the NPR, the Chinese government accused the United States of “nuclear 
blackmail” and vowed not to bow to foreign nuclear threats.72  The Chinese Foreign Ministry 
also demanded that the United States provide an explanation of its targeting policy.73  Some 
Western analysts, like Joanne Tompkins, argue that Chinese believe the NPR was only a “think 
piece” and thus not representative of official US doctrine.74  Nevertheless, the NPR generated a 
lot of commentary in the Chinese press, and due to space constraints, only a small sampling can 
be included here. Chinese concerns with the NPR appeared to focus on five things.   
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 First, China believes the NPR represents a fundamental change in the principles guiding 
US use of nuclear weapons.  Specifically, Chinese argue that the NPR raises the profile of 
nuclear weapons by lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use, creating new war-fighting 
roles for the weapons and advocating the development of new types of weapons.  They argue 
that the new weapons under consideration will blur the line between conventional and nuclear 
weapons.  As Chinese commentator Xin Benjian argues, the NPR  
 
not only regarded nuclear weapons as instruments for making diplomatic threats 
and launching ‘preemptive strike’, but also lowered the threshold for the use of 
nuclear weapons, with the result that the likelihood of the United States 
using…nuclear weapons in future war has greatly increased.75    
 
On another occasion, Xin argued more pointedly that the NPR elevated US “nuclear strategy 
from deterrence to actual deployment.”76  Similarly, Tang Shiping, at the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, asserts that the NPR “shows clearly that there have always been some figures in 
the United States that believe that nuclear weapons are not just for strategic deterrence, they are 
also for tactical use.” As a result, he continues, “possibly mankind is not moving farther away 
from a nuclear doomsday, but rather closer and closer.”77
 
Second, there is concern that the NPR undermines international arms control agreements 
and non-proliferation goals.78  As Tompkins concluded from her interviews of Chinese officials 
and analysts in the summer of 2002, “The Chinese feel there can be no realistic expectation of 
nuclear disarmament as long as the US government continues to place such importance on 
nuclear weapons…The aggressive posture outlined in the NPR was seen as sending a message 
that the US places little value on foreign lives.”79  As Liu Changhong quipped, “If a country 
finds itself unwelcome to Washington, what is the first thing it may do? Go get nuclear 
weapons!”80  Thus, argues Shi Yinhong, a professor at the Chinese People’s University, the NPR 
leads to a “near subversion of the international arms control system.”81  Similarly, Zhou Rong 
argues that 
 
This change in US nuclear strategy has severely poisoned the international 
political atmosphere.  It has made the United Nations and all other international 
organizations which protect world peace look pale and weak.  It also encourages 
certain regional powers which are appendages to the United States to wreak havoc 
and run wild with arrogance.  And what is most serious of all is that it will leave 
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many countries without a sense of security, thus leading to more and more 
countries researching, developing and testing nuclear weapons.82
 
Third, some Chinese commentators viewed the combination of the NPR with the US 
National Security Strategy as extremely aggressive.  Coupled with the preemption doctrine in the 
US National Security Strategy, they argue the NPR revealed a “totally different rationale” for the 
weapons, because “it contemplates their actual use on the same terms as conventional 
weapons.”83  For example, Chen Zhou, a researcher at the Academy of Military Sciences, argues 
that the NPR and the NSS can only mean “the US is seeking absolute superiority rather than 
absolute security.”84  Similarly, Hu Hsin argues that “the pursuit of unilateralism has always 
been regarded by the United States as the ideal international order following the Cold War,” and 
these policies allow the US to achieve that pursuit.  In his view, the NPR “only sought to carry 
out the doctrine of ‘preemptive action’ in the context of nuclear strikes; now the Bush 
government wants to apply this to conventional warfare” as well.85   Chinese commentator Gu 
Guolinang suggests that the real reason the United States is pursuing this policy is that 
“Americans harbor an exceptional superiority complex, they feel they should have technological 
superiority and that they should unilaterally exercise ‘freedom of action.”86  Or, as Mei Zhou, 
expressed it more tersely:  the United States wants to be a “nuclear overlord.”87
 
Fourth, Chinese critics of the NPR believe the policy increases the likelihood of resumed 
nuclear tests, especially because it outlines the need for a shorter time to prepare for a test 
resumption.88  As noted above, China has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty but has not 
yet ratified it, largely because of the US Senate’s rejection of the treaty in 1999.  Some in the 
Chinese government support ratification because China has already stopped testing and could 
claim the moral high ground on this global arms control issue.  Others, however, argue 
ratification would prevent China from resuming testing in response to a new round of US tests. A 
growing number of Chinese analysts believe that the US will start testing again to develop a new 
generation of nuclear weapons, as outlined in the NPR.89  As Evan Madeiros and Jing-dong 
Yuan argue, “If the US resumes testing, China will almost certainly follow suit.”90  (Indeed, 
much of the recent discussion in China about the US Reliable Replacement Warhead program 
has focused on this issue.  As Fan Jishe, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Science, 
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has argued, RRW “would probably lead to a new round of arms race,” because “experiments will 
have to be carried out for testing before the warheads are generally loaded.”91) 
 
Finally, China was alarmed to see Taiwan listed as a contingency for possible nuclear 
use.92  According to the allegedly leaked versions of the NPR, a military confrontation over the 
status of Taiwan is one of the scenarios that could lead Washington to use nuclear weapons 
against China.93  Beijing has long suspected that the US has nuclear targeting and contingency 
planning aimed at China; as Tompkins notes, many Chinese experts “acknowledge[e] that this 
has been the case for many years.”94  (As a commentary in Shanghai’s Jiefang Ribao argued 
about China’s place on the NPR target list, “the China threat theory has once again staged a 
comeback in US political and economic circles” because the United States “has suffered from 
‘enemy deficiency syndrome.’”95)  Yet, they were very surprised to see Taiwan listed as a 
scenario.  This reinforces Chinese concerns about a high likelihood of US military intervention 
in the event that China uses force to resolve the Taiwan issue.96  As Chinese scholar Qiu Huafei 
argued, the NPR 
 
…implied that if a war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, the United States will not 
rule out the possibility of employing nuclear weapons.  The US has also attempted 
to place Taiwan under the protection of its Theater Missile Defense system.  After 
this nuclear umbrella is established, it will great reduce China’s proper function in 
strategic nuclear deterrence.97
 
Similarly, Wang Weixing argues that “the United States plays a very bad role” in this situation:  
“No matter what the true US intention is, ‘pro-Taiwan independence’ elements believe that the 
United States has opened a strong ‘nuclear umbrella’ for them.  This will undoubtedly have a 
strong provocative effect.”98  Chinese scholar Yao Yunzhu was even more pointed in his 
criticisms.  In his view, “nuclear weapons ha[ve] no role to play in civil war scenarios” (as China 
views the Taiwan situation to be).  Indeed, he argues, “so far, China has never – in any 
government statements or official documents – threatened nuclear use in the cross-strait 
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conflict…The issue of Taiwan has forced the Chinese to face up to the possibility of military 
conflict with the United States…. However, such conflict should have been assumed nuclear-
irrelevant, but for the issuance” of the NPR. 
 
Partly in response to the leaked US policy, in a discussion about a hypothetical conflict 
over Taiwan, People’s Liberation Army Major General Zhu Chenghu warned in July 2005 that 
“if the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition [sic] on the target zone on 
China’s territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons.” 99 The US Defense 
Department noted in its 2006 annual report to Congress that “this is not the first time Zhu, or 
others, have threatened the United States with nuclear strikes in the context of conflict of 
Taiwan.”100  Some China scholars in the United States argue that Western journalists 
misconstrued Zhu’s comment and that it was simply intended as a warning about Taiwan’s 
importance for China.101  Pan Zhenqiang, the professor at the PLA’s National Defense 
University, agreed and argued that this is simply another case of American media overreaction, 
echoing the general Chinese perceptions of the US as “destabilizing hegemon” and 
“irresponsible” nuclear weapons state. 
 
Why so much fuss abut this small event?  The answer may be that there are 
people in the United States who are only too willing to see the dark side of China.  
What they forget is that, to date, China so far has been the only acknowledged 
nuclear weapon state that solemnly maintains a commitment to NFU.  Why do so 
few criticize the first-use policy of other nuclear weapons states in the Western 
media?...Is there a double standard regarding nuclear weapons policy for different 
countries, particularly for China?102
 
Other scholars argue that the comments were “motivated by a frustration – widely felt by civilian 
and military analysts – at American unilateralism demonstrated in the post 9/11 era.”103  
Following international criticism of the comment, the Chinese government formally disavowed 
General Zhu’s remarks, stating that they reflected a personal opinion and that China continues to 
adhere to its no-first use policy.104   
 
The US-India Nuclear Deal 
 
There has been relatively little written about the Chinese reaction to the US-India nuclear 
deal.  Understandably, as the “responsible nuclear weapons state,” the official Chinese 
government response has focused on the implications of the deal for the NPT.  As the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry has said, “China hopes that activities some countries conduct in peaceful use of 
                                                 
99 Austin Ramzy and Joyce Huang, “China Goes Ballistic,” Time International (July 25, 2005), p. 17. 
100 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic 
of China 2006, pp. 1-2. 
101 Interview with Kristen Gunness, Center for Naval Analyses, July 22, 2006; Blair, “General Zhu and 
Chinese Nuclear Preemption,” p. 17. 
102 Pan, “China Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 8. 
103Eric Hagt and Chen Yali, “Editor’s Notes: Opening the Debate on US-China Nuclear Relations,” China 
Security, no. 1 (Autumn 2005), pp. 2-3. 
104 Yao, “Chinese Nuclear Policy,” footnote 11. 
 40
nuclear energy are conducive to maintaining the authoritativeness and effectiveness of the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) mechanism.”105   
 
In addition to the concern about the future of the NPT, “unofficial” responses have 
focused on two things.  First, Chinese commentators have discussed the double standard of the 
US placing its own strategic interests ahead of global non-proliferation concerns.  For example, 
Hu Shisheng commented in the official English-language China Daily, 
 
The United States' making an exception to accommodate India, driven by geo-
political considerations, has, however, sent repercussions through the 
international non-proliferation infrastructure.  The double standards will very 
likely complicate the nuclear issues of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea all the more.  Moreover, US-Indian nuclear co-operation might 
encourage other nuclear powers to have nuclear co-operation with their partners, 
which might trigger a chain reaction of nuclear-technology proliferation.  Now the 
international community is presented with a big question: How can the 
effectiveness and binding power of the non-proliferation system be guaranteed?106
 
Fu Xiaoqiang, a researcher at the China Institutes of Contemporary Relations, struck a similar 
theme in the World News Journal: “The US sacrificed the international non-proliferation system 
to pull a potential ally over to its side.  This will seriously damage the current system…will 
cause more confrontation between the US and the Islamic world….[and] will provoke a new 
arms race in South Asia.”107  Or, as the pro-PRC Chinese language Macau Daily News remarked 
in an editorial: “Such an agreement will obviously undermine the efforts of stopping the 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons because the US has adopted a double standard in dealing 
with the Indian nuclear issues and Iran or the DPRK nuclear issues.”108
 
 Second, the Chinese perceive the purpose of the US-India nuclear deal to balance against 
China.  As Tang Yong and Chen Jihui suggested in the official Communist Party international 
news publication Global Times, “India has the strategic potential to balance China.  This is the 
main motive [of the nuclear deal]…Using India to balance China is far more important to the US 
than the India-Pakistan balance.”109  Similarly, Yu Shengjun argued that the nuclear deal “is due 
to mutual geo-political interests and needs:  stabilizing South Asia and balancing China…The 
China factor is the main reason behind Bush’s visit to India.”110
                                                 
105 “China hopes peaceful use of nuclear energy conducive to NPT mechanism,” Xinhua News Agency 
(March 2, 2006); “China hopes US-India nuclear cooperation abides by non-proliferation rules,” Xinhua 
News Agency (July 29, 2006). 
106 Hu Shisheng, “Strategic Gains at Heart of Bush South Asia Trip,” China Daily (March 7, 2006), 
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-03/07/content_527458.htm.  Also see 
Yuan Ying Dong, “Beijing Still Quiet on US India Deal,” Taipei Times(March 16, 2006), available at 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2006/03/16/2003297653.   
107 Fu Xiaoqiang, ‘What’s the Major Compromise of US Diplomacy?” Shijie Xinwenbao (World News 
Journal) (March 6, 2006). 
108 “US-India Agreement Sets a Bad Example,” Macau Daily News (March 4, 2006). 
109 Tang Yong and Chen Jihui, “Bush’s Visit Consolidates South Asian Strategy,” Huanqiu Shibao (Global 
Times) (March 6, 2006). 
110 Yu Shengjun, “Bush’s Trip to India has Created a Geo-Political Earthquake,” Guoji Xianqu Daobao 
(International Herald Leader) (March 2, 2006). 
 41
 
International academic consensus seems to be that the US-India nuclear deal may not be 
overly threatening to China, but is not a pleasant development. 111  While there has not been an 
overt response, there is concern that one may still be coming.  For example, “beyond supporting 
its Pakistani proxy, China may also choose to fortify its nuclear arsenal, potentially prompting a 
regional arms rivalry.”112  It appears China has been assisting Pakistan increase its nuclear 
arsenal by cooperating in the construction of a heavy water reactor at Khushab.113  However, this 
project began in 2000 and Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan has been stepped up since April 
2004, so this is not necessarily a response to the new US-Indian relationship.114
China’s Potential Reactions to Proposed Future Changes in US Nuclear Policy 
 As this analysis has suggested, China views US nuclear policy within the larger context 
of the bilateral relationship between the two countries.  China views itself as a rising power that 
needs to maintain a good working relationship with the United States to accomplish its internal 
objectives.  US nuclear policy plays only a very small role in that wider relationship.  US nuclear 
policy appears to matter in two ways.  First, because China styles itself as “the responsible 
nuclear weapons state,” US nuclear policy provides a convenient foil to help make China’s case 
in the international community.  Second, China appears to be concerned most by national missile 
defense, which has the potential to completely undermine China’s retaliatory capability. 
 
Therefore, if China’s reactions to the recent changes in US nuclear policy are any guide, 
China appears unwilling to divert resources to a nuclear arms race it does not believe is desirable 
or winnable.  China is much more interested in developing its economy than attempting to reach 
nuclear parity.  The guiding logic behind Chinese policy has remained very stable over the last 
several decades and it is not likely that minor changes in the US posture would effect a radical 
shift, when the massive arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States during the 
Cold War did not.  For this reason, it appears very unlikely that development of low-yield, earth-
penetrating or other smaller nuclear weapons by the United States would induce a major shift in 
Chinese strategic thinking.   The one exception to this might be that China would reconsider its 
commitment to the moratorium on nuclear testing. 
 
 
IRAN 
 
 Much has been written trying to decipher the Iranian motivation and intent to acquire and 
use nuclear technology.  Fewer scholars, if any, have looked at the view from Iran looking back 
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at the US and its nuclear policies.  This analysis shows that Iran’s perception of the US nuclear 
posture is inseparable from its view of all other US international policies.  Iran has felt 
victimized and persecuted by the US and its allies since its 1979 Revolution resulted in the 
countries’ global economic and diplomatic isolation.  More recently, US policies in the Middle 
East – including the campaign against Iran’s own nuclear program – have aggravated Iran’s 
perception of the US as untrustworthy, a security threat, and as a specifically anti-Iranian 
troublemaker.  Iran thus views the US nuclear posture through this lens of persecution.  US 
nuclear policies are seen as hypocritical and a permanent threat to Iran’s security.   
 
Iranian Perceptions of the United States 
 
 Iranian perceptions of the United States are colored by the country’s historic political and 
economic humiliation and isolation.  Multiple betrayals by the US, England, Germany, and 
Russia throughout the 20th Century have been well-characterized by scholars.115  This history 
contributes to an Iranian government perception of the United States as a betrayer, an 
untrustworthy regional bully and as a specifically anti-Iranian troublemaker.  In contrast, the 
Iranian people have generally been more supportive of the United States and American culture 
and democratic values, yet they also felt shunned and disappointed after the United States 
ignored Iran’s offer of assistance after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
 
  In characterizing the US as a betrayer, Iranians generally point to three things.  First, the 
Islamic Iranian government perceives the US as having propped up the regime of Shah 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, against the wishes of the people, in order to have access to Iranian oil.   
The Islamic Republic of Iran perceives that it has been shunned by the US since its accession to 
power during the 1979 Revolution when the Shah was overthrown.  Second, the US influenced 
its European allies to withdraw support for Iran’s (ostensibly) civilian nuclear power program.  
Third, during Iran’s war with Iraq from 1980-1988, , the US supported Iraq overtly and covertly; 
much of Iran’s military was purchased from the US and their ability to fight atrophied in part 
from lack of access to spare and replacement parts.116   Iran believes that the US and its allies 
sanctioned Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons against Iranians during the war, in 
violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.117
 
 Iran perceives the United States as “interventionist” in the Middle East, and feels the US 
presence there is destabilizing for the region and particularly for Iran’s security.  Iran feels 
especially threatened by US support for Israel, and gets a great deal of political mileage from 
highlighting this support of the “Zionist” regime. 118
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In addition to the historical betrayals and regional security threat that they believe the US 
poses in the Middle East, Iranians are especially offended by what they perceive to be selected 
targeting by American rhetoric and policy.  For example, despite Iran’s offer of assistance 
following 9/11 and Iran’s cooperation during the 2001 Afghanistan campaign against the 
Taliban, President Bush put Iran on the “axis of evil” list.119  Since then, President Bush has 
designated Iran as a “rogue state” based primarily on its support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon and 
its “civilian” nuclear program.  Iranian media deem Bush’s theory “obnoxious.”120  Thus, the 
US-led campaign to discredit and eliminate the “legal” and independent Iranian nuclear power 
program becomes not a facet of US nuclear policy abroad, but a symptom of a larger anti-Iranian 
attitude.  The US rhetoric regarding the Iranian nuclear program is seen merely as “propaganda” 
aimed to undermine Iran.   
 
Given its history of humiliation, betrayal and isolation, it is not surprising that the review 
of source literature showed Iran’s sense of voicelessness in the international community.  Thus, 
one of Iran’s major foreign policy goals appears to be gaining voice in the international 
community and resuming its “rightful” place as regional hegemon in the Middle East.  This quest 
for hegemony is driven by the desire to force Western (US) power out of the region and to 
establish a more “natural” regional balance that extends Iranian influence.  Iran does not believe 
that regional security and stability are possible as long as the United States retains a military 
presence in the Persian Gulf, and thus has promoted regional security cooperation under UN 
auspices, to minimize US influence.121   
 
Iranian Nuclear Policy 
 
This desire for regional and global respect appears to be a major motivation for the 
Iranian government’s belief in its right to develop nuclear technology.  Although the Iranian 
regime has publicly disavowed any interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, their exposed 
clandestine actions may suggest that acquiring nuclear weapons is indeed its objective.  There 
are three reasons why acquiring nuclear weapons would make sense for the Iranian regime.  
First, it feels insecure in its region, with historically “bad neighbors” – Pakistan, Afghanistan and 
Iraq – and its 20th century memory of being invaded and marginalized by other powers.122  
Possessing nuclear weapons – partnered with its ballistic missile capabilities – could provide Iran 
with the ultimate deterrent against Israel and other potential threats.123  
 
 Second, a nuclear program in general – and a nuclear weapons capability in particular – 
could provide Iran with prestige, ensuring it status as a regional, if not a global power.124  In this 
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regard, North Korea and India provide important examples.  From Tehran’s perspective, North 
Korea’s presumed nuclear capability has not only obviated a preemptive invasion, but actually 
generated potential security and economic benefits,125 while India has been accepted by the 
international community into the circle of nuclear powers, most recently with the US-India 
civilian nuclear power deal (more on that below).  It also reinforces the Iranian belief in Persian 
superiority.  “Iranians’ [sic] want their country to become technologically advanced and 
acquiring nuclear expertise and technology is part of the modernization process.  No power can 
stop Iran’s steady march toward development.”126   
 
Clearly, the Iranian nuclear program plays into Iran’s sense of being a victim of double 
standards.  The overwhelming majority of Iranians naturally support their country’s right to 
master nuclear technology.  Most Iranians believe this entitlement is both a natural right of a 
sovereign state as well as an important factor in becoming an advanced player in the modern 
world.  They resent the apparent discrimination of “haves” and “have-nots.”127  From Iran’s 
perspective, international exhortations that having so much oil and gas underground means Iran 
does not need nuclear energy are self-serving and hypocritical.  Iranians consider their oil a finite 
resource, and the advice to burn it off and not seek an alternative energy source, appears to them 
as dishonest.  As Iranian scholar Fariborz Mokhtari notes sardonically, “Iran, after all, is not the 
only country with rich oil and gas reserves to consider nuclear energy.”128 Or as Ali Muhammad 
Besharati, a former interior minister and deputy foreign minister, said, “If we backed down on 
the nuclear issue, the US would have found fault with our medical doctors researching stem 
cells.  What they would like to see us do is plant corn, make tomato paste and bottle mineral 
water.  They do not want to see us get high-tech.”129  Taking advantage of these sentiments, 
President Ahmadinejad has framed the stand-off between Iran and the international community 
as an effort by “a few countries that are armed with various types of weapons” to impose “a kind 
of scientific apartheid and nuclear monopoly in the world.”130     
 
 As Ahmadinejad’s quote suggests, the regime is using the nuclear program to play the 
nationalist card, in an effort to shore up the regime’s legitimacy – the third reason for Iran’s 
motivation to acquire nuclear weapons.  The stagnation of Iran’s command economy – with its 
double-digit inflation and unemployment rates, bloated bureaucracy, industrial decay and 
cumbersome subsidies – provides a strong incentive for the Iranian regime to try to distract the 
Iranian population with nationalist cries for nuclear weapons.   This situation is only likely to get 
worse, for Iran is creating only 400,000 new jobs each year for the million job seekers who enter 
the market annually.131   The nuclear program seems to be providing some legitimacy.  
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According to an Iranian Students Polling Agency poll conducted at the end of January 2006, 85 
percent of the Iranian population supported resuming the nuclear program.132   
 
The nuclear program certainly provides some legitimacy for the regime, although this 
support may not be as overwhelming as the conventional wisdom would suggest.  Michael 
Herzog has argued that the regime usually speaks of a peaceful nuclear energy program, or blurs 
the distinction between the energy and weapons programs, and almost all public opinion polls 
fail to ask questions that consider the difference between the two.133  In the IPSA poll cited 
above, for example, the level of public support for the program dropped to 74 percent if the 
IAEA referred the Iran case to the UN Security Council; 64 percent if economic sanctions were 
imposed, and 56 percent if Iran were to face military action.134  Trita Parsi’s analysis agrees with 
Herzog; she concluded that Iranians distinguish between weaponization and access to nuclear 
technology, and “the vast majority of Iranians argued that going nuclear [militarily] would make 
Iran less, rather than more safe.”135 Iranian demonstrators are now regularly playing on the 
regime’s slogan of nuclear “indisputable rights” by invoking other “indisputable rights” – such 
as permanent employment, higher wages, and an elected leader (a reference to the unelected 
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei).136
 
Iranian Reactions to US Nuclear Policy 
 
Iran views US nuclear policy through the lens of all other US-Iranian interactions.  
Tehran claims that the US nuclear policy is hypocritical and that it implements a double standard 
when it comes to nuclear dealings with friends or “rogues.”  This double standard is cited in US 
nuclear-related interactions with Israel, India, and in view of the NPT agreements.  The Iranian 
reaction to official pronouncements of US nuclear policy such as the 2001 National Security 
Strategy (NSS) or 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was limited to a few criticisms.  
 
The US Double Standard:  Nuclear Friends and Nuclear Foes 
 
Numerous articles in Iranian news media allege hypocrisy in US nuclear policy in the 
Middle East.  The Tehran Times regularly accuses the US of maintaining a double standard 
toward the various new or near-nuclear powers.  Most galling to Tehran is US support for Israel 
despite its suspected nuclear status.  As one Iranian journalist put it succinctly, “The West's 
policy of ignoring Israel's nuclear weapons program while raising unjustified concerns about 
Iran's peaceful nuclear activities has shown Muslim nations that the West applies double 
standards toward Islamic countries.”137  Further, news sources imply that there is an international 
consensus on Israel and its suspected nuclear status: “It is obvious that Israel cannot comment on 
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the nuclear activities of other countries from the legal point of view because the international 
community regards it as a rouge [sic] nuclear power...”138  The US double standard is also 
evident elsewhere in the world:  US tacit acceptance of and eventual support for Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear weapons versus its vitriol and commitment to undermining any nuclear 
capability in Iran, Iraq or North Korea.139   
 
Iran views the NPT as the primary vehicle for US hypocrisy.  The NPT is an inherently-
discriminatory document that divides the world into the nuclear weapons states (those that had 
the bomb prior to 1968) and the non-nuclear weapon states (those who agreed not to pursue 
weapons in exchange for nuclear power technology).  However, the US-India nuclear technology 
exchange deal, which occurred despite India’s having never signed the NPT, has undermined 
Iranian tolerance of criticism for its own “legal” nuclear program.  As the moderate newspaper 
Mardom-Salary commented: 
 
The fact that nuclear energy has been localized in the region [through the US-
India deal] creates a good opportunity for Iran to do its best in order to reach such 
technology similar to India and Pakistan who now are security poles of the region.  
All of us know that Pakistan and India have not signed the NPT; however they are 
supported by America and the European countries.  Now there is a question of 
why America and the European countries oppose Iran’s nuclear activities while 
Iran is a signatory of the NPT?140
 
The Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator, Ali 
Larijani’s response to the US-India nuclear deal was even more pointed.  Comparing US 
behavior towards Iran, which does not yet have nuclear weapons, with its behavior towards 
India, which does, he noted that, “This dual standard is detrimental to international security.”141  
Iran also relies on other international voices, such as the director general of the IAEA, to support 
its position: “Mohammed El-Baradei said that the United States cannot tell the international 
community that nuclear weapons are good for the USA and bad for other countries.” 142  Neither 
Iran nor the US has ratified the CTBT, but Iran views the American refusal as an implicit 
promise to build and test new nuclear weapons while abandoning its commitment under the 
Article VI of the NPT to work towards complete disarmament.  Furthermore, Iran claims that the 
US violated Article I of the NPT under the 2005 Energy Policy Act, a law that allows the sale of 
enriched uranium to military facilities at specific countries.143    
 
The US double standard works in two ways for Iran.  First, Iranian statesmen can take the 
high road by touting the fact that it signed the NPT and has made efforts to meet its 
requirements:  “In fact, Iran’s opposition to the complete stopping of enriching uranium is an 
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indication of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s adherence to the Geneva Convention Charter, the 
NPT, the IAEA regulations and articles 73 and 77 of Iran’s agreement with the NPT.”144  Ali 
Larijani used Iran’s apparent NPT compliance to paint his country as cooperative and rational: 
 
The Iranians do not want anything more than other countries in this respect. They 
expect the same rights considered for Japan, South Korea, Brazil and India, as 
well as other countries, in terms of nuclear technology to be considered for Iran as 
a member of the agency [IAEA]. We are not making strange demands. We 
believe that any suspension in this respect should be logical.145
 
Second, Iran can use what it sees as blatant US hypocrisy to further its innocent victimhood.  The 
Iranian response to the United Nations’ nuclear negotiation package presented on June 6, 2006 
claimed that the US tried to undermine Iran’s attempt at engagement with the international 
community: “certain governments, with no justification, prompted a negative campaign, declared 
a part of the package as prerequisite to any negotiation, and unilaterally broke the 
negotiations.”146   
The 2002 US Nuclear Policy Review and 2001 National Security Strategy 
Iranian reactions to the release of official US nuclear strategy in the 2002 NPR and 2001 
NSS were hard to discern.  Media reporting was limited and no scholarly articles were found that 
addressed either document specifically.  The few that did reference the NSS made no mention of 
the NPR, although the concept of new nuclear capabilities was discussed.  This is surprising, 
given that international press coverage of the allegedly leaked version of the NPR mentions Iran 
as a country against which nuclear weapons could be used in certain contingencies.147  One 
exception was the Iranian deputy foreign minister, speaking at the 2002 Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva, who criticized the US decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and 
proceed with national missile defense.  As quoted in a Pakistani newspaper, the deputy foreign 
minister pointedly stated that “while the international community was calling for multilateralism, 
cooperation and dialogue, one single voice talked about the escalation of war and 
unilateralism.”148
In his response to the NSS, Iranian Foreign Minister Seyyed Kamal Kharrazi commented 
that, “Despite the fact that there are a number of new points, most of what has been delineated in 
this new strategy is not new. In fact, it sets out the strategy that America formulated in the 
aftermath of 11 September to resolve its problems.”149  One interpretation of this statement is 
that the Iranian government did not wish to bring further attention to the NSS or have the public 
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interpreting the document for themselves.  Another interpretation is that it did not take the NSS 
seriously.  Most likely, it seems Iran was taken aback by the honest description of the Bush 
Administration’s pre-emptive policy that Tehran had already identified and the press publicized.  
Interestingly, the press devoted an entire article to denounce French President Jacques Chirac’s 
January 2006 speech announcing a change in France’s nuclear strategy.  This article argued that 
the new policy – that France would consider using weapons of mass destruction against countries 
that it believed were sponsors of terrorist acts – was influenced by the US.150   
 
Although the press did not call specific attention to the NPR, numerous media references 
were found to Washington’s doctrine of pre-emptive warfare and “mini-nukes.” Iranian 
newspaper articles reiterate the role of the international community and the IAEA in pressuring 
the US to adhere to international law and to give up its low-yield nuclear weapon plans. When 
President Bush in 2003 appropriated $15 million for low-yield nuclear weapons, the Tehran 
Daily stated that such a move would no less than “shift the balance of power in the world.”  Iran 
framed its disapproval as allied with the rest of the world: “The international community in 
general and officials from many countries in particular have protested against this decision.”  
The article was quick to point out that these weapons would be used specifically as “bunker 
busters.” It reiterated that the US “intends to mass produce such weapons” and that it “will most 
likely use them in a limited nuclear war in the future.”151  During the UN General Assembly 
meeting in New York in September 2006, President Ahmadinejad also expressed his disapproval 
for new US nuclear weapons:  
 
Some powers proudly announce their production of second and third generations 
of nuclear weapons. What do they need these weapons for? Is the development 
and stockpiling of these deadly weapons designed to promote peace and 
democracy? Or, are these weapons, in fact, instruments of coercion and threat 
against other peoples and governments?152
 
Tehran seems to identify US nuclear policy through governmental statements and US 
actions more than any “official” policy as outlined in the NPR or NSS.  For example, on June 19, 
2006, President Bush stated at the US Merchant Marine Academy that US engagement in direct 
talks with Iran regarding its nuclear program could not occur until “the Iranian regime fully and 
verifiably suspends its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.”153  Although diplomatic 
channels are always used to communicate during sensitive negotiations, such public statements 
also are part of the message received by Iran, especially with the US policy decision not to 
communicate bilaterally with the Iranian government. 
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Iran’s Potential Reactions to Proposed Future Changes in US Nuclear Policy 
Although the literature review indicates that Iran does have opinions about US nuclear 
policy, the number of articles that address other US policies, both in the Middle East and towards 
Iran specifically, greatly overshadow the nuclear dimension.  This should not be taken to mean 
that US nuclear policies are not important, but rather that when weighing the impact of its 
nuclear policy on a “rogue” state, the US should consider the multitude of other messages that 
are sent.  Those messages are sent via public speeches, news media sources, Internet, and 
“official” policy, but most importantly, they are sent through US actions.   
 
The net assessment is that the official US nuclear posture is only one factor in its 
relations with Iran.  Thus, Iran’s response to changes in US nuclear policy would likely be 
diluted by the other US policies that have larger implications for their immediate security 
situation.  Changes in the quantity or type of US nuclear weapons might be viewed as a specific 
attack on Iranian interests and security but Iran would likely view these changes through the lens 
of the existing diplomatic and economic climate between the two countries.  
 
 
PAKISTAN 
 
 While Chinese and Iranian views about US nuclear policy appear to be filtered through 
each state’s perceptions of all US international policies more generally, for Pakistan, US nuclear 
policy by itself seems to be quite important.  US nuclear policy has a significant independent 
effect on the wider bilateral relationship between the two countries, which is quite different from 
the other states examined in this paper.  There are three possible reasons for this difference.  
First, Pakistan relies heavily on its own nuclear policy as the cornerstone to its national security, 
and thus may give more weight to other states’ nuclear policies than most countries do.  
Similarly, unlike the other states examined here, Pakistan is an undeclared nuclear state that has 
not signed the NPT, and thus may be more sensitive to nuclear policies than most states due to its 
undeclared status.  Finally, because Pakistan’s fate – and its foreign policy – is so wrapped up in 
its relations with India, the US-India nuclear deal obviously affects Pakistan’s sense of security 
very directly.  At least this dimension of US nuclear policy has great effect for Pakistan.    
 
 As a result, everything with regard to Pakistan’s views of nuclear weapons and US 
declaratory nuclear policy must be analyzed in relation to how these issues interact with 
Pakistan’s strategic competition with India.  Whereas the United States forms a large part of 
Chinese and Iranian threat perceptions, it does not for Pakistan (or Germany).  Because it does 
not compete directly with the United States as China and Iran do, Pakistan views US nuclear 
policy through a different lens – one that is always conscious of the strategic rivalry between 
Pakistan and India.  
 
Pakistani Perceptions of the United States 
 
An understanding of the historical and current sources of Pakistan’s perception of the US 
is critical to understanding why, to Pakistan, US nuclear policy is simply more evidence of its 
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duplicity and untrustworthiness.  This section describes Pakistan’s perception of the US, 
historically and in relation to current events.  In ways that are similar to Iran, Pakistan’s historic 
narrative is replete with “a sense of wrongdoing and injustices, betrayals of trust and treaties, 
abandonment by allies, and victimization due to religion, race and color.”154  In this narrative, 
the United States is the cause for most of this abandonment, earning it the epithet of “fair 
weather friend” 155 – one that pursues its own interests irrespective of other considerations. 
 
 Pakistan believes that, throughout its history, it has been used by the United States and 
then abandoned when those interests were served.  In a relationship that swings like a pendulum, 
Pakistan has drifted from being “the most allied ally” in the 1950s, to “the ignored ally” in the 
1960s and 1970s, back to “the most allied ally” in the 1980s, to the most sanctioned ally in the 
1990s, and finally to “the most suspected ally” from 2001 until the present.  Understandably, 
such perceived fickleness on the part of the United States does not leave an endearing impression 
in the mind of most Pakistanis. 156    
 
 At the onset of the Cold War, Pakistan aligned itself with the United States by joining 
two regional defense pacts, the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the “Baghdad Pact.”  
As a result of these alliances, Pakistan received nearly $2 billion in US assistance from 1953 
until 1961, a quarter of this in military aid, thus making Pakistan one of America’s most 
important security partners of the period, “the most allied ally.”157   The relationship declined 
apart during the 1970s, as new strains arose over Pakistan’s efforts to respond to India’s 1974 
nuclear test by seeking its own nuclear capability.  With the 1980 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, however, US priorities shifted again, and Pakistan was again viewed as a frontline 
ally in the effort to block Soviet expansionism.  In 1981, the Reagan Administration offered 
Islamabad a five-year, $3.2 billion aid package, and turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear 
program – even waiving specific sanctions mandated by law (discussed further below).158  
Although Pakistan disclosed in 1984 that it could enrich uranium and revealed in 1987 that it 
could assemble a nuclear device, the US continued to certify Pakistan’s non-nuclear status until 
1990.  In exchange, Pakistan became a key transit country for arms to the Afghan resistance.   
 
 After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s strategic importance for the 
United States waned again, and in the 1990s, the US shifted towards India in terms of economic 
and strategic interests, while choosing to overlook India’s nuclear history.  During the same time, 
Pakistan was isolated internationally, and the United States again suspended aid because of 
Pakistan’s nuclear program.   
 
After more than a decade of alienation, US-Pakistan relations were transformed anew after 
September 11, 2001.  The US once again returned to Pakistan as a pivotal ally, this time in the 
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global war on terrorism.  To reward Pakistan for its cooperation with US military action in 
Afghanistan, the US waived nuclear specific sanctions and coup sanctions on Pakistan, and 
extended significant economic incentives to the Musharraf regime.  
 
Given this history of perceived American fickleness, it is not surprising that Pakistani views of 
the US have been consistently low for some time.  Since 1999, public opinion polls have 
consistently shown negative views about the United States, with less than a quarter of the 
population holding a “favorable opinion” of the US.  The lowest poll was in 2002, when only 10 
percent of the population held favorable views. 159    
 
In sum, Pakistan views the United States as a “fair weather friend,” and it resents how it 
has been, as it believes, used by the United States and then abandoned when those interests were 
served.  Pakistanis see themselves as having been allies with the US and having made many 
sacrifices for American interests, but not having received the follow through or support they feel 
they deserve.  Part of its resentment may also be the sense of powerlessness it feels, because 
although it sees the United States as fickle, Pakistan continues to need the relationship.  
 
Although Pakistan does not feel a direct military threat from the United States, as Iran does, it is 
vulnerable to the United States in other ways – strategically, militarily and economically.  
Strategically, Pakistan is vulnerable to the US in regard to India and Afghanistan.  From 
Pakistan’s perspective, the US also has the potential to upset the balance of the conflict in 
Kashmir.  Militarily, Pakistan depends on the US for equipping and supplying its military. 160 
Economically, Pakistan is heavily supported by US assistance.161  Thus, while the US does not 
pose a direct security threat to Pakistan, these other dynamics of US-Pakistani relations assure 
Pakistani dependency on US policies and actions in more subtle, but still important ways, and 
Pakistanis are well aware of this.      
 
Pakistani Nuclear Policy 
 
 The genesis of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was in direct response to its defeat 
in the Bangladesh War and India’s nuclear test in 1974.  These two events provided Pakistan 
with evidence of its insecurity in regard to both its sovereignty and its inability to deter possible 
Indian aggression.  Nuclear weapons were seen as an “equalizer,” making up for Pakistan’s lack 
of strategic depth and conventional asymmetry.  Pakistan’s development of the nuclear option is 
the result, at least in part, of its lack of success in its competition with India.162  Accordingly, 
nuclear weapons have always formed the centerpiece in Pakistan’s search for “strategic equality” 
with India, which has deep historical roots stretching back to the partition of the two countries in 
1947.163  India continues to be the almost singular focus of Pakistan’s security and nuclear 
                                                 
159 Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 13, 2006.  http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252 
160 For more details about US-Pakistan security cooperation, see Kronstadt, “Pakistan-US Relations,” pp. 
11-12. 
161 Kronstadt, “Pakistan-US Relations,” p. 20. 
162 Timothy D. Hoyt, “Strategic Myopia:  Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine and Crisis Stability in South Asia,” 
in South Asia’s Nuclear Security Dilemma:  India, Pakistan and China, ed. Lowell Dittmer (Armonk, 
NY:  ME Sharpe, 2005), pp. 113-115. 
163 Farzana Shaikh, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb:  Beyond the Non-proliferation Regime,” International 
Affairs, vol. 78, no. 1 (January 2002), p. 44.    
 52
doctrines.164  As Pakistani scholar Feroz Hassan Khan suggests, from a broader strategic cultural 
viewpoint,  
 
Pakistan refuses to acquiesce to Indian military might, and remains determined to 
find ways to equalize or balance.  Preservation of national sovereignty is thus the 
primary objective, and in pursuance of national security, all tools – including the 
use of an asymmetric strategy – are justified.165
 
One such tool is Pakistan’s first use policy, with the explicit statement that its nuclear 
weapons “are aimed solely at India.”166  This policy has not been clearly articulated, but in 
ambiguous terms, Pakistan has always reserved the right to use nuclear weapons, even in the 
case of responding to a conventional attack.  The first use policy and its ambiguity are designed 
to achieve maximum deterrence value.167  It can be attributed to Pakistan’s lack of conventional 
parity with India, lack of strategic depth and a weak economy that cannot sustain a large nuclear 
arsenal.168  As Khan argues, “Nuclear weapons are critical to Pakistan and an assurance for 
national survival.  There is no constituency in Pakistan that believes otherwise.”169  The 
Pakistani historical narrative focuses on Pakistan’s ingenuity and defiance of India (and the 
international community) to create self-reliance through nuclear weapons.170
 
Pakistan views the NPT as a “discriminatory” and “self-defeating instrument” because it 
legitimizes nuclear weapons for the nuclear weapons states, while not doing the same for others, 
and because it has not lived up to the principles laid out in 1968.171  Therefore, in its current 
form, the NPT is seen for some Pakistani observers as “irrelevant” and for others as “a foreign 
policy tool of both US & NATO.”172  Pakistan’s original position with regard to the NPT was 
that it would accede as a non-nuclear power – but only if India did the same.  On numerous 
occasions, Pakistan asked India to accede simultaneously, but to no avail.173   In recent years, 
                                                 
164 Shireen M. Mazari, “Understanding Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine,” Strategic Studies (Institute of 
Strategic Studies, Islamabad), vol. 24, no. 3 (Autumn 2004). Available at  
http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2004_files/no_3/article/1a.htm. 
165 Khan, “Comparative Strategic Culture,” p. 4. 
 166 General Kidwai as quoted in Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Matellini, “Landau Report on 
Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan,” available at http://www.mi.infn.it 
167 Michael Quinlan, “How Robust is India-Pakistan Deterrence,” Survival, vol. 42, no. 4 (Winter 2000-
2001), pp. 149-50. 
168 See Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy,” Strategic Analysis, vol. 27, no. 1 (Jan-Mar 
2003). 
169 Khan, “Comparative Strategic Culture,” p. 9. 
170 This historical narrative also praises A.Q. Khan as a hero, the father of a nuclear capability that the rest 
of the world was trying to block. Thus, when the A.Q. Khan proliferation ring was discovered, 
Pakistanis viewed the black market activity less as a matter of concern than as a symbol of defiance of 
the West. 
171 Moazzam Tahir Minhas, “NPT and Flawed Convention,” The Nation (Pakistan) (May 7, 2005). 
172 Mazari, “Understanding Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine;” Minhas, “NPT and Flawed Convention.”  
173  Pakistani proposals include: “(i) Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia endorsed by the UN since 
1974 (ii) India and Pakistan should issue a joint declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of 
nuclear weapon in 1978, (iii) to put all nuclear installations in India and Pakistan under inspection of the 
Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (iv) 1979- bilateral inspection of all nuclear facilities 
on reciprocal basis (iv) 1979-simultaneous acceptance of IAEA safeguards by Pakistan and India on all 
nuclear facilities (v) 1979-simultaneous accession to NPT (vi) 1987-regional test ban treaty (vii) 1987 
 53
however, Pakistan has reversed course and stated that it would still like to join the NPT, but as a 
recognized nuclear power.174  In a quote typical of Pakistani views about whether it might 
consider signing the NPT, Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz in 1999 said, 
 
There is no question of it because we cannot join NPT as a non-nuclear power and 
in the present shape of NPT, only five countries are nuclear powers and they do 
not accept others… Therefore, either they amend the treaty and allow us entry as 
nuclear power, then we may join. But the signing of NPT is not under debate as 
yet.175
 
In sum, everything with regard to Pakistan’s views of nuclear weapons and US 
declaratory nuclear policy must be analyzed in relation to how these issues interact with 
Pakistan’s strategic competition with India and its historic sense of the United States as a “fair 
weather friend.”   
 
Pakistani Reactions to US Nuclear Policy 
Like the other states in this analysis, Pakistan views US nuclear policy as hypocritical. In 
fact, Pakistani references to US nuclear posture typically describe US hypocrisy and double 
standards.  Many analysts write that the US wants to maintain an extraordinary, very robust 
nuclear weapons position, while at the same time dictating to others what they can and cannot 
do.  While Iran’s concern with the double standard focused on the US’ behavior towards nuclear 
friends (such as Israel and India) versus nuclear foes (such as North Korea and Iran), Pakistan’s 
concern with the double standard focuses on the United States’ own nuclear policy.  In other 
words, Pakistan is most upset by its perception of US nuclear policy as demonstrating that the 
United States believes itself powerful enough – and thus exceptional enough – to apply different 
standards of behavior to itself versus others.  Pakistan also believes that US actions are 
undermining its stated goals for global nuclear non-proliferation.  
The US Double Standard:  Non-Proliferation Taking a Back Seat to US Strategic Interests 
 
 Pakistani analysts and policymakers argue that there is a large gulf between US stated 
objectives about nuclear non-proliferation and its actions.  They point to a perceived lack of US 
commitment to the NPT, the US failure to ratify the CTBT, US double standards with respect to 
Israel, and US behavior in South Asia, which only enforces non-proliferation sanctions when 
other US strategic interests have been met.   
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First, Pakistan views US commitment to Article VI of the NPT as non-existent.   At the 
2000 Review Conference, the US committed itself to concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament 
and reducing and eliminating the role of nuclear weapons in US security policy.  These 
commitments, however, are seen as completely baseless in light in the 2002 NPR and the Bush 
Doctrine (as discussed below).  For many, the US commitment to the “NPT and disarmament [is] 
a hoax and nothing more.”176   
 
Second, analysts cite the US failure to ratify the CTBT as indicative of double standards 
and problematic for trying to produce peace in South Asia.  Many opponents to the CTBT in 
Pakistan cited US failure to ratify the Treaty as evidence not to accede, saying that “for all 
practical purposes the treaty is dead.”177  Pakistan’s Foreign Minister framed the problem more 
subtly:  “the prospects of the treaty entering into force have dimmed because the US has rejected 
ratification.”178  As a result, some Pakistanis believe that the US rejection reduces the burden of 
responsibility for Pakistan to sign the treaty. 
 
 Third, Pakistanis believe that US support for non-proliferation policies differs for 
different countries, based on other US strategic interests.  Analysts especially point to the blind 
eye that the United States apparently turns to Israel’s alleged nuclear arsenal.  As Shireen Mazari 
argued, “In the field of non-proliferation…. the whole focus is on a country-by-country approach 
rather than one based on accepted international principles.  So one can safely assume that there 
will be no US pressure on Israel with regard to WMD.”179
 
Perhaps most importantly, for many Pakistani observers, US behavior regarding sanctions 
enforcement in South Asia is rather confusing and ineffective for achieving the US stated goal of 
nuclear non-proliferation.  Writing about US non-proliferation efforts in South Asia, Pakistani 
scholar Samina Ahmed stresses the concern that,  
 
Although declared US policy has emphasized nuclear nonproliferation goals, 
other perceived political, commercial and strategic interests have more often 
taken precedence over nonproliferation and arms control objectives. 
Nonproliferation sanctions were insubstantial and were rarely sustained; 
inducement strategies were inappropriate and unconditionally extended.180
 
Ahmed views US nuclear non-proliferation goals in South Asia within the historical context of 
the United States as a “fair weather friend” – arguing that the US often made decisions that led to 
increased nuclear danger in South Asia.  In her view, the post-September 11th environment is 
simply a continuation of that context:  “Nonproliferation, formerly a centerpiece of US policy 
towards both India and Pakistan, has taken a back seat to the expediencies of the war on 
terrorism.”181  In her estimation,  
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US nonproliferation concerns and arms control objectives have receded into the 
background as counterterrorism strategies take primacy over all other US 
political, economic and strategic interests in South Asia….and Pakistan’s military 
regime has become a major beneficiary of these changed US priorities.182   
 
Ahmed details how the US, since 2001, has waived nuclear-specific sanctions on Pakistan to 
reward Islamabad for its cooperation with US military action in Afghanistan.  These include: 
 
• The Symington Amendment (1976), which prohibits most US economic and military 
assistance to any country delivering or receiving nuclear material not safeguarded by the 
IAEA;  
• The Pressler Amendment (1985), which bars most economic and military assistance to 
Pakistan unless the US President can certify on an annual basis that Pakistan does not 
possess a nuclear device; and 
• Military Coup Sanctions (1988), which prohibit most US assistance to any country whose 
elected head of government is deposed by a military coup (as Pakistan’s was in 1999, 
after Gen. Pervez Musharraf ousted the democratically elected prime minister, Nawaz 
Sharif). 
 
In addition, to assuage Indian concerns about a renewed military relationship with Pakistan and 
acknowledge a continued US interest in a strategic relationship with India, the United States has 
also eased all Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act sanctions on India, including restrictions on 
military sales and prohibitions on high technology.183
 
In sum, Pakistan’s own experience with the United States suggests that US non-
proliferation goals will always take a back seat to other strategic interests, and this makes the 
United States’ non-proliferation policy seem hypocritical.   
 
The 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review and 2001 National Security Strategy 
From the Pakistani perspective, the most important way that the United States’ stated 
nuclear non-proliferation goals are undermined in the world is through recent changes to its own 
nuclear policy – including the 2002 NPR, the related decisions to withdraw from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty and build a National Missile Defense program, and the pre-emption 
doctrine outlined in the 2001 NSS.  Pakistan considers these changes to US nuclear policy 
aggressive and hypocritical.  The most negative Pakistani reactions have focused on the possible 
development of new nuclear weapons, such as “mini-nukes” and earth penetrating weapons.  
And, like the Chinese, Pakistani observers regard the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which stipulated the 
reduction of deployed nuclear arsenals in the US and Russia, to be hollow. 
 
Many Pakistani analysts believe that recent changes in US nuclear policy are the single 
most threatening influence on international non-proliferation efforts today.  As an Islamabad-
based security analyst argued, “When the Cold War ended, it was believed that the end of the 
Soviet Union would also bring an end to the nuclear threat….Ironically, that threat has grown in 
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the recent years, mainly due to the weapons policy being pursued by the current Bush 
administration, in which the nuclear arsenal remains a driving force.”184  This analyst, Ghazala 
Yasmin – a research fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies – argues that the NPR enunciates 
“an aggressive combination of unilateral military action in support of US interests, and the 
abandonment of long-pursued disarmament and non-proliferation policies.”  She concludes that  
 
the administration’s weapons policies are violating its international arms control 
and disarmament obligations and, in the process, are damaging the non-
proliferation regime…the US is, thereby, creating further insecurity and 
instability across the world as the main cause of proliferation by fueling an arms 
race world wide. 185
 
 Similarly, an editorial in The Nation (Pakistan) comments:  
 
There has been a reduction in the number of weapons after the Cold War ended, 
but nuclear weapons remain integral to the strategic doctrines of all the nuclear 
five. The US has on the other hand taken measures that have started a new arms 
race. Despite its having developed into the mightiest military power in history 
which no country in the world is in a position to challenge, it is developing a new 
generation of nuclear weapons, more maneuverable and destructive than the older 
ones. At the same time it is seeking to build a national missile defense system to 
provide it immunity from any possible nuclear attack, thus forcing some of the 
major powers who feel the need for deterrence to develop new delivery systems 
and smaller warheads capable of penetrating the American defensive shield. 
While the members of the nuclear club maintain that terrorists taking recourse to 
low intensity warfare constitute the greatest threat to their security, they continue 
to add new warheads to their nuclear arsenal while advising those outside the 
exclusive club to adhere to the NPT. This is sheer hypocrisy.186
 
An oft cited example of such hypocrisy is the US prosecuting a preventive war in Iraq and 
demanding that Iran halt all nuclear activities, while at the same time putting forth proposals for 
new weapons in the NPR.  As an editorial in Peshawar’s Frontier Post noted,  
 
While the US is persisting with its erroneous pursuit of nuclear hegemony, it has 
been leveling accusations of nuclear proliferation against every country that 
provokes its ire.  For example it has been accusing China of facilitating shipments 
to Pakistan in order to help build its ballistic missiles.  And as if to give further 
proof of its duplicity, it has been looking the other way to implicitly permit India 
to pursue its missile plans.  Similarly, it has been repeating accusations of Iraq 
being [sic] going ahead with its nuclear program with the aim of using this as a 
pretext to impose a new war on that country.  The fact of the matter is that the US 
is creating hurdles in the way of nuclear non-proliferation in the world.187
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Pakistanis express particular concern about the seeming renewed emphasis in US security 
policy on using nuclear weapons, especially against non-nuclear weapons states. Writing in 
Dawn after elements of the NPR were leaked in March 2002, Ashfak Bokhari argued that, “the 
Bush administration has brought the world much closer to the actual use of nuclear 
weapons…The key significance of these changes is to transform nuclear bombs from the “last 
resort” into weapons which can be used at will.”  This decision has “signalled an end to the 
universally accepted notion, on which the international security regime rested, that a nuclear 
weapon is a deterrent, not a weapon for use.”  Bokhari also highlighted that Muslims, in 
particular, should take note of this shift, especially in light of talk among individuals in the US of 
“nuking” Mecca and supporting “a new version of the medieval Crusades.”  Furthermore, 
Bokhari emphasized the oft-repeated claim of US double standards stressing that “had any other 
country been seen planning to develop a new nuclear weapon and contemplating pre-emptive 
strikes against certain non-nuclear powers, Washington would have declared that state a 
‘dangerous rogue state’.”188
 
Writing on the same day in The News, Shireen Mazari presented a similar reaction, 
framing the NPR in terms of the US making “a concerted effort to legitimize the use of nukes… 
The US is now telling the world that it will use nuclear weapons as and when it sees fit.”  
Mazari, like Bokhari, speculates that this shift may be directed toward the Muslim world, stating 
that “all in all, given the new obsession of the US – actually an old one revived – with destroying 
regimes, even states it dislikes, one should expect covert destabilizing activities in many parts of 
the world – especially the Muslim world.”189   
 
Similarly, Yasmin argued that “the picture that seems to be emerging is that…a regime 
not to the US liking is also cause for a nuclear attack.”  Yasmin’s analysis focused extensively on 
the NPR alleged list of potential targets of a US nuclear attack – China, Russia, Iraq, North 
Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria.  Noting that five of these states do not possess nuclear weapons, 
she criticized the fact that the US might strike non-nuclear states, “a drastic departure from the 
policy that the US has pursued for decades, by which it pledged never to launch a nuclear attack 
on non-nuclear states.”  In her view, “the current US policy seems to make nuclear weapons no 
longer weapons of last resort, but rather instruments of coercion that may be used in fighting 
wars, even against non-nuclear weapons states.”190  
 
In tandem to its negative reaction to the NPR, Pakistan has criticized the US decisions to 
withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty and build a national missile defense program.  Both are 
viewed as “go-it-alone” decisions that undermine collective security for “arbitrary and uni-
dimensional approaches to security.”191  Some articles suggested that NMD would not work, 
highlighting its “staggering” costs and a “highly scripted, unrealistic test environment.” As 
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Yasmin argued, the Bush “administration’s present confidence in the effectiveness of the BMD 
is, therefore, misplaced.”192
 
Like the Chinese, Pakistani observers regard the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which stipulated 
the reduction of deployed nuclear arsenals in the US and Russia, to be hollow.  The few articles 
that discussed the treaty note that it does not require either nation to destroy any warheads, but 
merely remove them from active deployment.  In Yasmin’s words, “SORT, in fact, eliminates 
nothing….in effect the treaty is just a whitewash for the aggressive nuclear weapons policies 
being pursued” by the US.193
 
Finally, there is also great Pakistani hostility to the doctrine of preemption as outlined in 
the 2001 National Security Strategy (the Bush Doctrine).  Many analysts find the links between 
the preemption doctrine and the NPR to be especially dangerous.194  Unlike Iran, which feels 
itself to be a target of this pre-emptive doctrine, the Pakistani hostility toward preemption is 
usually stated in general terms – focusing on its violation of international law, creating instability 
and setting a dangerous precedent of unilateralism.  As one Pakistani scholar noted: 
 
The new US policy is a dangerous and a provocative one… the US wants to fight 
against terrorism on its own terms with little regard for international law…A 
dangerous divide between the US and the rest of world can be seen as taking 
shape. While the world looks to the provisions of the UN Charter for a civilising 
role in the conduct of international affairs, the prevailing view in Washington 
draws its inspiration from the same Charter’s emphasis on the sovereignty of 
nation states. For the US, this means that its status as the sole superpower must not 
be challenged in its drive to build a new world order based entirely on American 
notions.195   
 
Some Pakistani scholars also worry that the US doctrine of preemption will also be adopted by 
India and (on the assumption that its suspected nuclear arsenal is real) Israel.196  
 
Finally, many Pakistanis see the Bush Doctrine as unjust and directed against Muslim 
countries.  Many sympathize with their coreligionists, especially in Iran and Iraq, which are seen 
as being dictated to and under attack by the US.197   In these observers’ eyes, the doctrine of 
preemption and the US prosecution of its war on terrorism are simply two sides of the same coin.  
As Pakistan’s former Foreign Minister wrote in 2003, “the war on terrorism is widely perceived 
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as a war against Islam.”  On the same day, Kurshid Ahmad, Senator and Chairman of the 
Institute of Policy Studies in Islamabad, wrote that the war on terror is 
 
a vicious campaign against one religion and its adherents. Islam and the Muslim 
countries are being singled out as the source and abode of all terrorism. Muslims in 
America and abroad are at the suffering end. The fair name of Islam is being 
maligned in a systematic manner.198
 
Similarly, Shireen Mazari, Director General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 
asserted that, “All in all, it is clear that the direction adopted by the US is spreading instability all 
across Asia – especially the Muslim World.”199
 
 In sum, the changes to US nuclear policy enshrined in the NPR, including the related 
decisions to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty and proceed with a national missile defense 
program, have only received negative responses from Pakistan.  These policies are seen to be 
aggressive, hypocritical, and undermining international non-proliferation efforts.  As Yasmin 
asserts, “The new US policies violate the basic principles of the [NPT] treaty and expose double 
standards of the world’s leading power.  The US seems to be sending a message across the world 
– do as we say, not as we do.”200
 
The US-India Nuclear Deal 
 
Pakistani reaction to the 2006 proposed US-India nuclear deal has been negative, to say 
the least.  The deal is considered by many to be exceptionally “discriminatory” and hence 
“unacceptable.”   It has reinforced the perceptions of the US as a “fair weather friend,” as well as 
reinforced perceived US hypocrisy in putting its own strategic interests ahead of its stated 
nuclear non-proliferation objectives.  The official Pakistani government statement released after 
President Bush’s trip to the region in March 2006 stresses the instability such a deal will create 
in the form of an arms race in South Asia.  In addition, it emphasizes how this deal will 
undermine international non-proliferation efforts.201  These views are widely accepted; as the 
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Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting in Pakistan has expressed it, “surely, 100 
percent people are against this. There is [sic] not a single one percent people who are supporting 
this issue.202  The Pakistani response is negative, for four reasons. 
   
First, as explained above, Pakistan’s security revolves around strategic competition with 
India.  The US-India nuclear deal is seen as upsetting the balance that has prevailed in recent 
years and effectively consigning “the smaller countries in South Asia to Indian hegemony.”203  
As Rashid Rahman, Editor of the Post Newspaper, explained, 
 
The insecurity that Pakistan feels in a more enhanced manner now, because of this 
Indo-US nuclear deal, I think they will increase. And I think Pakistan will take 
steps. There is very much a real threat of a new arms race, and even more 
alarmingly, a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. I don't think this deal 
helps.204
 
Lt. General Talat Masood (retired) has stressed that the deal would have “severe implications for 
the issue of Kashmir, arms race in South Asia and regional stability.”205  In more succinct terms, 
the Pakistan Muslim League General Secretary, Senator Mushahid Hussain, has said that the US 
-India civil nuclear agreement “will lead to the start of cold war in the region.”206   
 
Pakistan believes that if the US supplies India with nuclear fuel, India will be able to 
divert its domestic supply to the production of nuclear weapons forcing Pakistan to respond in 
kind.   An editorial in the Urdu-language paper Jang argued that the 
 
US offer of civilian nuclear technology to India has created apprehensions in 
Pakistan, as there is a very thin line between civilian and military uses of nuclear 
technology.  And India has a very bad track record of fulfilling its 
commitments.207
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As Foreign Minister Mahmud Kasuri explained in an interview with Die Welt, a German 
newspaper, “The US offer for cooperation with India in the area of civilian nuclear technology 
enables India to acquire additional fissionable material and to use it for a strategic program.  This 
will lead to a strategic imbalance that jeopardizes peace.”208  Indeed, a July 2006 report claimed 
that Pakistan is in the midst of constructing a major heavy water nuclear reactor.  Upon 
completion, the 1,000 megawatt reactor might boost Pakistan’s weapons-grade plutonium 
production capabilities to more than 200 kilograms per year, or enough for up to 50 nuclear 
weapons.209
 
In a related issue, many Pakistanis believe the nuclear deal “will also provide opportunity 
to India to back out from the gas pipeline deal with Iran and Pakistan.”210  The pipeline, 
originally proposed in 1989-1990, is planned to extend from Iran through Pakistan and on to 
Delhi and requires cooperation from all three countries.  Estimated to cost $7 billion, the pipeline 
would stretch 2,100 kilometers, bringing 90 million cubic standard meters of natural gas to India 
every day.  The deal has suffered several setbacks, including staunch opposition from the US and 
US pressure on India and Pakistan to drop the deal.  For Pakistan, the US-India nuclear deal 
provides simply one more way the US is trying to undermine the pipeline.  Pakistan, however, 
expecting to profit from the transit of the natural gas, has said that it will go through with the 
plan, with or without India. 
 
Second, the deal is seen as hypocritical and based on a double standard of American 
strategic interests, as opposed to a genuine non-proliferation effort that would fairly include 
Pakistan.  First, the deal is seen as elevating India to the position of a nuclear power.  “Although 
India, like Pakistan and Israel, has refused to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the deal amounts 
to de facto acceptance of India as a legitimate nuclear weapons state.”211  Similarly, an editorial 
in Pakistani News noted, “Not long ago, the US State Department spoke of ‘poor Indian 
commitment to non-proliferation.’  But now India has [citing a more recent State Dept. quote]   
an ‘impeccable record on the question.”212  Moreover, Pakistan has the same energy needs as 
India, if not more, and American reasons for excluding Pakistan are seen as baseless.  As a 
public radio talk show commented, “Like India, Pakistan also has energy needs, and access to 
peaceful nuclear energy is its dire need, and this option should be open for all.”213  Tasnim 
Aslam, Foreign Office spokesperson, has said that “Pakistan has the same claim and expectation 
for international cooperation under safeguards for nuclear power generation, especially because 
Pakistan is a fossil fuel deficit country and has a significant and fully safeguarded nuclear power 
generation program.”214   In addition,  
 
Pakistan and India are nuclear weapons states which are not part of the NPT and, 
instead of making exception for one, it would have been better for the US to work 
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out a package deal that would take care of energy requirements of the two 
countries, the strategic stability in this region and would also take into account the 
non-proliferation effort.215
 
Foreign Minister Kasuri has said more pointedly, “We demand equality of treatment and we’ll 
continue to pursue it. We have a large population and a fast-growing economy. If the Indian deal 
goes through there are some things we will do.”216  This final comment seems to be about 
building the new nuclear reactor, as well as aligning Pakistan more closely with China, which 
will be discussed below. 
 
Third, for Pakistanis, the US-India deal also raises serious questions about US 
commitment to the NPT and international non-proliferation efforts.  For many years, the US 
stressed the need for non-proliferation in South Asia and this deal is seen as undermining all the 
rhetoric of the past.  In terms of non-proliferation, the deal is seen as “a violation of NPT and 
American laws and proof of a double standard of American leaders.”217  Shireen M. Mazari 
believes that “the deal totally undermines the NPT, and would have severe implications for 
international non-proliferation regime… such a deal would assist and encourage India to develop 
nuclear weapons.” 218   She also pointed out that the deal undermines Nuclear Suppliers Group 
guidelines and the objectives of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones.  According to Foreign Minister 
Kazuri,  
 
The whole nuclear non-proliferation treaty will unravel. It's only a matter of time 
before other countries will act in the same way… Nuclear weapons are the 
currency of power and many countries would like to use it. Once this goes through 
the NPT will be finished. It's not just Iran and North Korea. Brazil, Argentina and 
Pakistan will all think differently.”219
 
Pervez Hoodboy, a well respected Pakistani physicist, has stated more tersely, “the NPT is dead 
after this if this nuclear deal does go through.”220  Or as Iftikhar Ahmad wrote in The Nation 
(Pakistan), 
 
If the NPT becomes ineffective and the United States also abandons the goal of 
nuclear disarmament (against commitment to “the ultimate goal of nuclear 
disarmament”) it will make the global village a more dangerous place than ever 
before.  It is therefore the moral duty of the United States lawmakers to look into 
the implications of the US-India nuclear deal before final approval is granted.221
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Finally, from the Pakistani perspective, the US-India nuclear deal is simply the latest 
episode in US fickle behavior towards its loyal ally, Pakistan.  In March 2006, President Bush 
traveled to India and then on to Pakistan with the message that, “Pakistan and India are different 
countries with different needs and different histories.  So as we proceed forward, our strategy 
will take in effect those well-known differences   Pakistan took this as a slap in the face, as a few 
quotes make clear: 
 
• The Foreign Ministry spokesman: “There has been a perception in Pakistan, at the public 
level, that the US is not reliable friend.  They see this deal as one more evidence of 
that.”222 
• The Federal Minister for Information and Broadcasting: “We have sacrificed hundred 
and hundreds our soldiers. We have delivered the Khalid Sheik. We have sent in our 
70,000 troops on the Afghan border. And I believe that due to this decision, the Pakistani 
nation is in shock.”223  
• Dr. Tahir Amin, political analyst: “They feel embarrassed and alienated. They feel that 
somehow the United States has let them down. You could see the reversal of the peace 
process anytime.”224 
• An editorial in The Nation: “The US-India strategic agreement has given birth to a 
perception that Pakistan has been left high and dry.”225 
• An editorial in Pakistan Observer: “It’s frustrating because Pakistan is the United States’ 
traditional ally and has always remained a willing partner in the pursuit of the US agenda 
in the South Asian region.”226 
• An article in Dawn:  “There was a feeling of dismay and betrayal in Islamabad.  But that 
is the stuff of which US-Pakistan relations are made.  Recently.”227 
 
Overall, Pakistanis appear to believe that the United States will use Pakistan for the global war 
on terrorism and then abandon it again.  So many observers naturally question how much help 
Pakistan should really be giving the US.   
 
 This lack of trust in the US, in the wake of the US-India nuclear deal, has led many in 
Pakistan to call for closer relations with China.  Foreign Minister Kasuri has cautioned that “the 
US should be conscious of the sentiments of this country….Public opinion sees things in black 
and white. They compare the US to China and feel it has not been a constant friend the way 
China has.”228  The Minister for Information and Broadcasting seconded this view, by arguing 
that “our commitment with the China and friendship will be more strengthened, and people in 
Pakistan saying openly in the media that China is the only friend to whom we can trust.”  An 
editorial in The Nation remarked that “under the circumstances, while maintaining good relations 
with Washington, Pakistan should develop closer ties with China and improve relations with 
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Russia. As a step in this direction, it should concentrate on gaining the membership of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).”229  Similarly, an editorial in Khabrain warned that if 
the US did not extend a similar deal to Pakistan, “Pakistan would have no other option but to talk 
with other countries for its security requirements.”230  
Pakistan’s Potential Reactions to Proposed Future Changes in US Nuclear Policy 
As the previous section highlights, changes in the current US nuclear posture to 
implement the proposals leaked in the NPR would be viewed very negatively by Pakistan.  If the 
US builds new weapons or resumes testing, Pakistan would likely view this as a signal for others 
to do likewise.  As a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace states, “if the 
United States pursues new types of nuclear weapons, then others—Russia, China, India, and 
Pakistan, for example—are likely to do the same, to the extent they can. At the very least, they 
will be less supportive of nonproliferation and more resistant to US calls for them to forgo 
building up their own nuclear forces.”231  The result could have severe implications for South 
Asia.  Specifically, these types of changes in US nuclear policy could trickle down and 
incidentally spark even more competition and conflict between India and Pakistan.   
 
Although Speed and May argue “the change in US declaratory nuclear policy does not 
seem to have had an impact on Pakistan”232 in material terms, the analysis above certainly 
suggests that the recent changes in US nuclear policy have had very strong negative impact in 
perceptual terms. All of these changes have reinforced the more general view in Pakistan that the 
United States is a both a “fair weather friend,” ready to abandon Pakistan when its strategic 
interests dictate, and a duplicitous hypocrite in the realm of nuclear non-proliferation.  Given that 
its nuclear weapons program is central to its own security policy, Pakistan – more than the other 
countries examined in this paper – seems to place great credence in US nuclear policy by itself, 
in addition to its reactions to other US international policies.  Therefore, the way that US nuclear 
policy and actions appear to contribute to the global WMD proliferation problem – especially the 
NPR and the US-India nuclear deal – appear especially poignant to Pakistan.  This is definitely a 
place where two countries have differing views of what the “proliferation problem” is and thus 
have very different perspectives about how to “solve” it.  
 
For some Pakistani observers, the implications for Pakistan of US nuclear policy are 
clear.  As Mazari argues, “Pakistan needs to keep all of its nuclear options open” and review its 
relationship with the US, focusing instead more on “cooperative strategic frameworks with allies 
in the region” such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. 233
 
As far as actual reductions in the US nuclear stockpile or reversal of the policies laid out 
in the NPR and NSS, these would be welcome changes to Pakistan.  However, such changes 
seem unlikely to most Pakistanis.  Even if such changes do occur, the possibility that such 
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changes in US nuclear policy would lead to reductions in the Pakistani stockpile or a change in 
Pakistani doctrine is unlikely.  As the Carnegie report argues, “Pakistan will not give up its 
weapons if India does not, India will not if China does not, and China will not if the US and 
Russia do not.  Therefore, Pakistan will only give up its nuclear weapons through “a process of 
reciprocal global nuclear disarmament.”234
 
The net assessment, then, is that short of some type of global nuclear disarmament, a 
reduction in the number of US nuclear weapons would elicit almost no response from Pakistan.  
Conversely, as currently posed, potential physical changes in US nuclear weapons as well as 
changes in the doctrine associated with they how the weapons might be used would both elicit a 
negative response from Pakistan, with rather uncertain ramifications depending on how India 
responds, as well. 
 
 
GERMANY 
 
 Germany provides an interesting counterpoint to the other countries considered here, 
because it is both one of the United States’ closest allies and a non-nuclear weapon state.  
Defenders of the current US nuclear posture often argue that Germany would seriously consider 
renouncing its non-nuclear status if the nuclear umbrella is weakened beyond its present state.  
As Harald Mueller has argued, Germany often serves as “the pet bogeyman of nuclear pundits to 
defend the status quo.”235  This section examines that argument within the wider context of 
Germany’s views about recent changes to US nuclear policy and finds that the evidence does not 
support it.  Instead, Germany takes pride in its identity as a non-nuclear weapon state and as a 
steward of international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes – an identity that 
accords with Germany’s wider worldview that values multilateral, institutional solutions to 
global problems.   
 
Given how much it values multilateral, institutional efforts towards arms control, it is not 
surprising that Germany is critical of US nuclear policies. But like the other countries examined 
here, Germany does not view US nuclear policy in a vacuum, but rather within the context of the 
wider German-US relationship and other US international policies.  Thus, despite their 
differences of opinion on a variety of issues, Germany acknowledges the importance of its 
friendship with the United States, which often leads Germany to try to influence US policy from 
within the relationship and their common institutional networks.   
 
In other words, there is a tension for Germany between its dual identities as a leading 
non-nuclear state and as a member of a nuclear-based alliance, NATO.  Indeed, Germany itself 
could be perceived as hypocritical:  it enjoys the NATO nuclear umbrella, yet complains about it 
and does not always pull its weight to counter proliferation.  These dual identities provide the 
filter through which it perceives US nuclear policy. 
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German Perceptions of the United States 
 
 If the difference in worldview between Germans and Americans had to be boiled down to 
one sentence, it would be this:  while most Germans attribute an increasing importance and 
potential to solve global problems in multilateral institutional arrangements, they believe that 
most Americans do not.  This bothers Germany, because it recognizes that the institutional 
framework within which it is so embedded was created by the United States after World War II.  
Germans are critical of the United States’ increasing unilateralism for two reasons.  First, they 
believe this undermines their ability to influence the United States through NATO and other 
multilateral institutions.  Second, they believe this unilateralism is destabilizing for international 
security. 
 
 Germany perceives a power imbalance with the United States, partly because it perceives 
the US as acting with more dominance and less compromise.  In particular, Germans appear to 
resent the lack of consultation that they have been receiving from the US.  As an ally, they 
believe that they deserve US policymakers’ candor and an opportunity to discuss US policy 
decisions that will affect them – before those decisions are implemented.  As Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder argued about US policy towards Iraq in a September 2002 New York Times interview,  
 
Consultation cannot mean that I get a phone call two hours in advance only to be 
told ‘we are going in.’ Consultation among grown-up nations has to mean not just 
consultation about the how and the when, but also about the whether.236
 
There is also a concern that even when the US has engaged in “consultation,” it has been for 
show, without any real dialogue or compromise.237  Thus, most Germans view their country as 
no longer an equal partner with the United States; in a 2002 poll, 73 percent described the US as 
having a dominating role, while 26 percent still considered Germany an equal partner.238  
Equally understandably, Germans no longer count on the United States as their most important 
ally in international issues.  Transatlantic Trends polling data from 2003 show that France is now 
seen as Germany’s most important partner, and France is also considered a more reliable partner.  
The preference for France is part of a wider “Europe first” orientation that has emerged out of 
frustration with US foreign policy.239
 
 Underneath these poll results, it appears that Germans are upset that the strategic 
change in US foreign policy – with a preference for “coalitions of the willing” and 
unilateralism – is “choking off” one of the main avenues for German multilateralism, 
NATO.  This also contributes to the German sense of the US as not listening to its allies.   
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Germany embodies the European strategic cultural preference for multilateral, institutional and 
cooperative approaches to security problems.  Multilateralism involves a lot of diplomatic 
activity, an area where most European policymakers pride themselves on good performance.  
Europeans believe that the way forward is to engage problem states and find solutions to 
underlying problems, not merely to contain these states and freeze the situation into a hostile 
status quo.  Europeans favor diplomatic and political solutions over intrusive, unilateral and 
coercive ones.  Germans, in particular, embody this European strategic culture, perhaps in an 
effort to compensate for its aggressive, unilateral 20th century history.   
 
Germans perceive the United States as unskilled in diplomacy and too quick to write off 
some regimes as “beyond repair.”240  In their view, the US tendency to name and blame “rogue 
states” often creates self-fulfilling prophecies.241  Thus, it is not surprising that 74 percent of 
Germans “highly disapprove” of the axis of evil rhetoric.242  Germans also have a different 
perspective on the threat from WMD proliferation and terrorism than the United States does.243  
These different perspectives translate into different preferences for how to address the problem.  
For example, as German security analyst Peter Rudolf argues, “the preferred measures to combat 
terrorism lie – to a greater extent than among Americans – in the economic realm: in helping 
poor countries to develop their economies.”244
 
Germany tends increasingly to see America deploying its power unilaterally and in 
pursuit of narrow interests. German scholars have criticized American “disdain” for international 
law and multilateral organizations. They cite the “obvious disregard for the Geneva 
Conventions” in the Bush administration’s opinions about torture, the US rejection of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the Treaty banning landmines.  These scholars 
argue that US behavior has not only eroded US soft power, but by extension, is eroding Western 
European soft power as well.245  Moreover, German public opinion has consistently been highly 
critical of concrete US actions that are perceived as unilateral and self-interested, such as the war 
in Iraq, opposition to the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol.246  Thus, in Peter 
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Rudolf’s estimation, unilateralism – “not the predominant power” of the US, “but the way this 
power is used” – is “the main factor” in that more negative view of the US overall.247   
 
For example, in a June 2005 poll, when asked how desirable it is that the US exert strong 
leadership in world affairs, 60 percent of Germans said it was undesirable and 39 percent, 
desirable.  These numbers were almost exactly reversed in 2002, when 68 percent said US 
leadership was desirable and 27 percent called it undesirable.  Opinions about President Bush 
specifically were even more critical:  83 percent disapproved of Bush’s handling of foreign 
policy (up from 62 percent in 2002), while 16 percent approved (down from 36 percent in 
2002).248   
 
German Nuclear Policy 
 
Germany emerged from World War II deprived of the right to conduct any (civilian or 
military) nuclear activities.  Although the first post-war chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, renounced 
the production of nuclear weapons on German soil in a protocol to the 1954 Brussels Treaty, in 
which Germany acceded to the Western European Union, he expected this was a temporary 
setback.  His government tried to conclude a secret agreement with France and Italy to produce 
nuclear weapons together, but this project fell through when French President Charles DeGaulle 
was elected in 1958.  Then, in the early 1960s, under State Department pressure, Germany 
supported a US proposal of a NATO multilateral nuclear fleet, but that idea was eventually 
scuttled by President Johnson in the face of a general lack of support and because the Soviet 
Union refused to go forward with the NPT as long as it was on the table.  Adenauer’s party, the 
Christian Democrats, even blocked Germany’s signing of the NPT when it was first written in 
1968; it took a new government to sign the treaty in 1969, and Germany did not ratify the NPT 
until 1975.  Indeed, until the mid-1970s, Germany was “rather a brake on nuclear arms control.  
Adenauer [and the Christian Democrats more generally] did not want to give any concessions to 
Moscow because such signs of weakness could encourage Soviet ventures.”249
 
Starting in the mid-1970s, however, Germany became more active and favorable towards 
nuclear arms control.  It embraced an identity as a leading non-nuclear weapons state, an identity 
which has colored its behavior ever since.  Part of the reason for embracing this view is that 
because of the dense network of security institutions outlined above, “nuclear weapons are even 
more marginalized.”250  Mueller argues that, “Today, non-nuclear status, multilateral security 
policy, and support for arms control as an integral part of that policy have become part of the 
German identity and are doubted or criticized by very few.”251  As the following list of events 
suggests, there has been a steady evolution of the German attitude in a more and more non-
nuclear direction – both in terms of nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear energy.252  The 
                                                 
247 Rudolf, “Mutual perceptions,” p. 2. 
248 Transatlantic Trends poll data, cited by Donfried in her testimony before the US House of 
Representatives Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats (November 9, 2005). 
249 Mueller, “A View from Germany,” p. 345. 
250 Mueller, “A View from Germany,” p. 344. 
251 Mueller, “A View from Germany,” p. 347. 
252 For an overview of the evolution of German views towards nuclear energy, see Ernst Ulrich von 
Weizsaecker, “German Nuclear Policy,” in Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats, ed. 
 69
German government has even affirmed a position of phasing out nuclear energy (der Austieg) in 
Germany, and thus has been critical of the Bush Administration’s Global Nuclear Energy 
Program (GNEP) as well.253
 
Thus, Germany has a long history advocating a response to non-proliferation problems 
based on treaties and international agreements. 
 
• In 1987, during negotiations to eliminate all US and Soviet intermediate range 
nuclear systems, then Chancellor Helmut Kohl – “with the applause of a vast majority 
of the German public and all parties, including his own” – facilitated the agreement 
by offering up the Pershing IA.   
• In 1989, Germany persuaded the United States to renounce the modernization of the 
Lance missile.   
• In 1990, Germany reinforced its non-nuclear status as a reunified country in the 2+4 
Treaty that ended the four-power responsibilities for Germany and restored the 
country’s full sovereignty.254   
• In 1993, then Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel set out a robust ten-point non-
proliferation initiative, which asserted the importance of the NPT and other 
nonproliferation regimes and advocated disarmament of all existing nuclear arsenals – 
including the five NWS – through multilateral arms control.255   
• In 1994, the Bundestag unanimously voted for an indefinite extension of the NPT. 256 
• In 1998, Germany tried to move NATO to renounce its first-use doctrine, which 
caused significant friction within the alliance.257  Germany has also fought within 
NATO to ensure that the alliance remains strongly supportive of the various WMD 
nonproliferation regimes.258   
 
Most recently, in the run-up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the left-leaning Liberal 
Party called on the German government to urge the Americans to withdraw the tactical nuclear 
weapons deployed in Germany, “to strengthen the credibility of the non-proliferation regime and 
as a sign that the disarmament obligations of the nuclear weapons states are being taken 
seriously.”259   
 
But the tension inherent in the dual identities of leading non-nuclear weapons state and 
member of a nuclear-armed military alliance is also apparent in German positions on nuclear 
matters.  For example, in 1995, Germany protested French and Chinese nuclear tests.  Yet, then-
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Chancellor Helmut Kohl – trying not to create too much distance with his French ally – 
acknowledged that the French tests were a “sovereign decision.”260  More recently, many 
Germans were very critical of French President Chirac’s 2006 speech about French nuclear 
policy, in which he threatened “terror states” with retaliation in “non-conventional ways.”  Some 
German Bundestag members and the German defense minister warned that this would 
“militarize” the controversy over the Iranian nuclear program and perhaps spark a “nuclear arms 
race.”  Simultaneously, Chancellor Angela Merkel refused to speak against Chirac, perhaps 
trying to square the circle with France – as Kohl did after the 1995 French nuclear tests.261
 
 The tension between the two identities is also evident in German views about the 
continued basing of US nuclear weapons on German soil.262  These weapons became a point of 
contention in the week before Germany’s September 18, 2005 national elections, when reports of 
an updated US nuclear doctrine – the draft “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations” – hit prime-
time German news. (The doctrine will be discussed further below.)  As presented in German 
news, the doctrine contains a wide-ranging list of scenarios in which the US might be prepared 
for nuclear first-use, which “contradicts NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, which states that ‘the 
fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political’.”  During the election run-up, 
Claudia Roth, chair of the leftist Green Party, declared:  “For us it is absolutely unimaginable 
that the German armed forces continue to prepare for the use of nuclear weapons or that a 
nuclear weapons mission [could be] initiated from German soil.” 263  Shortly thereafter, the 
Christian Democrats, a traditionally right-leaning, pro-transatlantic party, called for a discussion 
of the draft doctrine within NATO.  (The Christian Democrats are now the only party in the 
Bundestag that supports the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Germany and NATO’s 
nuclear posture.  According to the party’s defense spokesman, they support this because it 
“guarantees political influence on the use or non-use of nuclear weapons.”264)  German scholars 
argue that having these nuclear weapons in Germany is not in German strategic interests, either.  
As Klaus-Dieter Schwarz argues, these weapons “are not very compatible with the new 
partnership with Russia and provide Moscow with an excuse to maintain its arsenal of tactical 
weapons.”265   
 
 German security analysts opine that it is unlikely that Angela Merkel’s “grand coalition” 
government will make removing the US weapons from Germany or rethinking NATO nuclear 
policy an immediate priority.  Although three smaller opposition parties (the pro-disarmament 
Greens, the free-market Liberals, and the left-wing socialists) openly favor withdrawal of US 
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nuclear weapons from European soil, the two larger parties in the “grand coalition” – Merkel’s 
Christian Democrats and the left-of-center Social Democrats – are likely to shy away from a 
confrontation with the Bush Administration.  As Oliver Meier argues, Merkel will “probably 
follow the line of her predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder, who was quoted in the daily paper 
Tageszeitung as declaring that he was ‘not going to have a row with the Americans just because 
of those 20 ‘thingamies’ ….”266 Moreover, German defense officials tend to view US nuclear 
weapons deployed in Germany “not as a military asset but as a communication channel” – in 
other words, having the weapons deployed there is one way Germany can keep some influence 
on US and NATO nuclear policies.267   
 
German Reactions to US Nuclear Policy 
 
 Given its self-identity as a leading non-nuclear state and its belief in the effectiveness of 
multilateral institutions to solve security problems, it is understandable that German reactions 
would focus most on the ways that US nuclear policy appears to undermine various international 
non-proliferation regimes.  Like Iran and Pakistan, Germany worries about perceived double 
standards and hypocrisy in US positions, but Germany does not take those double standards as 
personally as those other states do.  Instead, Germany worries most that US behavior “signals an 
abandonment of the various non-proliferation regimes, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy 
whereby such regimes become ineffective because the United States assumed they were.”268  In 
other words, Germans are upset because they believe that the current US approach is 
destabilizing the status quo that has been so beneficial for their security. 
 
US Decisions Seen as Undermining Non-Proliferation Regimes 
 
From the German perspective, US behavior severely undermines various non-
proliferation regimes – including the CTBT, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC), the 1972 ABM Treaty and the NPT and the protocols from its review 
conferences.  Germany, as a leading non-nuclear weapons state, sees itself as a guardian of these 
regimes.  
 
 Germans criticize the US decisions not to ratify the CTBT and the BTWC verification 
protocols.  Before the US Senate vote on ratifying the CTBT, German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder – together with French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair – bought a full-page advertisement in the New York Times that warned that a US failure to 
ratify would “expose a fundamental divergence within NATO.”269  When the treaty was 
ultimately rejected by the Senate, this was viewed by these leaders “as a slap in the face” because 
they had very publicly laid their credibility on the line in its support.  Earlier, after European 
leaders had invested a lot of effort negotiating verification protocols to the 1972 BTWC, they 
viewed the US as “torpedoing” their efforts and felt betrayed.270
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Most Germans were also highly critical of the US decision to withdraw from the 1972 
ABM Treaty and proceed with building a national missile defense program.  US withdrawal 
from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 is seen as a repudiation of arms control in general and an 
open invitation to other states (particularly Russia and China) to respond by building more 
offensive nuclear weapons.271  For example, Stefan Kornelius argued in the Sueddeutsche 
Zeitung, although the treaty has little “practical value” today, the US decision to unilaterally 
terminate it “signal[s] indifference with respect to arms policy.  The treaty is associated with a 
spirit of trust, understanding and mutual control.  Anyone who willfully withdraws from the rules 
of arms control destroys this spirit.”272  The lone German voice found in the literature review 
arguing the other perspective was Oliver Thraenert, a security analyst at the German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs. Thraenart supported the US decision to withdraw from the 
ABM Treaty, arguing that the treaty “belonged to a different age of ‘mutual assured destruction’ 
and can no longer be the basis in the 21st century.”273  (The missile defense program will be 
discussed below.) 
 
Finally, Germans argue the United States has backtracked from its commitments as a 
signatory of the NPT, and especially from the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive 
implementation of Article VI, that it signed at the 2000 Review Conference.  In addition to the 
“unequivocal undertaking” by nuclear weapons states to eliminate their arsenals, these 13 steps 
include ratification of the CTBT; the principle of irreversibility as applied to nuclear 
disarmament and related arms control and reduction measures; full implementation of START II 
and conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM 
treaty; increased transparency regarding nuclear weapons capabilities; concrete measures to 
reduce the operational status of  nuclear weapons; and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in 
security policies.   
 
German analysts point to the ways that the United States no longer considers itself bound 
to all of these commitments:274
• The US has not ratified the CTBT. 
• Although the US and Russia signed the Moscow Treaty, the treaty does not 
require the destruction of any nuclear weapons, but only limits deployed delivery 
systems, which contradicts the principle of “irreversibility” for arms control and 
nuclear disarmament. 
• Rather than strengthening the ABM Treaty, the US has withdrawn from it. 
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• By promoting a qualitatively improved nuclear arsenal and the development of 
new types of weapons systems such as earth penetrators, the NPR appears to 
increase the role of nuclear weapons in US security policies. 
• The NPR does not mention the NPT at all. 
 
In addition to these actions, top US officials have also suggested that the United States is 
reassessing its commitments made at the 2000 Review Conference.  John Bolton, then under 
secretary of state for arms control and international security, told Arms Control Today in March 
2002 that “we take our obligations under the NPT very seriously.” But at the same time, he 
implied that the United States might no longer support all 13 practical steps: “In terms of what 
was said at the 1995 and 2000 NPT conferences, we’re reviewing all of that in the context of our 
preparation for the 2005 Review Conference.”275  The following month, then US ambassador to 
the Conference on Disarmament Eric Javits, speaking to the 2002 NPT Preparatory Committee, 
said the Bush administration only “generally agrees” with the conclusion of the 2000 Review 
Conference and that “we no longer support some of the conclusions” in the final document from 
that conference.276   
 
 German security analyst Goetz Neuneck argues that US behavior has “completely 
undermined” all 13 practical steps signed at the 2000 Review Conference, and he cites the final 
report of the United Nations High Level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change, which warned 
that “we are nearing the point of no return in the hollowing out of global nonproliferation 
regimes, which could create a further cascade of proliferation.”277  
 
Similarly, from the German perspective, the United States’ support of undeclared nuclear 
weapons states also undermines the NPT.  As Oliver Thraenert argues (assuming like many 
others that Israel’s alleged nuclear arsenal is real),  
 
The fact that three nuclear weapons states – India, Pakistan and Israel – remain 
outside the NPT is a heavy burden on the treaty.  None of these three have made 
any move to suggest that they would give up their nuclear weapons.  Furthermore, 
they are all important partners for the United States.  Therefore, Washington puts 
no pressure on them to join the NPT….The situation is seen as unjust by many 
non-nuclear weapons states.  Therefore, there exists a danger that an increasing 
number of these states can no longer be persuaded to take an active part in the 
NPT process or, perhaps, to accept the expanded modern verification 
procedures.278
 
In response to the US unilateral actions listed above, German analysts call for Europeans 
to step up to strengthen multilateral non-proliferation regimes and support disarmament, even in 
situations where the United States refuses to cooperate.  As Meier and Neuneck argue, “Europe 
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should demonstrate its own multilateral approach more confidently and should try to encourage 
rulings which strengthen security whenever possible, even without American support.”279  More 
specifically, Thraenert suggests that, “as a non-nuclear weapons state, Germany has traditionally 
had considerable interest in maintaining and strengthening the NPT.”  Moreover, “as the largest 
non-nuclear weapons state, Germany has an important role to play within the EU” on 
disarmament policy.  Therefore, he argues, Germany should work on improving the treaty and 
pressing Israel, India and Pakistan to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states.  He recognizes 
that “this demand may have taken on the form of a ritual, but sometimes, it is better to cling to a 
ritual than to abandon it, for renouncing it would probably have graver consequences.”280
 
The 2002 US Nuclear Policy Review and 2001 National Security Strategy 
 Germany has been critical of the NPR, for five reasons.  First, the NPR is viewed as 
undermining the NPT and the agreements reached at both the 1995 and 2000 Review 
Conferences.  In this view, not only does the NPR put into question the indefinite extension of 
the treaty and the nuclear weapon states’ commitment to implement Article VI in good faith, it 
also amounts to an “unequivocal rejection” of most of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 
Conference.281  Because of the NPR and NSS, Thraenert argues, 
 
Nuclear weapons are experiencing a general renaissance and again becoming a 
‘normal’ instrument of security policy….The United States makes it clear that 
nuclear weapons will still have a prominent role in US national defense strategy.  
Thus, the fulfillment of the NPT’s disarmament pledge recedes further into the 
distance.282
 
More specifically, Germans believe that the US is breaching its NPT obligations and 
commitments made at the 1995 NPT Review Conference by targeting non-nuclear states.  In this 
view, targeting non-nuclear states with nuclear arms undermines US negative security assurances 
and threatens the foundation of multilateral arms control.   For Germans, the grand bargain 
behind the NPT is that non-nuclear weapons states forswear nuclear arms in return for assurances 
that they will not be attacked by nuclear arms.  If the US reneges on the second part of the 
bargain, some countries may decide to renege on the first.  For this reason, German Deputy 
Foreign Minister Ludger Volmer reacted to the NPR by saying that “such a strategy could 
endanger the disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.”  He called US plans to 
retaliate with nuclear arms against non-nuclear states that use chemical or biological weapons 
“extremely questionable.”283
 
 Second, Germans argue that the NPR and the draft Doctrine on Joint Nuclear Operations 
could motivate other states to develop or build weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear 
weapons.  Ottfried Nassauer, the head of the Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic 
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Security, argued in 2003 that the NPR “runs counter to our efforts for arms control.  The 
deployment threshold for nuclear weapons is being lowered, and it encourages other countries to 
also further develop nuclear weapons.”284  Gernot Erler, an influential Social Democrat and 
member of the Bundestag, told German n-tv that “the conclusion is clear:  [a nation that] forgoes 
nuclear weapons is without protection against US pressure.”285   Analysts argue the US decision 
to build new weapons shows a “double standard” to Third World countries, which are told they 
cannot acquire nuclear weapons.286  As Thraenert puts it,  
 
In giving up nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear weapons states as a rule assumed 
that the difference between the nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons 
states would not continue for eternity but would be abolished in the not too distant 
future…the implementation of modern verification procedures will only be 
acceptable to many non-nuclear weapons states if the nuclear weapons states take 
nuclear disarmament seriously and not…assign nuclear weapons a key role in 
their national defense strategy.287
 
Third, Germans also have expressed concern that the NPR’s call for developing a new 
generation of low-yield, earth-penetrating tactical weapons blurs the boundary between 
conventional and nuclear weapons.  In the past, nuclear weapons were used for deterrence, but 
this blurred line will move the nuclear weapons “into the ‘normal’ arms arsenal” and thus make 
them more usable, according to Nikolas Busse, writing for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.  
Interviewing German defense officials and security analysts, Busse summarizes two additional 
criticisms of the new weapons proposed in the NPR.  First, these “tactical” nuclear weapons 
could increase the “nuclearization” of US security policy.  More importantly, the earth-
penetrating weapons may not be effective.  “Military officials” interviewed for the article point 
to the US B61-11, which was designed for underground targets but can only explode about six 
meters below the surface – far short of underground bunkers being built today at depths greater 
than 100 meters.  In Busse’s words, “it is technically very difficult to construct a nuclear weapon 
that will explode only after it has drilled down many meters…therefore it is unrealistic to dream 
of a bomb that will not have any [radioactive] contamination.”288
 
Another analysis of the low-yield earth penetrating weapons argues astutely that the 
policy was designed for US domestic political reasons.  Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, writing about 
earth penetrating “mini-nukes”, as well as the RRW program, suggested in a footnote that “one 
gets the impression that these projects are primarily designed to find new tasks for the nuclear 
military-industrial complex.”289
 
Fourth, similar to their concern about national missile defense, Germany worries new 
military capabilities in the nuclear arena could widen the capability gap between the US and its 
NATO allies.  As Jean du Preez argues,  
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The NPR and the US National Security Strategy thus puts NATO countries in the 
position of either living with a shift of the balance of power further towards the 
United States or committing themselves to new expenditures in order to keep their 
arsenals relevant…. Some European leaders fear that the US nuclear doctrine, 
seen in conjunction with the current administration’s preference for unilateral 
action in conflict situations, could make European members of NATO ‘irrelevant’ 
as military allies. 290
  
In a similar manner – echoing more general German perceptions of the US discussed above – 
some Germans were concerned that the NPR was adopted by the United States without any 
consultation with its allies, simply “leaving them behind,” as an editorial in the Berliner Zeitung 
put it. Given how destabilizing the NPR and NSS may be for German security, this caused much 
resentment.291  As Meier argues, the non-nuclear members of NATO, including Germany, 
 
participated in nuclear sharing – a policy that was developed during the Cold War 
to deepen US-European military ties and to create a forum where Europe could 
have its say on Washington’s nuclear policies.  But times have changed, and 
nuclear sharing no longer gives Europeans any influence on US nuclear 
thinking.292
 
Finally, and most importantly, Germany is concerned that the new US nuclear doctrine 
could have profound implications for NATO nuclear policy and German security.  In other 
words, Germans are worried about what political scientists call alliance “chain ganging” – when 
one state engages in aggressive behavior that pulls its ally into a situation against the ally’s own 
best interests.293  For example, Uwe Vorkoetter argues that “NATO’s security policy credibility 
will be seriously shaken if its leading power acts differently from what the alliance partners are 
saying.”294  German analysts scoff at the argument that the United States NPR, NSS and the 
2005 draft Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations are US-only national policy documents that 
have no bearing on NATO’s nuclear policy.  Calling this argument a “half-truth,” Meier argues: 
 
US nuclear doctrine has profound implications for NATO’s nuclear posture:  
What if the White House ordered the use of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe to 
destroy a suspected biological weapons cache in a Mideast country?  Allies might 
expect Washington to consult NATO in advance, but the only way they could 
prevent an actual deployment would be to deny overflight rights for US aircraft 
carrying nuclear weapons to their intended targets.295
 
Similarly, Harald Mueller and Stephanie Sohnius have warned German foreign 
policymakers that German armed forces could be drawn into a US-initiated nuclear exchange if 
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they were part of a NATO deployment abroad.  In an article titled, “The New US Nuclear 
Doctrine: a dangerous mistake,” they argue that the draft joint doctrine lists several scenarios in 
which a US regional commander may request presidential approval for use of nuclear weapons – 
without ally consultation – including a situation in which a nuclear weapon might be necessary 
to ensure “success of US multinational operations.”296  In another monograph, Mueller and 
Sohnius argue further that the NPR “conventionalizes” nuclear weapons use, which goes against 
the NATO “de-emphasis” of nuclear weapons put forth in the 1991 NATO nuclear policy.297
 
US National Missile Defense Program 
 
In addition to their criticism of the US decision to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty, 
discussed above, Germans are critical of the US national missile defense program.  Nonetheless, 
German discussion about the US NMD program provides an excellent demonstration of the fine 
line that Germany walks between its dual identities as a leading non-nuclear weapon state and an 
ally of the United States and member of the nuclear-armed NATO alliance.  The government 
changed its position on NMD, eventually muting its criticism to strengthen relations with the 
new Bush Administration.  
 
First, Germans believe that NMD is destabilizing for international security.  German 
leaders have said that they view the US national missile defense program as an incentive to 
proliferate WMD, undermining rather than reinforcing security.298  As Patrik Schwarz argued in 
the Berliner Tageszeitung, NMD is  
 
militarily aggressive…it gives the United States the aura of invulnerability.  Even 
if this is technically illusory, a dangerous effect develops. Potential enemies feel 
all the more provoked, because they suspect an American grasping for world 
power; the Americans themselves will be enticed into military adventurism.299   
 
Similarly, Stefan Kornelius argued in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung that “subliminally America may 
dream of invulnerability…the America of a George W. Bush is inspired with the notion of being 
internally strong so that it can pursue its external mission.”  As a result, NMD could be “the 
breeding place for a new distrust, for a new escalation of armament, and for confrontation and 
the formation of camps.”300  Some Germans also worried that the planned upgrade to US 
military capabilities that the NMD program will entail “could widen the gap between the 
military-technological capabilities of the United States and its European allies.”301   
 
 Second, many analysts questioned whether the system would even work. Sueddeutsche 
Zeitung quoted a NATO official as saying that the Bush Administration’s NMD “is like selling 
us [allies] a new car without a guide, a sample, or a blueprint.”  Handelsblatt pointed out that if 
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the United States intercepts a target missile during the middle or latter stage of its flight, it is akin 
to “staking everything on a single throw.” Moreover, because those who fire the missile can 
launch decoys, “it is too easy for the defenders to be deceived.”302  
 
 Given such comments, it is perhaps not surprising that in a poll shortly after Bush was 
inaugurated in 2001, 64 percent of Germans feared that missile defense could trigger a new arms 
race, and 73 percent called on the German government not to participate in the system.  
Moreover, 44 percent believed that the German-American relationship would be permanently 
impaired by the NMD program, whereas 41 percent believed that it would remain good.303
 
 The official German government stance on US NMD provides another example of the 
tension in Germany’s different identities.  Given such negative public opinion, it is 
understandable that German politicians were very critical of the proposal.  The Free Democratic 
Party questioned whether the program would ever be technologically feasible and pointed to its 
huge costs.  The Green Party argued that it would hurt international arms control efforts. 304  Of 
all the major political parties, only the right-center Christian Democrats supported Germany 
participating in the US NMD program and called on the government to formulate a missile 
defense policy in coordination with NATO.305
 
Even Chancellor Schroeder and his Social Democrat Party (SPD) were initially very 
critical, although eventually their position changed to accept the US program.  Gernot Erler, the 
deputy chairman of the SPD in the Bundestag, said in an interview that NMD would only protect 
against a fraction of the dangers facing the United States and thus “reduces to one singular 
problem, in an irresponsible manner, the catalogue of pending security policy issues and their 
possible responses.”306  Schroeder, in a televised interview in early February 2001, argued that 
the discussion with the United States about NMD was not being conducted “in a manner he felt 
was appropriate” and argued that the program “could lead to a renewed arms race and different 
levels of security within NATO that may even affect the alliance’s cohesion.”307   
 
A few weeks later, however, Schroeder had shifted his position, emphasizing instead that 
Germany had an interest in participating in the development of the technology necessary to 
implement the system.  As Guenther Bannas observed, Schroeder’s “intention clearly was to ease 
the dialogue with the new Bush administration, which seems determined to go ahead with 
NMD.”308  This muted criticism makes strategic sense, given the tension in German foreign 
policy between staunch support of non-proliferation initiatives and the desire to maintain 
amicable transatlantic relations.  Yet it opened Schroeder to serious domestic criticism.  For 
                                                 
302 Quoted in Huang Yong, “Differences still exist between Europe and the United States on the missile 
defense issue,” Beijing Xinhua News Service (May 4, 2001). 
303 Klaus-Peter Schoeppner, “Germans not frightened by Bush’s Hawks – Large Majority wants self-
confident foreign policy,” Die Welt (February 21, 2001). 
304 Hans-Juergen Leersch, “Growing Resistance to US Missile Plans,” Die Welt (February 23, 2001). 
305 “CDU/CSU in favor of participation in missile defense system,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (March 
15, 2001). 
306 Leersch, “Growing Resistance to US Missile Plans.”  
307 Guenther Bannas, “Schroeder shifts position on US missile shield,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(February 28, 2001). 
308 Bannas, “Schroeder shifts position on US missile shield.” 
 79
example, in an article in Der Spiegel magazine, titled, “It Just Amazes You,” Juergen Hogrefe 
and Alexander Szandar highlighted the hypocrisy in the German government’s flip-flop: 
 
It is now clear to the Chancellor that stubborn rejection of the NMD plan will not 
get him any further.  He does not doubt the new US president wants to have the 
high-tech defense developed at all costs.  So it seems more sensible to him to 
quickly jump on the bandwagon instead of sulking in a corner.  It was ‘completely 
right’ to strictly oppose NMD, as long as one was dealing with a hesitating 
government on the other side of the Atlantic [the Clinton Administration], which 
apparently itself did not fully support the NMD program, as it is said at Joschka 
Fischer’s Defense Ministry.  The current version of the Chancellor’s cooperation 
is nothing but an ‘organic development’ of the position in a ‘changing landscape.’  
After all, the federal government has always demanded to share in the technology 
of the new armament program.309
 
 As with the NPT, German analysts argue that Germany should play a leading role in 
helping the United States to change its position on national missile defense and reintegrate its 
actions within the nonproliferation regime.  As German academics Joachim Krause and Oliver 
Thraenert argued in a 2001 editorial in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  
 
America’s allies should make it their priority to point out that missile defense 
alone cannot be a politically effective strategy.  It can only be useful in terms of 
comprehensive security policy, particularly effective non-proliferation policy, if it 
is integrated within the overall security policy system. In particular, the 
opportunities for far-reaching measures towards nuclear disarmament must be 
improved.310
 
The US-India Nuclear Deal 
 
 Germany has been less outspoken about the US-India nuclear deal than other states 
examined in this analysis.  Overall, however, German commentary has been critical of the deal, 
for many of the same reasons cited by China, Pakistan and Iran.  Most importantly, German 
observers worry that this reinforces a double standard, in which American allies are allowed to 
have undeclared nuclear weapons while other states are not.  Karl Grobe pessimistically 
concluded in the Frankfurter Rundschau:  “With this, Bush officially turned the Non-
Proliferation Treaty into waste paper….To move Iran’s Ayatollah’s to renounce their suspected 
nuclear arms program will now become more difficult.”311  Similarly, Frank Harold in the 
Berliner Zeitung opined that, 
 
Contrary to Iran, India has never signed the NPT and has no intention to do so.  
Promises to use the US technology for peaceful purposes only are non-binding 
and can be taken back at any time.  The agreement cannot be controlled because 
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India is moving beyond international control systems.  The US therefore wants to 
include bilateral control mechanisms in the contract.  This is not a way out, but 
sets a dangerous precedent.  If India is granted an exception, why should not Iran 
and North Korea get the same?  In the current efforts to get both countries to 
refrain from nuclear weapons, an Indian-American nuclear treaty would be 
completely unproductive.  Moreover, it could motivate other developing countries 
to be less reserved.312
 
In addition, some German analysts stressed that this deal demonstrated that the United States was 
more motivated by its own strategic interests than by international non-proliferation goals.  For 
example, Sven Hansen, in the Berliner Tageszeitung, argued that, 
 
Given the American-Indian agreement, Iran and North Korea will view the US 
criticism of their nuclear programs as pure hypocrisy and believe that the US 
threats are just power politics.  Tehran and Pyongyang will come to the 
conclusion that if they get hold of nuclear weapons by pursuing tricky policies, 
Washington will have to accept these realities.  This is the dangerous message of 
yesterday’s agreement.  It further weakens the international non-proliferation 
regime…The new agreement is also tomorrow’s US power politics….It is 
regrettable that the agreement came with a high political price tag.313
 
Yet some Germans also see an upside, in that the International Atomic Energy Agency will 
finally get oversight of the civilian part of the Indian nuclear program.  For example, as Klaus-
Dieter Frankenberger argued in the Frankfurter Allgemeine,  
 
Given the current conflict over Iran’s nuclear program, a country that unlike India 
signed the NPT, the American-Indian civil nuclear agreement has far-reaching 
significance.  Critics are wrong to view it as a danger that sets a bad precedent 
and counteracts international non-proliferation efforts…Are double standards 
applied here? Of course, Bush’s concessions are in part realpolitik and have to do 
with international coalitions as well as the rise of China.  If the dangerous 
development cannot be reversed, it should at least be controlled.  That is the 
reason why the IAEA welcomed the agreement.  It will get overseeing powers it 
did not have before.314
 
Such views notwithstanding, from a German perspective the US-India nuclear deal is another 
example of US hypocrisy, by choosing to place its own strategic interests ahead of its stated 
global non-proliferation goals. 
Germany’s Potential Reactions to Proposed Future Changes in US Nuclear Policy 
 It is unlikely that Germany will change course and decide to pursue a nuclear weapons 
program.  It values its non-nuclear identity and the multilateral institutional frameworks that 
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undergird its security policy too much.  As Mueller argues, the non-nuclear attitude of the 
German public “would make it suicidal for any serious politician to make a political platform out 
of this subject.”  In his estimation, this would only change if there were an “extraordinary” 
change in events, such as: 
 
The security situation must deteriorate, with a fully reemerged and ostentatiously 
hostile Russia pushing westward once more; the institutional framework must 
unravel, with NATO dissolved and the European Union breaking down under a 
fatal German-French divorce; and the internal balance of political forces must 
give way to a landmark shift to the far right.315
 
The likelihood that this combination of circumstances will occur is highly unlikely. 
 
 Germany would likely support any US moves towards reducing the stockpile, eliminating 
kinds of weapons or de-alerting.  As Mueller argues, “one can expect that a majority of people 
and the elite would welcome such steps and strongly support it.”316  At the same time, Germany 
is likely to be highly critical of changes in US nuclear policy that appear destabilizing for 
international nonproliferation regimes and seem to reinforce the NPR’s trend towards 
unilateralism.  But US nuclear policy is not viewed in a vacuum by Germans; they look at all US 
behavior across policy areas.  Thus, the United States could balance behavior in the nuclear 
arena that destabilized international regimes with behavior in another policy area that enhanced 
international cooperation. For example, the United States could throw its support behind 
international efforts to overhaul the UN Security Council to make it more effective. 
 
Such trade-offs could be made within the nuclear policy area as well.  For example, given 
that the central German concern with the US national missile defense program is, as they see it, 
its effect of scuttling the ABM Treaty and weakening existing nonproliferation regimes, one way 
to mollify the Germans would be for the United States to make a parallel investment in the 
surviving regimes.  As Joanna Spears argues, “If the United States moved from being a block on 
these regimes to supporting what they were trying to achieve (and recognizing their role as one 
element in a web of deterrence), it would reap some further security benefits and would ease 
tensions with its transatlantic partners.”317   
 
As the discussion of the shifting official German view of the US national missile defense 
program suggests, Germany may mute its criticisms of US nuclear policies in an effort to 
minimize tensions between the allies.  But the United States would be imprudent to assume that 
Germany will always behave that way, or to push Germans into that position frequently.  Instead, 
the US could gain valuable points by trying to meet Germany halfway through investing in other 
cooperative measures. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has examined how various actors in the international community – including 
allies, developing states and potential adversaries – perceive US nuclear policy. As such, it fills a 
vacuum in the current debate about the future of US nuclear policy and the future of the US 
nuclear complex.  It examines how various states responded to the last change in US nuclear 
posture, to see what lessons might be obtained for proposed future changes.  The purpose of this 
paper was to present data that is not easily accessible or frequently summarized for US decision 
makers, to help inform the current conversations about the future of the US nuclear complex. 
 
As discussed in the literature review, there has been much debate in policy circles about 
the effect of US nuclear policy on global nuclear proliferation.  Some observers argue that US 
nuclear policy has no effect on other states’ decisions to acquire nuclear weapons.  Rather, they 
argue, states decide to proliferate for domestic political or regional security concerns.  An 
alternate view, which is supported by the data presented here, is that US decisions do matter and 
can lead other states to be more inclined to acquire their own nuclear weapons.  As Tom Sauer 
argues,  
 
It is very unlikely that states like Iran or North Korea, or even India and Pakistan, would 
have tried to acquire nuclear weapons, had nuclear weapons never been invented.  It was 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the US that forced the USSR to produce nuclear 
weapons.  The latter was a major incentive or at least a major justification for France and 
the UK to build nuclear weapons…  This does not mean that the elimination of nuclear 
weapons by one state would automatically mean the elimination of the other nuclear 
weapons arsenals.  The point is that the longer the nuclear weapons states do not fulfill 
their obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons as agreed upon in the NPT and as clarified 
in the NPT Review Conferences later on, the more non-nuclear weapon states will get 
nervous and may start acquiring nuclear weapons as well.318
 
As this quote suggests, as the remaining global superpower, the United States is often held to a 
higher standard in most issue areas, including its responsibilities under Article VI and 
commitments made at the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  
Thus, any small changes in US nuclear policy that are perceived as moving away from 
disarmament are judged harshly in the international community as increasing global nuclear 
danger. 
 
 Nonetheless, the importance of US nuclear policy should not be oversold.  Although the 
analysis presented here indicates that the four states do have opinions about US nuclear policy, 
the number of articles surveyed that address other US policies greatly overshadow the nuclear 
dimension.  This should not be taken to mean that US nuclear policies are not important, but 
rather that when weighing the impact of its nuclear policy on other states, the US should consider 
the multitude of other messages that are being sent at the same time.  Those messages are sent 
via public speeches, news media sources, Internet, and “official” policy, but most importantly, 
they are sent through US actions.  US political, economic and defense activities in the region 
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around a target country need to be considered when trying to predict how that state will react to 
new developments.   
 
Therefore, although nuclear policy is arguably an important signaling device in the 
international system, this analysis finds that: 
 
• Each of these states views US nuclear policy through the prism of other aspects of its 
bilateral relationship with the United States, as well as the prism of its own nuclear 
posture.   
• The US nuclear posture is relatively unimportant by itself.  Instead, the US nuclear 
posture is just one factor in how these states perceive and respond to the United States.  
Moreover, US nuclear policy cannot be separated from historical and current political 
situations. 
• US nuclear policy, by itself, only seems to matter if it directly affects another state’s 
regional security and stability.  For example, the US nuclear energy deal with India 
matters greatly to Pakistan, because from Pakistan’s perspective, it has altered the 
strategic balance of power in the region. 
• Most importantly, the US nuclear posture is not seen in a vacuum, but as one piece of the 
United States’ behavior on the world stage.  These states generally argue that the United 
States is hypocritical in its nuclear posture, and that the nuclear realm is simply one more 
issue area where the United States exhibits exceptionalism in the international system. 
 
 It is especially striking that despite the differences in these four states – in terms of their 
respective relationships with the United States as well as their own nuclear postures – all four 
appear to agree on some basic beliefs about the United States.  The evidence in this paper 
suggests that these states believe that the United States is hypocritical and that its actions 
demonstrate double standards – one set for the US and its allies, and another set for all others. 
For the US, these states cite the US determination to maintain nuclear weapons and a perceived 
increased role for nuclear weapons in US security policy as inconsistent with US calls for global 
non-proliferation. For US allies, they cite US support for undeclared (India, Pakistan) or alleged 
(Israel) nuclear weapons states while censuring “rogues” for similar behavior.  In this regard, the 
recently ratified US nuclear energy deal with India raised the greatest critiques, for it appears to 
exemplify the Bush Administration’s non-proliferation policy as supporting what George 
Perkovitch has characterized “democratic bombs.” In this view, nuclear weapons are not the 
problem, non-democratic regimes are.319  This perception of hypocrisy has eroded US soft power 
and the legitimacy of US global leadership.   
 
This finding is very similar to the conclusions of the SAIC study, which examined 
foreign responses from a broader perspective.  Like this paper, in its survey of nearly 50 
countries, SAIC found that: 320
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• Other countries view US nuclear policy through a wider lens of US foreign policy more 
broadly, and that policy entails US unilateral action and “a US pursuit of absolute 
security and military primacy.”   
• There is a “widespread perception” that the US is “placing heightened emphasis on 
nuclear weapons as part of overall US defense posture, shifting from a posture of nuclear 
deterrence to one of nuclear war-fighting if not nuclear preemption, while intentionally or 
unintentionally lowering the threshold of nuclear weapons use.” 
• US missile defenses are “increasingly welcomed” by allies, but “still a concern” for 
Russia and China. 
• The US is “widely perceived to be seeking to escape from deterrence relationships with 
new adversary nuclear powers” (such as North Korea and Iran). 
• US allies and friends “oppose US development of new, tailored, low-yield nuclear 
weapons as unnecessary, potentially dangerous, politically divisive and adversely 
impacting non-proliferation.” 
• There are “widespread concerns among US allies and friends (not simply among the 
traditional disarmament activists)” that US nuclear policy and posture are “giving 
nuclear weapons a heightened security role,” with “possible adverse non-proliferation 
impacts.”  
• Close US allies argue that “a greater US readiness to engage on nuclear disarmament 
issues would pay off in increased support from other third parties in pursuing US non-
proliferation objectives.” 
 
The fact that these two studies, with very different analytical methodologies, reached similar 
conclusions gives us confidence in the finding’s robustness. 
 
 This finding has three implications, and these implications point out the difference 
between material and perceptual effects.  First, because these states do not treat US nuclear 
policy in a vacuum, it is unlikely that small changes in US nuclear policy will have a drastic 
material effect on US relations with these states, unless the policy changes are perceived as 
being congruent with other US policies and actions.  Second, the evidence suggests that US 
nuclear policy would matter even less – in terms of the material relationships with other states – 
if it was perceived to diverge from other policies or actions.   
 
Perceptual relationships, however, are another matter.  The third implication of this 
research is that nuclear policy matters immensely for the United States’ international reputation.  
Such reputation effects can have significant impact in terms of gaining international cooperation 
in addressing global issues that require multilateral solutions – and given the interdependent 
nature of the world today, most issues fall into this category.   In contrast to a state’s hard power, 
soft power provides an indirect way to influence others.  Soft power is an invaluable asset to:  (1) 
keep potential adversaries from gaining international support and winning moderates over to 
their causes; (2) influence neutral and developing states to support US leadership; and, (3) 
convince allies to support and share the international security burden.  The United States needs 
soft power assets (including “the moral high ground”) to solve these problems multilaterally and 
proactively. 
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As stated at the outset of this study, it is important to recognize that the analysis 
presented here is not the “objective truth” about US nuclear policy, but a summary of 
international perceptions and beliefs about US nuclear policy.  If the data about international 
perceptions rankle, they help us to be aware of our own biases, especially about the interaction 
between hard and soft power.  This analysis suggests that both hard and soft power is important.  
To accomplish its own objectives most effectively in the world, the United States needs both 
kinds of power operating in tandem. 
 
 Although this analysis suggests that the four nations studied view US nuclear policy 
specifically (and its international behavior more generally) as hypocritical, it is neither possible – 
nor recommended – for the United States simply to take these criticisms to heart and unilaterally 
disarm.  Indeed, it would be incredibly imprudent to simply bow down to what everyone else 
wants.  Instead, this analysis has three benefits.    
 
 First, it allows US policymakers simply to know and understand what everyone else 
wants, which creates the space for negotiation.  If other states did not receive the message we 
were intending to send, we still need to know what message they did receive.  This will allow us 
to send our message more clearly in the future.  Like the SAIC study, this paper recommends 
that the US needs to do a better job at articulating US nuclear policy, so that other actors are not 
left to draw their own conclusions, or worse, so that other actors cannot articulate US policy for 
us through the lens of their own agendas.  
 
 Yet, this is not to imply that the US is simply being misunderstood and if it were to send 
the message more clearly, all of the disagreements would evaporate.  From the perspective of 
these other countries, US hypocrisy and double standards are not just a matter of perception, but 
is also conditioned by logic and their own national interests.  For example, why is it acceptable 
to build light water reactors in North Korea but not Iran?  Why does the US sanction Pakistan’s 
weapons program only when it is convenient for the US?  Why doesn’t the US press Israel, 
widely believed to have nuclear weapons, to become party to the NPT?  Why is the US 
overturning 30 years of nonproliferation policy to sell nuclear technology to India, which doesn’t 
have to eliminate nuclear weapons, sign the CTBT or accept full-scope IAEA safeguards?  Some 
legitimate disagreements do exist, and the US needs to respond to these disagreements 
appropriately – if only to agree to disagree. 
 
 Therefore, the second benefit of this analysis is to help US policymakers understand 
where other states are coming from with more clarity, in order to illuminate places of common 
interest and create opportunities for cooperation.  As close US allies advised in the SAIC study, 
“If you want other countries to help work your issues [non-proliferation], then you need to help 
them work their issues [public-political support for a nuclear disarmament process].”321   By 
seeking to narrow gaps between the US’ and other states’ positions, US policymakers can buy 
“breathing room” for those areas where US vital interests cannot be compromised.  At the very 
least, sustained strategic dialogue with allies and potential adversaries can sow the seeds for new 
perceptions of the US as being willing to listen to others. 
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 Finally, this analysis helps policymakers understand how (mis)perceptions of US nuclear 
policy may lead states to adopt countermeasures, which can create unanticipated consequences 
and harm the US ability to promote these and other policies abroad.  How other international 
actors perceive US policies and actions matters a great deal in their decisions about how much 
they will cooperate on the US policy goal of non-proliferation.  The tragic irony is this:  US 
nuclear policy and actions, which have the objective of trying to “solve” the global proliferation 
problem, may actually be making other international actors feel less secure.  Their increased 
sense of insecurity lessens international security overall and reverberates back to the US as a 
heightened insecurity as well.  Strategic dialogue with these actors could help to reduce their 
uncertainties about US intentions, while simply acknowledging some of their concerns about 
perceived hypocrisy could help to rebuild US soft power.  Both actions could improve US 
security immeasurably.   
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APPENDIX 1:  CHINA 
 
Chinese Perceptions of the United States 
 
 China holds a realistic view about the United States’ power in the international system.  
Chinese leaders also recognize that their country is still relatively weak by comparison, and thus 
they are willing to accommodate the hegemon – it is a pragmatic strategy that has been paying 
off while China focuses internally on economic development and domestic stability.  Yet the 
prevailing conviction is that the United States is deliberately using its power to destabilize the 
international system, as well as China’s domestic stability and rise to great power status.  
 
America:  The Destabilizing Hegemon 
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the prevailing view among Chinese analysts was that 
American power was declining and the emergence of a multipolar system was imminent.  By the 
middle of the decade, however, much to their dismay, it was apparent the US was growing 
stronger.  As Warren Cohen has argued, “China had no choice but to attempt to achieve its goals 
in an American-dominated unipolar world…This is why Deng Xiaoping had advised his 
comrades to hide China’s capabilities, to build national power patiently.”322   This prompted a 
pragmatic effort by the Chinese to reduce tensions between the countries and accommodate US 
hegemony.  China recognizes that it must maintain its close relationship with the United States if 
its modernization efforts are to succeed.  As Singapore scholar Kishore Mahbubani puts it, China 
realizes that “although there is almost nothing that China can do to disrupt the political stability 
of the United States, the United States can do plenty to destabilize China.”323
 
The United States and China view China’s current status very differently.  From the US 
perspective, the current Chinese government is a relic of the Cold War communist era, and that 
China would be much better off as a democracy.  If China were to throw off its “oppressive” 
communist rule and allow freedom to ring, the country would flourish.  Therefore, many 
Americans believe that the United States should be pursuing measures to plant the seeds of 
democracy in China as soon as possible.   
 
In contrast, China views this American thinking as interventionist, arrogant and, most 
importantly, very destabilizing.  “From Beijing’s point of view, China’s recent rise marks the 
end of a century of internal convulsions, civil wars and foreign humiliations.  The Chinese feel 
that after having climbed a treacherous slope….their great future has finally arrived.”324  Many 
Chinese believe the United States does not give China enough credit for the progress it has 
achieved. As Beijing University scholar Jia Qingguo wrote, “Despite all the progress China has 
made over the years, there is little sign the US public has appreciated it or will ever be disposed 
to do so.  Instead, one hears endless vicious allegations and condemnations from those 
Americans with ulterior motives.”  Commenting on the frequency of negative stories in the US 
media about China’s human rights abuses and government oppression, he continues:  
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To an average Chinese, it is incredible and highly depressing to hear so many 
hostile as well as ill-founded allegations against China.  It appears to them that 
many Americans are so hostile to China that they only want to look at the bad 
things about China, and if they cannot find enough of them, they will simply 
fabricate some….China has been trying very hard to tackle the many problems it 
is facing, including making genuine efforts to improve its human rights situation.  
Under the circumstances, why are there more criticisms and condemnations of 
China from the US? Why can’t the Americans leave the Chinese alone?  Many 
Chinese cannot help but feel that the real answer to such questions is that despite 
all the apparent lofty pretensions like democracy and freedom, what some 
Americans really want is to keep China down.  They simply cannot tolerate that 
some Chinese people, members of the yellow race, aspire to the same level of 
economic affluence and human dignity to which Americans have been 
accustomed.325
 
Many Chinese analysts believe that the US sense of priorities for China – human rights 
and democracy now – would be destabilizing, and they resent that the United States assumes that 
it could know better than the Chinese about what the Chinese need and how they could best get 
it.  China was especially wary of the Clinton Administration’s engagement policy, because it 
watched Clinton sell it to the American people as a way to change China according to US 
priorities.326   
 
Given their country’s 20th century experiences with anarchy and corruption, Chinese 
leaders value domestic stability – even if that means a slower trajectory towards economic 
development and political freedom.  The rapid modernization process and the transformation of 
the centrally planned economy into a market economy created a great deal of social and political 
tension.  As Jia argues, “most Chinese believe that their interests lie in political stability, 
economic development and territorial integrity, with political stability as the first priority.  
Without political stability, China cannot develop its economy or defend its territory, let alone 
expand freedoms and develop democracy.”327   
 
For these perceptual reasons, there is a growing conviction among Chinese policymakers 
that the United States is bent on curtailing China’s rise and looking for opportunities to 
destabilize China.  Observers cite at least four examples.  First, many Chinese remain convinced 
that the US missile attack on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo War was 
deliberate.  As Mahbubani argues, “pointing to the sophistication of US surveillance technology, 
they hold on to the belief that the attack was intended as a message to China:  beware of US 
power.”328   
 
Second, Chinese leaders view American support of Taiwan as trying to thwart China’s 
highest foreign policy priority – reuniting Taiwan with the mainland.   The 2004 Chinese 
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National Defense White Paper argues that Taiwanese separatist activities have “increasingly 
become the biggest immediate threat to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” and 
promoting the reunification of Taiwan is listed as one of China’s five national security goals.329  
The PRC passed an anti-secession law on March 14, 2005, authorizing the use of force in 
response to a Taiwanese move towards independence.  (Although this is widely viewed as 
inflammatory, the vast majority of the act is laying out means of improving relations through 
diplomatic and economic ties.)330  
 
 Even though Washington officially opposes Taiwan’s independence and recognizes 
Taiwan and the mainland as one China, Chinese tend to view US policy towards Taiwan with 
suspicion – especially US arms sales to Taiwan and the promise of protection under the US 
nuclear umbrella and its promise to intervene.331  Chinese scholar Shen Dengli argues that the 
US arms sales from 1979-2000 amounted to more than $40 billion, and that these arms sales  
“strengthen” the Taiwanese separatists.  Consequently, the Chinese public has been “very 
dubious about the long-term US strategic intention over Taiwan.”332  Similarly, the White Paper 
argues, these arms sales and promises “send a wrong signal to the Taiwan authorities.  The US 
action does not serve a stable situation across the Taiwan Straits.”333  In other words, China 
worries that these US actions provide Taiwan with a false sense of security, which could 
encourage Taiwan to seek independence.  The Chinese view Taiwan as an internal matter, and 
they resent the support that Taiwanese separatists get from the United States, which in turn 
constrains China’s ability to interact with Taiwan.334  As Chinese scholar Qiu Huafei argues,  
 
This is a severe test for China’s future security strategy on how to raise the overall 
national strength and maintain domestic political stability in order to make its own 
careful decisions with security strategy significance, as to ‘when’ and ‘how’ to 
bring about national reunification, without outsiders making decisions on the 
issue of ‘whether’ it should reunify….The Taiwan issue touches on the core 
values of China; therefore, China must do its best to safeguard national territorial 
and sovereign integrity…The United States should understand the high degree of 
sensitivity of the Taiwan issue.335
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Third, Chinese point to US sanctions of China after the 1989 pro-democracy 
demonstrations in Tiananmen Square – as well as more recent American support of dissidents 
and religious groups, such as Falun Gong – as examples of intervening in China’s domestic 
affairs and destabilizing its political stability. 
 
Finally, China views US unilateralism in its foreign policy as very dangerous.  The 
Chinese were profoundly troubled by the American use of NATO forces to attack Serbia in the 
1999 Kosovo War, as well as the unilateral US invasion of Iraq in 2003.  In both situations, the 
US effectively bypassed the UN Security Council and intervened in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state. Given its own history of ethnic tensions with Tibetans and the Uighers of 
Xianjiang province, China is upset by the precedence for intervening in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state, fearing that the United States might consider similar actions on behalf of these 
minorities in China. 
 
Thus, it is not surprising that Singaporean Mahbubani would conclude: 
 
Chinese leaders are acutely aware that during the country’s transition toward a 
more open and representative political system, they will be moving on unsteady 
political ground, as if climbing up a mountain slope covered with rocks that, if 
suddenly loosened, could trigger an avalanche. As they clamber up this 
treacherous slope, they perceive the United States as throwing rocks at their feet.  
Although Washington assures them that it is not trying to destabilize China, they 
see it acting in ways – supporting dissidents, encouraging nationalist forces in 
Taiwan, lionizing the Dalai Lama – that could threaten China’s political 
stability.336
 
Nonetheless, Chinese scholars have also noted that there is an upside for China to all of the 
United States’ destabilizing international behavior.  For example, Wang Jisi, the dean of Peking 
University’s School of International Affairs, has argued that the United States’ “soft power has 
been weakened” since 2001, resulting in “international isolation” from allies, Islamic countries 
and other great powers.  He concludes that this is good news for China:  “As long as the United 
States’ image remains tainted, China will have greater leverage in multilateral settings.”337  Or as 
Chinese scholar Qiu Huafei has noted, China and the United States “have different value 
orientations on the understanding of soft power,” which has had the positive effect of increasing 
the common ground between China and European countries, at the expense of US-European 
cooperation.338  Finally, as Chong Zi argues, “The resistance against the US-led invasion of Iraq 
and the strong opposition to the war worldwide show us that the Big Stick is not always a magic 
wand in handling the international conflicts.”339
 
 China’s ambivalence about the United States appears to be mirrored in US policy towards 
China.  For example, China is the United States’ third-largest trading partner and is the single 
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largest owner of US debt,340 and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review states that the US goal is 
for “China to continue as an economic partner and emerge as a responsible stakeholder and force 
for good in the world.”  Yet the same document explicitly declared a “hedging” strategy against 
China, in case cooperative approaches might fail to preclude future conflict, because China “has 
the greatest potential to compete militarily” with the US.341  Thus, Chinese leaders remain wary 
of US-led efforts to contain China.  According to recently disclosed Chinese leaders’ 
deliberations, Chinese President Hu Jintao said: 
 
[The United States has] strengthened its military deployment in the Asia-Pacific 
region, strengthened the US-Japan military alliance, strengthened strategic 
cooperation with India, improved relations with Vietnam, inveigled Pakistan, 
established a pro-American government in Afghanistan, increased arms sales to 
Taiwan, and so on.  They have extended outposts and placed pressure points on us 
from the east, south and west.  This makes a great change in our geopolitical 
environment.342
 
An Overview of Chinese Foreign Policy 
 
As the previous section suggested, China is transitioning to great power status, and its 
foreign and nuclear policy are aligned with this goal.  In practice, this means that China is 
focused internally on economic development, domestic political security and military 
modernization, and its external relations are focused on helping to achieve this internal 
transformation.  The official foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China asserts, 
 
China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. The fundamental 
goals of this policy are to preserve China's independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, create a favorable international environment for China's reform and opening up 
and modernization construction, maintain world peace and propel common 
development.343
 
This priority on internal policies means that China appears willing to accommodate the United 
States, as it realizes that a good working relationship with the US is important for is domestic 
focus.   To reduce widespread apprehension about the potential impact of China’s “rise,” Beijing 
has also engaged in a wide range of multilateral activities designed to demonstrate that China is a 
“responsible” member of the international community.   
 
China is intent on achieving great power status, but has a long-term strategy to avoid 
having its rise prove overly costly or contentious.344  The Chinese recognize that the United 
States currently has a preponderance of conventional and nuclear military power and so view 
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direct confrontation with the US as ill-advised, if not suicidal.345  There is a widespread belief 
among the Chinese elite that the arms race is what caused the Soviet Union to collapse and they 
are keen to avoid a similar fate. 346   Chinese leaders are eager to emphasize moderation and 
accommodation with the United States while preserving their core interests, because they 
recognize China as a relatively weak power vis-à-vis the US at this time.347  There appears to be 
a consensus within the Chinese foreign policy elite, military as well as civilian, that a good 
working relationship with the US is essential.  It provides flexibility and it has worked.348  As 
Wang Jisi has written, 
 
The United States is currently the only country with the capacity and the ambition 
to exercise global primacy…this means that the United States is the country that 
can exert the greatest strategic pressure on China….Yet the United States is a 
global leader in economics, education, culture, technology and science.  China, 
therefore, must maintain a close relationship with the US if its modernization 
efforts are to succeed.349
 
Thus, China is focused on developing its economic, political, and military capacity in a 
minimally threatening manner.   
 
For China, the primary goal has been and remains developing the economy.350  China is 
currently the third largest trading state and the second largest trading partner for both the US and 
EU.351  Some estimates say that China’s economy will surpass the United States in the next 35 
years.  GDP growth has been consistently around 9 percent for the last several years and was an 
impressive 9.2 percent last year, which was largely driven by a 27.7 percent growth in 
industry.352   Another important indicator of economic growth is energy consumption.  In the last 
decade and a half, China has gone from petroleum self-sufficiency to being the world’s second 
largest importer of oil.353  To ensure a stable supply of this precious commodity, the PRC has 
pursued good relations with a number of states that raise concerns in the West, including Iran, 
Iraq, Sudan, Venezuela, and Russia, among others.354    
 
However, this economic development is not necessarily satisfactory for everyone, either 
domestically or internationally.  Development has not been evenly distributed internally.  
China’s east coast region accounts for 80 percent of the trade growth, whereas the rest of the 
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country, which is home to one billion people, enjoys only 29 percent of the growth.355  This 
discrepancy has the potential to cause dissatisfaction that could undermine the regime. 
Meanwhile, many nations and international organizations complain about China’s unfair trading 
and currency policies.  The yuan is pegged to the dollar and is widely regarded as being 
undervalued, giving China a trading advantage.  The trade deficit with the United States hovers 
around $200 billion.  On the other hand, devaluation of the yuan could very well lead to 
speculation that could radically destabilize China’s economy.  In 2004, the PRC restricted 
imports – ostensibly to prevent the economy from overheating, but some regard it as 
protectionism.  Given the economic and political liabilities associated with free market 
capitalism, the Communist Party is being careful to follow Deng Xiaoping's policy of "crossing a 
river by feeling for each stone."356  This cautious policy has certainly slowed reforms that could 
make China more efficient, but has allowed the CCP to retain control of the country.357
 
In addition to its economic development, China has been working to modernize its 
military.  During the 1980s, China began to reassess its decision to neglect military 
modernization in favor of economic development.  The overwhelming victory of the American-
led coalition in the First Gulf War reinforced the need to reinvest in modern military technology.  
China is shifting from a continental orientation requiring large land forces for “in-depth” defense 
to a combined land and maritime force that requires a smaller, more mobile, and more 
technologically advanced “active peripheral defense” capability.358  While manpower has been 
reduced, the defense budget has grown dramatically as China acquires new technology and more 
sophisticated training.  A major focus of this modernization has been a professionalization of the 
PLA officer corps, with an increased emphasis on recruiting skilled officers with science and 
technology expertise (the “Strategic Project for Talented People”).359  In addition, one of the key 
areas of training and investment has been amphibious assaults, like those that would be 
necessary to pacify Taiwan.360  While the Pentagon has estimated China’s military spending at 
roughly $60 billion, a RAND study puts it at $31-35 billion.361  Although the estimates of 
China’s defense budget differ, some analysts note that the resources committed to defense 
modernization have “increased at a pace that is intended neither to undermine the attainment of 
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essential civilian development priorities nor to unduly alarm both the peripheral states and the 
major powers and thus erode the generally benign threat environment facing China today.”362
  
To further these economic and military modernization goals, China has worked to 
develop friendly relations with a wide range of strategic partners.  Moreover, it has begun to take 
a “less confrontational, more sophisticated, more confident, and at times, more constructive 
approach toward regional and global affairs.”363  It has embraced much of the current 
constellation of international institutions, rules and norms as a means to promote its national 
interests, and has actively invested in building new institutions – such as the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization – where the existing ones do not meet their needs.  In short, China is 
starting to see itself as a “responsible” great power and wants to demonstrate that commitment 
by binding itself into the international system. Among the many ways that China has engaged in 
multilateral relationships and institutions:364
 
• Following the Cold War, in just two years, it established diplomatic relations with 28 
countries, including South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and South Africa. 
• It has been establishing various levels of “partnership” with states, to facilitate economic 
and security coordination and offset the US system of regional alliances.  For example, it 
has signed the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation with Russia in 
2001, and signed similar agreements with South Korea and India. 
• Since 1991, it has settled border conflicts with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Russia, 
Tajikistan, and Vietnam, often on less than advantageous terms. 
• It has ramped up foreign aid to neighboring countries, as well as African countries that 
help with its strategic economic and energy needs, by investing in large infrastructure 
projects without the strings that are normally attached to loans from the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank, the US or Japan. 
• In 2000, it led the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Central 
Asia’s regional security and trade organization. 
• It has initiated political dialogue and engagement with NATO, the European Union, the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
• It has shown greater involvement in international organizations, such as the World Trade 
Organization and G-8. It has also increased its engagement with the UN Security Council 
and increased its participation in UN peacekeeping operations, supporting contingents in 
places such as East Timor and Congo. 
• It has ratified several major arms control and non-proliferation accords, including the 
NPT and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and agreed to adhere to the basic tenets of 
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the Missile Technology Control Regime.  (Although it has signed the CTBT, it has not 
yet ratified it.) 
 
China’s international engagement has been matched by a more institutionalized and 
decentralized foreign policy-making process, which is less dependent upon any single leader and 
more focused on information gathering and analysis.  Szue-Chin Philip Hsu, a scholar who 
studies China’s foreign policy apparatus, argues that the new CCP leadership “appears to be 
more open to international norms and rules” and that the increasing contact with international 
institutions has fostered among them “an understanding that an isolationist, non-cooperative 
grand strategy of foreign policy is not a viable option” for China.  Hsu argues that one reason for 
China’s willingness to engage multilaterally is that China is “indubitably the greatest 
beneficiary” of globalization, increased capital and technology flows and multilateral 
engagement in the international system.365  Thus, promoting a multipolar international order, to 
constrain the “destabilizing” influence of the United States as well as to increase its own status in 
the international system, makes sense. In Qui Huafei’s words, “As far as China is concerned, 
developing a positive, cooperative relationship” with other countries, especially European 
countries, “can curb factors that give rise to a tense world-political situation and also help revive 
the weakening political foundation of Sino-US strategic relations.”366
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APPENDIX 2:  IRAN 
 
Iranian Perceptions of the United States 
 
US nuclear policy is only one part of the face the United States presents to Iran. An 
understanding of the historical and current sources of Iran’s perception of the US is critical to 
understanding why US nuclear policy is only a fraction of their concern.  This section describes 
Iran’s perception of the US, historically and in relation to current events.  It shows an oppressed 
Iran suffering under the yoke of a United States they see as untrustworthy, as a regional bully 
and as a specifically anti-Iranian troublemaker.  The section concludes with a discussion of 
whether or not the American “read” of Iran’s views is accurate based on the cultural divide that 
separates the Persians from the West.  
 
America: The Betrayer 
 
The historical roots of Iran’s view are based in the country’s historic political and 
economic humiliation, rejection and isolation.  Multiple betrayals by the US, England, Germany, 
and Russia throughout the 20th Century have been well-characterized by scholars.367   More 
recently, Iran fell from US grace during the 1979 Revolution when the American-friendly Shah 
was overthrown and the theocratic Islamic Republic of Iran was established.  The US influenced 
its European allies to withdraw support for Iran’s (ostensibly) civilian nuclear power program.  
From 1980 to 1988, Iran fought a losing war with Iraq.  During the war, the US supported Iraq 
overtly and covertly; much of Iran’s military was purchased from the US and their ability to fight 
atrophied in part from lack of access to spare and replacement parts.368   Iran believes that the US 
and its allies sanctioned Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons against Iranians during the 
war, in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.369  As recently as June 25, 2005, Majlis 
Speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel stated that the West had a hand in the Iraqi chemical weapons 
attacks on Iran.370   
 
America: The Regional Terrorist 
 
Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, Iran’s deep mistrust of the US continued.  The US 
invasion of Kuwait during the First Gulf War was viewed with mixed emotions by Tehran.  
Although it supported the reining in of its recent enemy Iraq for invading Kuwait, the increased 
US presence in the area was not welcomed.  The successful demonstration of US military 
superiority did not go unnoticed by the Iranian military still recovering from the war with Iraq.  
Further, while Iran actually supported the US invasion of Afghanistan following the September 
11th terrorist attacks, the result was a semi-permanent American presence on the Eastern border 
of Iran. 
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 The perception of the US as the bully on the block was only exacerbated by the 2003 
invasion of Iraq.  According to the Commander of the Islamic Republic Guard Corps (IRGC) 
Brigadier-General Yahya Rahim-Safavi in 2003: 
 
The occupation of Iraq by the Americans was the most significant contemporary 
global development next to the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran…. The 
Americans can be the harbingers of great revolutionary developments, and 
unprecedented changes in this whole region with their presence in Iraq.371  
 
Continuing US support for the Zionist regime in “occupied Palestine” also is viewed as a 
regional security threat.  Iran sees US policies throughout the Middle East as “interventionist.”  
As the Iranian Minister of Defense, Vice-Admiral Ali Shamkhani, stated in February 2003, “We 
should consider foreign intervention as a factor which contributes to growing instability… 
America's quest for international hegemony was another threat to the security and national 
interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”372  Iranian leaders get a great deal of political mileage 
by highlighting US support for Israel. As an article in the Tehran Times noted, “Of course, the 
US media, including influential papers like the Washington Post and New York Times and the 
television networks CNN and NBC, are controlled by Jewish investors who are part of the 
Zionist lobby.” 373
The on-going US threat to Iran was perceived in the recent conflict in Lebanon and 
articulated by Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei: “Today, everyone realizes that the attack on 
Lebanon was planned in advance, and was a Zionist-American operation - a first step towards 
taking control over the Middle East and over the [entire] Muslim world.”374  The Iranian 
perception of the US as a regional security threat could also stem from US media.  For example, 
Seymour Hersh’s article in The New Yorker in July 2006 claimed that military leadership was 
planning a bombing campaign against Iran and had considered (and rejected for primarily 
political reasons) using a nuclear device.375  Other military policies such as the well-publicized 
US “revolution in military affairs” (RMA), which promises an even smarter, faster and more 
precise military force, also contributes to Iran’s sense that the US poses a long-term threat to the 
region.376   
 
America: The Troublemaker 
 
In addition to the historical betrayals and regional security threat that the US poses in the 
Middle East, Iranians are especially offended by what they perceive to be selected targeting by 
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American rhetoric and policy.  For example, despite Iran’s offer of assistance following 9/11 and 
Iran’s cooperation during the 2001 Afghanistan campaign against the Taliban, President Bush 
put Iran on the “axis of evil” list.377  Since then, President Bush designated Iran as a “rogue 
state” based primarily on its support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon and its “civilian” nuclear 
program.  Iranian media deem Bush’s theory “obnoxious.”378   
 
Specifically, Iran sees the US as a “troublemaker” for Iran.  In 2005, Ali Larijani, the 
Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator, stated:  
 
As far as America is concerned, there are two problems. America's behaviour 
should be a criterion for us. America has created a trouble-making country in the 
region. Wherever we try to defend the Iranians' national interests, we realize that 
the Americans have created difficult conditions…. The people of Iran have 
witnessed America's coarse behaviour since the time prior to the revolution. This 
behaviour was felt by various groups after the revolution. They therefore cannot 
alter their views just because of the remarks made by an ambassador. Of course, 
the important point is to take real steps, and not for publicity purposes, so that it 
becomes obvious that they have abandoned the practice of creating obstacles 
against the Iranians' national interests.379  
 
Likewise, in 2003, the Commander of the Islamic Republic Guard Corps (IRGC) Brigadier-
General Yahya Rahim-Safavi stated that the Americans are 
harbingering political change inside Iran through launching a psychological-
diplomatic war from abroad, and this is a test-study for them… [They are r]uining 
the legitimacy of the revolution, creating a deep gap between the people and the 
system, instigating social unrest throughout the country, exerting outside pressure 
simultaneously with occasional troubles inside, and alienating Iran at the 
intentional scenes, and finally, if all those policies fail, probable military threat 
(sic) are in the US agenda for Iran.380   
 
Thus, the US-led campaign to discredit and eliminate the “legal” and independent Iranian nuclear 
power program becomes not a facet of US nuclear policy abroad, but a symptom of a larger anti-
Iranian attitude.  The US rhetoric regarding the Iranian nuclear program is seen merely as 
“propaganda” aimed to undermine Iran.  A recent IAEA complaint gives credence to this view.  
The IAEA has complained about an unclassified staff report from the US House Intelligence 
Committee, saying that it “contains erroneous, misleading and unsubstantiated information” 
about Iran’s nuclear program and overstated aspects of the threat it posed.381  Finally, articles 
regularly indicate that Iran perceives the US as able to “manipulate the world opinion against the 
Islamic Republic of Iran” as it tries to present an “extremist image of the Islamic Republic to the 
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world.”382  Iranian president Mahmood Ahmadinejad reiterated this feeling during his speech 
before the United Nations in September 2006: 
 
The prevailing order of contemporary global interactions is such that certain 
powers equate themselves with the international community, and consider their 
decisions superseding that of over 180 countries. They consider themselves the 
masters and rulers of the entire world and other nations as only second class in the 
world order.383
 
The Cultural Gap Question 
 
There is some concern among scholars that understanding Iranians through their media 
may be hindered by a cultural gap.384  It seems the published texts of Iran oscillate between the 
two poles of victimhood and arrogance.  Some scholars have taken this to mean that Iran 
perceives the West as weak and this encourages it to continue to build its nuclear program in the 
face of international opposition.385  Indeed, many scholars have noted the historical Persian 
hubris is deeply ingrained in the culture.  For example, Iranian scholar Kamran Taremi notes that 
the country’s “desire for dominating the Gulf stems from national pride and an exaggerated 
perception of self-importance.”386 However, a sense of victimhood and extreme arrogance are 
two sides of the same coin, and the reviewed literature suggests that Iran feels that its voice is not 
heard on the international stage or is not capable of building international consensus or affecting 
US policy.   
 
Iran’s sense of voicelessness is visible in the collected literature of this review.  Articles 
by Iranian scholars (as well as by scholars of Iran) mainly focus on explaining Iranian views of 
the world, suggesting that Iran feels misunderstood.  These articles seem to be aimed at bridging 
the cultural gap and they take a much gentler line on the US and its policies than do the media. 
 
An Overview of Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
Given this sense of voicelessness, it is perhaps not surprising that one of Iran’s major 
foreign policy goals is to be heard on the international stage.  Throughout the news media, 
articles attempt to show how allies and international organizations support Iran.  Through this 
technique of “bandwagoning” with its allies, Iran hopes that its opinions will balance against the 
more powerful Western states.  Based on the available media, Iran believes that Russia, Iraq and 
other oppressed Arab countries, and occasionally the EU are its primary allies.    
 
Regarding its neighbor and historic rival and foe, in February 2003, Tehran painted the 
picture of Iraq as an equally-oppressed ally: “Despite the fact that Iran was attacked by Iraq and 
suffered heavily during the eight-year war Tehran has been magnanimous enough to emphasize a 
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non-military solution to the issue” (referring to the potential for illegal WMD in Iraq).387   In 
2005, the picture was largely the same: 
 
About security issues in Iraq, Iraq is one of our neighbours and a natural ally. 
Improved security there will mean better conditions in this region. Iran wishes 
that a parliament is established in Iraq as soon as possible, an elected government 
established there, and its people relieved from the occupation rule in order to live 
a comfortable life as all other nations. We are prepared for all kinds of 
cooperation with the government of Iraq.388
 
Iran’s attitude towards its other Arab neighbors also is solicitous when trying to gain support to 
balance US interests in the Middle East.   
 
Over the past three decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always been a good 
neighbour of the small Arab states on the southern coast of the Persian Gulf, has 
defended their rights, and has never tried to attack them. In fact, Iran has always 
believed it has a common destiny with them.   Therefore, if the Arab states on the 
southern coast of the Persian Gulf that currently believe that the United States is 
their security guarantee change their views, a new chapter can be opened in their 
security and defence cooperation with Iran.  Therefore, the Persian Gulf littoral 
states should try to establish a common security system with Iran in order to 
guarantee regional security and the safe passage of ships in the Persian Gulf 
because a powerful and stable Iran is to the benefit of these countries.389  
 
Iran also invokes its participation in the United Nations and IAEA to show how the 
country is a peaceful and cooperative world-citizen that complies with all international 
agreements.  As Larijani stated in 2005, “Our cooperation with the IAEA will be within the 
frameworks of the NPT and Safe Guard Agreement. If we have allowed inspections to any site, it 
was because Mr. Al-Baradi'i requested and we agreed. We have done so for the sake of 
transparency. Otherwise, the norm is for us to cooperate only within the IAEA rules and 
regulations.”390  Likewise, the language of the June 2006 Iranian response to the nuclear 
negotiations package repeats their intentions to cooperate, engage, and negotiate within the 
bounds of the IAEA.391  During his speech before the UN General Assembly in September 2006, 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad recommended ways to redress the power imbalance caused by 
U.S. dominance of the Security Council: In his view, the Non-Aligned Movement, the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference and the African continent should each have a 
representative as a permanent member of the Security Council, with veto privilege. 
 
To further gain the favor of its international allies, Iranian leaders forgive them their 
failures by blaming US hegemony.392  Dr. Kazem Jalali, of the Majlis Committee for National 
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Security and Foreign Policy told the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), that “the powerful 
countries of the world should not have allowed America to play around with the credibility of the 
UN and the Security Council.”393  One editorialist in 2003 in the Tehran Times went further by 
attempting to rally Middle Eastern support by pointing out US international failures and accusing 
it of being a dog wagged by the “Zionist lobby” tail: 
 
There is no doubt that the recent report by the IAEA stating that Iran has violated 
the Safeguards Agreement of the agency was influenced by Washington…It 
seems that this time the White House hawks need to start a new disinformation 
campaign to cover up their political failure in dealing with such issues as the 
Palestinian crisis, the North Korean nuclear arsenal, as well as the Iraqi and 
Afghan campaigns… This propaganda is engineered by the Zionist lobby…”394  
  
In addition to the goal of being heard, Iran would like to resume its “rightful” place as 
regional hegemon in the Middle East.  This quest for hegemony is driven by the desire to force 
Western (US) power out of the region and to establish a more “natural” regional balance that 
extends Iranian influence.  Iran does not believe that regional security and stability are possible 
as long as the United States retains a military presence in the Persian Gulf, and thus has 
promoted regional security cooperation under UN auspices, to minimize US influence.395  Iran’s 
conciliatory gestures to its Arab neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iraq, appear to be 
trying to draw them away from their relatively close ties with the United States.  Iran also 
continues to support Hezbollah and the Palestinian government, in an effort to balance against 
Israel.  Yet Iran does not seem to have territorially expansionist ambitions; its desire is more to 
restore itself to a position of regional (and global) respect, that would, as Caroline Ziemke puts 
it, “inspire outsiders to leave it alone but would allow Iran to venture out and engage with the 
outside world at times and by means of its choosing.”396
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APPENDIX 3:  PAKISTAN 
 
Pakistani Perceptions of the United States 
 
An understanding of the historical and current sources of Pakistan’s perception of the US 
is critical to understanding why, to Pakistan, US nuclear policy is simply more evidence of its 
duplicity and untrustworthiness.  This section describes Pakistan’s perception of the US, 
historically and in relation to current events.  In ways that are similar to Iran, Pakistan’s historic 
narrative is replete with “a sense of wrongdoing and injustices, betrayals of trust and treaties, 
abandonment by allies, and victimization due to religion, race and color.”397  In this narrative, 
the United States is the cause for most of this abandonment, earning it the epithet of “fair 
weather friend” 398 – one that pursues its own interests irrespective of other considerations. 
 
America:  The Fair-Weather Friend 
 
Pakistan believes that, throughout its history, it has been used by the United States and 
then abandoned when those interests were served.  In a relationship that swings like a pendulum, 
Pakistan has drifted from being “the most allied ally” in the 1950s, to “the ignored ally” in the 
1960s and 1970s, back to “the most allied ally” the 1980s, to the most sanctioned ally in the 
1990s, and finally to “the most suspected ally” from 2001 until the present.  Understandably, 
such perceived fickleness on the part of the United States does not leave an endearing impression 
in the mind of most Pakistanis. 399    
 
At the onset of the Cold War, Pakistan aligned itself with the United States by joining 
two regional defense pacts, the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the “Baghdad Pact.”  
As a result of these alliances, Pakistan received nearly $2 billion in US assistance from 1953 
until 1961, a quarter of this in military aid, thus making Pakistan one of America’s most 
important security partners of the period, “the most allied ally.”400  These security guarantees 
were found to have no utility when Pakistan faced Indian military forces in 1965 and 1971, as the 
United States pressured its ally through UN Security Council resolutions and withheld 
ammunition and spare parts for all of the weapons it had sold Pakistan in previous years.401  
 
The relationship declined during the 1970s, as new strains arose over Pakistan’s efforts to 
respond to India’s 1974 nuclear test by seeking its own nuclear capability.  The US has been 
reluctant to criticize the Indian program, because, through the lens of American strategic interest, 
India was seen as a democratic country and counterweight to China.  Yet the failure to sanction 
the Indian program provided added impetus to Pakistan to pursue its own nuclear weapons.402  
President Carter responded to Pakistan’s covert construction of a uranium enrichment facility in 
1979 by suspending US aid. 
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With the 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, US priorities shifted again, and 
Pakistan was again viewed as a frontline ally in the effort to block Soviet expansionism.  In 
1981, the Reagan Administration offered Islamabad a five-year, $3.2 billion aid package, and 
turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear program – even waiving specific sanctions mandated by 
law (discussed further below).403  Although Pakistan disclosed in 1984 that it could enrich 
uranium and revealed in 1987 that it could assemble a nuclear device, the US continued to certify 
Pakistan’s non-nuclear status until 1990.  In exchange, Pakistan became a key transit country for 
arms to the Afghan resistance.   
 
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s strategic importance for the 
United States waned again, and in the 1990s, the US shifted towards India in terms of economic 
and strategic interests, while choosing to overlook India’s nuclear history.  During the same time, 
Pakistan was isolated internationally, and the United States again suspended aid because of 
Pakistan’s nuclear program.  One of the notable results of the aid cutoff was the non-delivery of 
F-16 aircraft purchased by Pakistan in 1989.404  Throughout the decade, the US considered 
declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism and went as far as imposing four different sets of 
sanctions, in response to Pakistan’s nuclear test in 1998 and the military coup in 1999.  Pakistan 
turned to Islamic radicalism, by supporting the growing insurgency in Kashmir and the Taliban 
movement in Afghanistan. 
 
After more than a decade of alienation, US-Pakistan relations were transformed anew 
after September 11, 2001.  The US once again returned to Pakistan as a pivotal ally, this time in 
the global war on terrorism.  As Pakistani scholar Samina Ahmed outlines, 
 
Counter-terrorism objectives have taken precedence over all other US political, 
military and strategic objectives in South Asia, and Pakistan’s military regime has 
become a major beneficiary of these changed US priorities. To reward Pakistan 
for its cooperation with US military action in Afghanistan, the United States has 
waived nuclear specific sanctions and democracy sanctions on Pakistan. To retain 
Pakistan’s support, the United States and its allies have also extended substantive 
incentives to the Musharraf regime. These include the restoration of economic 
assistance by Pakistan’s major donor, Japan, cash grants for budgetary assistance 
by the US and its allies, and the US-led coalition’s support for debt relief and 
enhanced loans from international financial institutions to Pakistan. Against the 
backdrop of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in November 
2001, President Bush announced a $1 billion aid package to Pakistan.405  
 
From the Pakistani perspective, the US focus on its own strategic interests above all else was 
apparent most recently in the US-India nuclear deal, as will be discussed further below.   
 
Pakistani President Musharraf recently announced that the United States threatened to 
bomb his country if it did not cooperate with the 2001 American campaign against the Taliban in 
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Afghanistan.  In an interview with “60 Minutes” on CBS, Musharraf said that his intelligence 
director was told by Richard Armitage, then US deputy secretary of state, that if Pakistan did not 
cooperate with the United States, it should “be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to 
the Stone Age” – which Musharraf said “was a very rude remark.” The Bush Administration has 
said there would be no comment on a “reported conversation between Mr. Armitage and a 
Pakistani official.” 406  Armitage, however, denied making the threat.407  Whether or not this 
threat is true, Musharraf’s recounting of it certainly affects how Pakistanis see the United States, 
and it certainly fits with the larger perception of the United States as using Pakistan to achieve its 
own strategic interests. 
 
Given this history of perceived American fickleness, it is not surprising that Pakistani 
views of the US have been consistently low for some time. President Musharraf responded to a 
question about why this is the case by stating,  
 
Before 1989, we were a strategic ally of the US and fought a war in Afghanistan 
for 10 years. Then we got left high and dry. The United States then started to have 
a strategic relationship with India, which was in the enemy camp. What would the 
man on the street think?408
 
Since 1999, public opinion polls have consistently shown negative views about the United 
States, with less than a quarter of the population holding a “favorable opinion” of the US.  The 
lowest poll was in 2002, when only 10 percent of the population held favorable views. 409  As a 
senior US expert opined in January 2004 testimony before a US Senate panel, “Pakistan is 
probably the most anti-American country in the world right now, ranging from the radical 
Islamists on one side to the liberals and Westernized elites on the other side.”410  The one 
exception to these low numbers occurred in 2005, when an earthquake devastated Pakistan and 
the US made considerable contributions for relief and aid.  A poll conducted the month following 
the earthquake showed US favorability among Pakistanis had doubled from 23 to 46 percent, and 
81 percent said that earthquake relief was important for them in forming their overall opinion of 
the United States.411  By the following year, however, the favorability rating had dropped back to 
about a quarter of the population. 
 
While these poll numbers suggest that anti-American sentiment is common in Pakistan, 
Islamist groups in Pakistan tend to be the most anti-American, “at times calling for ‘jihad’ 
against the existential threat to Pakistani sovereignty they believe the relationship with 
Washington entails.”412  In the past, Pakistan’s politics were rather secular and extremist groups 
were isolated, but elections in 2002 gave 20 percent of the National Assembly to a coalition of 
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Islamist parties, in addition to substantial gains in provincial assemblies in the North West 
Frontier Province and Baluchistan.   
 
In sum, Pakistan views the United States as a “fair weather friend,” and it resents how it 
has been, as it believes, used by the United States and then abandoned when those interests were 
served.  Pakistanis see themselves as having been allies with the US and having made many 
sacrifices for American interests, but not having received the follow through or support they feel 
they deserve.  Part of its resentment may also be the sense of powerlessness it feels, because 
although it sees the United States as fickle, Pakistan continues to need the relationship.  
 
America:  The Bankroller 
 
Although Pakistan does not feel a direct military threat from the United States, as Iran 
does, it is vulnerable to the United States in other ways – strategically, militarily and 
economically.  Strategically, Pakistan is vulnerable to the US in regard to India and Afghanistan.  
Certainly, the US-India nuclear deal is the most obvious example of how the US could threaten 
Pakistan’s security.  As will be explained in more detail below, the deal is seen as upsetting the 
balance of power in the region and allowing India to establish hegemony over its smaller 
neighbors.  Because the United States is a party to the deal, and Pakistan feels threatened by the 
deal, the United States is perceived indirectly to be a cause of that threat.  From Pakistan’s 
perspective, the US also has the potential to upset the balance of the conflict in Kashmir.  In 
addition, US actions in Afghanistan threaten Pakistan’s strategic influence in the region.  This 
point is not openly stated by Pakistani analysts or officials, but foreign analysts raise the critical 
point that, throughout the 1990s, Afghanistan under the Taliban was in many ways a client-state 
of Pakistan.  US actions in Afghanistan have reduced Pakistan’s influence there considerably.  
They have also exacerbated Pakistan’s problems along its western border in the Baluchistan 
province – especially on occasions when US aerial drones have launched missiles on Pakistani 
territory.   
 
Militarily, Pakistan depends on the US for equipping and supplying its military. The 
close US- Pakistan security ties of the cold war era — which came to a near halt after the 1990 
aid cutoff — have been in the process of restoration as a result of Pakistan’s role in the US-led 
anti-terrorism campaign.  In 2002, the United States began allowing commercial sales that 
enabled Pakistan to refurbish part of its fleet of American-made F-16 fighter aircraft, and in 
2005, the US announced it would resume sales of F-16s to Pakistan after a 16-year hiatus.  In 
June 2004, President Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally of the United States.  
The US is training and equipping new Pakistan Army Air Assault units that can move quickly to 
find and target terrorist elements. There has been a direct US role in training the security detail of 
the Pakistani president and training and equipping Pakistan’s internal police forces.413  This 
support is needed to ease Pakistani fears vis-à-vis its strategic competition with India.  
  
Economically, Pakistan is heavily supported by US assistance.  Pakistan’s cooperation 
after September 11, 2001 led to an inflow of US aid and assistance, a boost in trade and 
investment and an easing of its national debt, which has since significantly helped Pakistan’s 
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economy with steady growth in GDP and stock market figures.  The US is by far Pakistan’s 
leading export market, accounting for about 20 percent of its total exports.414
 
Thus, while the US does not pose a direct security threat to Pakistan, these other 
dynamics of US-Pakistani relations assure Pakistani dependency on US policies and actions in 
more subtle, but still important ways, and Pakistanis are well aware of this.      
 
An Overview of Pakistani Foreign Policy   
 
Though Pakistan has only been a nation state since 1947, it has had an extraordinary 
share of security challenges, including four wars with India.  Its geopolitical neighborhood 
leaves it overshadowed by three large, relatively rich and powerful neighbors, China, India and 
Iran.  Regular skirmishes with regional rivals on unsettled borders, as well as ethnic and 
sectarian clashes domestically, have fostered a security-intensive environment.  Given its 
endemic sense of insecurity, it is not surprising that Pakistan’s most robust institution is its 
military.  The military has controlled the government for about half of Pakistan’s existence, with 
numerous coups; the military prides itself as “guarantor of the state.”  A strong defense – from 
internal and external threats – is thus Pakistan’s foremost priority.  Stephen Cohen has argued 
that Pakistan’s concerns over its ultimate survival create strong parallels with Israel (and his 
argument presupposes that the alleged Israeli nuclear arsenal is real): 
 
Like Israel, Pakistan was founded by a people who felt persecuted when living as 
a minority, and even though they possess their own states (which are based on 
religious identity), both remain under threat from powerful enemies.  In both 
cases, an original partition demonstrated the hostility of neighbors, and 
subsequent wars showed that these neighbors remained hostile.  Pakistan and 
Israel have also followed parallel strategic policies.  Both sought an entangling 
alliance with various outside powers (at various times Britain, France, China and 
the United States), both ultimately concluded that outsiders could not be trusted in 
a moment of extreme crisis, and this led them to develop nuclear weapons.415
 
The primary importance of India in Pakistan’s foreign policy cannot be overstated.  
Pakistanis believe that India has never accepted the concept of Pakistan and has sought 
proactively to undermine Pakistan’s existence.  Given its self-identification as the South Asian 
Muslim state, Pakistan blames India for trying to “steal” Kashmir, a Muslim region that Pakistan 
believes should belong with its co-religionists.  Pakistan also blames India for breaking up the 
country when India supported the Bengali insurgency in East Pakistan.  In Pakistan’s view, its 
defeat in the 1971 Bangladesh War was caused by “India’s machinations and intervention that 
exploited Pakistan’s vulnerability in order to humiliate it,”416 not by Pakistan’s own harsh 
treatment of the Bengali minority – excluding it from political institutions and then clamping 
down with military occupation and gross human rights abuses to prevent the province from 
seceding.   
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During times of intense crises, Pakistan’s external allies, China and especially the United 
States, showed that they were unwilling or unable to guarantee Pakistan’s security.  As a result, 
Pakistan has learned to rely on itself.  Thus, besides its nuclear arsenal, another tool for self-
reliance has been supporting ideological radicalism, especially in Kashmir and in Afghanistan.  
The influx of global aid, mercenaries and mujahideen fighters from all over the world to fight the 
Soviets in Afghanistan played an important role in Pakistan’s foreign policy.  This continued 
with Pakistan’s support of the Taliban during the 1990s, when Pakistan was isolated by the 
international community.  Unfortunately for Pakistan, the September 11, 2001 attack by al-
Queda terrorists based in Afghanistan exposed the unintended consequences of encouraging 
ideological radicalism.  Since then, Pakistan has effected a multi-dimensional strategic 
reorientation back towards the mainstream – supporting the US in its war on terrorism, 
rebuilding its external alliance with China, proactively seeking rapprochement with India and 
Afghanistan, and focusing on economic development and domestic issues.417
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APPENDIX 4:  GERMANY 
 
German Perceptions of the United States 
 
 If the difference in worldview between Germans and Americans had to be boiled down to 
one sentence, it would be this:  while most Germans attribute an increasing importance and 
potential to solve global problems in multilateral institutional arrangements, they believe that 
most Americans do not.  This bothers Germany, because it recognizes that the institutional 
framework within which it is so embedded was created by the United States after World War II.  
Germans are critical of the United States’ increasing unilateralism for two reasons.  First, they 
believe this undermines their ability to influence the United States through NATO and other 
multilateral institutions.  Second, they believe this unilateralism is destabilizing for international 
security. 
 
America: The Dominant Partner 
 
 In an old Cold War joke, the purpose of North American Treaty Organization  (NATO) 
was threefold – to keep the US in, the USSR out, and Germany down.  Germans 
unselfconsciously acknowledge the importance of the United States in helping Germany to repair 
relations with its neighbors after World War II, and thus Germans have always been enthusiastic 
supporters of the NATO alliance.  Germany always believed it held a special place in the NATO 
alliance, as the majority of American troops overseas during the Cold War were stationed on 
German soil.  Yet, Europe is no longer a primary theater for US strategic policy, and the US 
trend towards unilateralism has led it to invest less effort in coordinating policy with its old 
allies.  It’s no wonder that German security analyst Peter Rudolf has grieved, “The romance in 
the relationship is gone.”418
 
 Germany is more aware now of the power imbalance with the United States, partly 
because it perceives the US as acting with more dominance and less compromise.  In particular, 
Germans appear to resent the lack of consultation that they have been receiving from the US.  As 
an ally, they believe that they deserve US policymakers’ candor and an opportunity to discuss 
US policy decisions that will affect them – before those decisions are implemented.  While 
Germany understands that the United States is free to make any policy decisions that it chooses, 
Germany feels it has a right to be heard before US policy that affects both nations is announced.  
For example, in the case of Iraq, then Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder aired his frustration in a 
September 2002 New York Times interview, saying that  
 
Consultation cannot mean that I get a phone call two hours in advance only to be 
told ‘we are going in.’ Consultation among grown-up nations has to mean not just 
consultation about the how and the when, but also about the whether.419
 
Schroeder’s anger at not being consulted is easy to understand, given that Iraq was an issue with 
potentially far-reaching political and economic ramifications for the allies’ interests.  Therefore, 
he and the other allies felt justified that their views be taken into account.  Schroeder also 
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claimed a right to be consulted based on the fact that Germany had shown its solidarity in the 
2001 Afghanistan war, and he had personally risked “his own political survival to get a coalition 
majority for German participation” in the war.420  This theme was reinforced in a February 2006 
speech by Chancellor Angela Merkel, who pushed for NATO to become “the most important 
consultation body for international security problems.”  As German analyst Ulrike Guerot noted, 
“Her wording made it clear than consultation can not mean US guidance, and that common 
analysis does not automatically lead to common action in the end.”421
 
There is also a concern that even when the US has engaged in “consultation,” it has been 
for show, without any real dialogue or compromise.  For example, Uta Zapf, then a Social 
Democratic member of the German Bundestag (legislature), recounted her experience with a 
senior Bush appointee:  She and fellow Bundestag members were allowed one hour with the 
official; however, virtually all of that time was taken up by him talking “at them.  There was no 
real discussion…The Bush team’s approach was resented and its message given less attention 
because of the preemptory manner of its delivery.”422
 
 For these reasons, it is understandable that most Germans view themselves as no longer 
an equal partner with the United States.  In 1993, when Germans were asked whether the US 
dominated German-American relations or whether Germany had become an equal partner, 
opinions were mixed.  By 2002, in Rudolf’s words, the “the German public appears to have shed 
its illusions”:  73 percent described the US as having a dominating role, while 26 percent still 
considered Germany an equal partner.423
 
 Equally understandably, Germans no longer count on the United States as their most 
important ally in international issues.  Transatlantic Trends polling data from 2003 show that 
France is now seen as Germany’s most important partner, and France is also considered a more 
reliable partner.  The preference for France is part of a wider “Europe first” orientation that has 
emerged out of frustration with US foreign policy.  The overwhelming majority of Germans 
polled (82 percent) believe the US only pursues its interests without regard for the interests of 
European allies.  For this reason, when asked whether the EU or the US were more important to 
German vital interests, 81 percent chose the EU (up from 55 percent in 2002).  The same number 
believed that a common European stand on issues was more important for German foreign policy 
than close German-American relations.  Finally, 70 percent (up from 48 percent the year before) 
wanted the EU to become a “superpower,” to balance against the United States and allow “a 
more independent European course in diplomatic and security affairs.”424
 
 Interestingly, the preference for Europe over the United States has not damaged the 
image of NATO.  A surprising 85 percent of Germans agree that NATO will be needed in the 
future (with only a minor difference between West Germans, 86 percent, and East Germans, 80 
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percent).  Younger Germans are even more convinced of NATO’s future importance.425  Thus, 
NATO is seen less as an instrument of American foreign policy than as a part of Germany’s 
foreign policy identity.  These data may be the result of the Bush Administration’s decreased 
attention to the alliance in its foreign policy. 
 
 Underneath these poll results, it appears that Germans are upset that the strategic change 
in US foreign policy – with a preference for “coalitions of the willing” and unilateralism – is 
“choking off” one of the main avenues for German multilateralism, NATO.  This also 
contributes to the German sense of the US as not listening to its allies.  Under the Bush 
Administration, NATO has lost its salience and, correspondingly, Germany has lost a lever of 
influence.  In Thomas Risse-Kappen’s view, NATO is no longer what it used to be – a “unique 
institutional framework for the Europeans to affect American policies with consultation norms 
and joint decision-making procedures as the underpinnings of Europe’s influence on the United 
States.”426  Or as Peter Rudolf argues,  
 
The traditional premise of German foreign policy in the transatlantic setting – 
gaining influence by cooperation – has been put into serious doubt….Europe is no 
longer a primary theater for US strategic policy, and there will be no resurrection 
of the once unique German-American relationship.  In this respect, one can speak 
of the ‘end of the transatlantic epoch.’427
 
America:  The Unilateral Hegemon 
 
 Americans often find it hard to understand why Europeans are willing to accept 
multilateral, regime-based approaches to international security problems such as WMD 
proliferation, instead of robust military capabilities or other unilateral solutions.  As Senator John 
Kyl has framed the debate, “Which would you trust, a missile or a piece of paper?”  For many 
Americans, the answer is self-evident.  Not so for Europeans.  As British scholar Joanna Spear 
has argued,  
 
What Americans often fail to acknowledge is that European security has long 
rested on pieces of paper – such as the Washington Treaty (which established 
NATO) – and that these have yielded good outcomes for Europe.  Thus 
cooperative approaches to security have a positive resonance across the 
Atlantic.428
 
The European strategic culture prefers multilateral, institutional and cooperative approaches to 
security problems.  Multilateralism involves a lot of diplomatic activity, an area where most 
European policymakers pride themselves on good performance.  Europeans believe that the way 
forward is to engage problem states and find solutions to underlying problems, not merely to 
contain these states and freeze the situation into a hostile status quo.  Europeans favor diplomatic 
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and political solutions over intrusive, unilateral and coercive ones.  Germans, in particular, 
embody this European strategic culture, perhaps in an effort to compensate for its aggressive, 
unilateral 20th century history.  Thus, during the Cold War, West Germany pursued a policy of 
Ostpolitik to engage with East Germany,429 and more recently, Germany has adopted a process 
of “active influence” (active Einwirkung) with Iran.430  Germans believe that this process has 
yielded benefits such as a decrease of Iranian terrorism in Europe, and see it as the best way to 
deal with the risk of unconstrained technology flows to Iran, especially from Russia.431
 
 Given this strategic culture, it is understandable that Germans (and other Europeans) 
view the United States’ penchant for military, technological and unilateral solutions with some 
distaste.  As German security analyst Peter Rudolf has argued, even when the United States 
attempts multilateralism,  
 
…it is a pure instrumental notion of multilateralism, namely using international 
institutions and, more often, flexible ad-hoc coalitions, for the pursuit of national 
interests…..The United States behaves more and more as a world power using its 
preponderant resources for the pursuit of its national security interests instead of 
acting in its traditional role as ‘benign hegemon’ guided by a broader world order 
perspective suited to a globalizing world.  This unilateral thrust has become even 
more prevalent as consequence of the ‘Bush Doctrine.’432   
 
Similarly, according to Johnannes Thimm, a German scholar of transatlantic relations, while 
Germans “ have acknowledged an increasing importance and potential of global governance 
mechanisms…parts of the American political elite view them as a threat to national 
sovereignty.”433
 
Germans perceive the United States as unskilled in diplomacy and too quick to write off 
some regimes as “beyond repair.”434  In their view, the US tendency to name and blame “rogue 
states” often creates self-fulfilling prophecies.  Even the concept of “rogue states” is a problem, 
because “it risks stereotyping and, by suggesting that some states are beyond reasonable hope, 
precludes political measures designed to blunt their aggressiveness and bring them in out of the 
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cold.”435  Moreover, German analyst Oliver Thraenert argues “the term ‘axis of evil’ [suggests] 
that all countries involved in proliferation can be dealt with in the same way.”436  Thus, it is not 
surprising that 74 percent of Germans “highly disapprove” of the axis of evil rhetoric.437
 
Germans also have a different perspective on the threat from WMD proliferation and 
terrorism than the United States does.  As Joanna Spear has argued about proliferation, 
Americans tend to view the problems caused by individual states or terrorist groups within a 
global framework.  Thus, the issues are extracted from their regional setting, and “both the 
problem and possible solutions are decided at an abstract global level.” In contrast, Germans 
(and other Europeans) view these problems “in the context of regional security and do not 
necessarily single out weapons of mass destruction for special attention.”438   
 
Similarly, while Germans are “almost as concerned as Americans about the threat of 
terrorist attacks” and 61 percent supported the war in Afghanistan, they “do not perceive the war 
on terror as a war against evil, a war against civilization.”  The vast majority of Germans (85 
percent) think the US is acting mainly in its own interests in the war on terror.439  Given its long 
experience with domestic terrorism (i.e. the Baader-Meinhof Gang), Germans generally view 
terrorist threats within a domestic political context, rather than as an existential threat to world 
order, as many Americans view al-Queda.  These different perspectives translate into different 
preferences for how to address the problem.  Germany prefers to adopt existing domestic 
counter-terrorism solutions that focus on law enforcement at home and develop strategies that 
address underlying grievances, such as poverty, abroad.  As German security analyst Peter 
Rudolf argues, “the preferred measures to combat terrorism lie – to a greater extent than among 
Americans – in the economic realm: in helping poor countries to develop their economies.”440
 
 German analysts argue that 9/11 was a transformative moment for US foreign policy that 
accentuated some long standing structural problems in the transatlantic relationship.  Rudolf 
argues the Bush Administration’s foreign policy after 9/11 demonstrated three things to 
Germany:  
 
firstly, the structural asymmetry resulting from the huge disparity in military 
power on both sides of the Atlantic; secondly, the deeply rooted strategic 
divergence in the perception of security threats and the response to them; and 
thirdly, diverging perspectives on world order, leading to conflicts over the role of 
international institutions and the unilateral thrust of United States foreign 
policy.441
 
Rudolf draws a distinction between all Americans and the Bush neo-conservatives behind current 
US foreign policy.  Writing in 2002, Rudolf quipped that “Americans and Germans do not live 
on different planets but those neoconservatives do.”  In his view, “the more this neoconservative 
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wing of the Republican Party will shape American foreign policy, the more it will lead to a 
growing strategic divergence between the United States and Europe, especially with 
Germany.”442  Similarly, Johannes Thimm argues that  
 
Resistance to multilateral regimes is most of all an elite [American] 
phenomenon…It is a myth that the average American is afraid of a UN that will 
eventually come with black helicopters to take over the country.  UN skeptics are 
mostly to be found within the political establishment.443
 
 Germany tends increasingly to see America deploying its power unilaterally and in 
pursuit of narrow interests. German scholars have criticized American “disdain” for international 
law and multilateral organizations. They cite the “obvious disregard for the Geneva 
Conventions” in the Bush administration’s opinions about torture, the US rejection of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the Treaty banning landmines.  These scholars 
argue that US behavior has not only eroded US soft power, but by extension, is eroding Western 
European soft power as well.444  
 
Moreover, German public opinion has consistently been highly critical of concrete US 
actions that are perceived as unilateral and self-interested, such as the war in Iraq, opposition to 
the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol.445  According to public opinion data in 
Der Spiegel magazine, in 2002, nearly two-thirds of Germans believed the US pursues only its 
own interests when it intervenes in the world’s crisis regions. In 1993, only 58 percent expressed 
that opinion.  Even more significantly, a declining number view the US as “the guarantor of 
global peace and security” (only 48 percent in 2002, down from 62 percent in 1993).446  Thus, in 
Peter Rudolf’s estimation, unilateralism – “not the predominant power” of the US, “but the way 
this power is used” – is “the main factor” in that more negative view of the US overall.447   
 
Similar results about the depth of Germans’ negative feelings about US foreign policy 
were visible in poll results from Transatlantic Trends, a project of the German Marshall Fund 
and the Compagnia di San Paolo.  In the June 2005 poll, when asked how desirable it is that the 
US exert strong leadership in world affairs, 60 percent of Germans said it was undesirable and 39 
percent, desirable.  These numbers were almost exactly reversed in 2002, when 68 percent said 
US leadership was desirable and 27 percent called it undesirable.  Asked specifically about 
President Bush, the results were even more critical:  83 percent disapproved of Bush’s handling 
of foreign policy (up from 62 percent in 2002), while 16 percent approved (down from 36 
percent in 2002).448  Such data suggest that Germans have always been more skeptical about 
Bush foreign policy than about the US more generally, but the negative views have become more 
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generalized over time.  In the view of Karen Donfried, director policy programs for the German 
Marshall Fund, “the data suggests that what we defined as anti-Bush sentiment during the first 
term has deteriorated into a broader anti-Americanism in the second term.”449
 
 For these reasons, perhaps it is not surprising that Charles Kupchan, a US scholar of 
transatlantic relations, argued recently that cooperative security with Europe is waning, and that 
“balance of threat thinking is making a distinct comeback.  Europe is not balancing against 
American power, but it is balancing against American behavior.”450  Or as German scholar 
Johannes Thimm tersely concludes, “As long as there is fundamental disagreement on how to 
construct a world order, which helps us to achieve our common goals, there is more trouble 
ahead.”451
 
An Overview of German Foreign Policy   
 
 Despite the relatively negative German perception of the United States, most analysts 
agree that “a functionally driven cooperative relationship” with the United States will remain a 
“cornerstone of German foreign policy culture,” albeit of lesser importance than in the past and 
perhaps posing more problems.452  Relations with the United States are so interwoven with a 
variety of institutional networks, and the interactions on a variety of international issues are so 
dense and complex, that it would be impossible for Germany to completely sever ties, even if it 
wanted to.  Instead, Germany is trying to find ways to use these common institutional networks 
to influence US policy away from unilateral efforts, as well as enhance European strength to 
interact more autonomously with the United States.  In general, Germany prefers embedding its 
foreign policy into multilateral frameworks, striving for “civilized international order” through 
non-military means.453
 
 Like other European countries, Germany’s foreign policy is undergirded and shaped by a 
network of multilateral, institutional frameworks.  The first framework consists of the various 
arms control agreements that structure the security situation in Europe – the Conventional Forces 
in Europe Treaty, the Vienna documents on confidence building, and global agreements such as 
the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BTWC).  As Mueller commented, “These agreements contribute powerfully to the 
benign security situation, grant early warning long before any threat would become serious, and 
strengthen trust in the validity and perpetuity of the impossibility of major war.”454
 
The second framework consists of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, the North American Cooperation Council, and the NATO-Russian Council.  These 
institutions offer chances to address grievances and emerging conflicts early, and to deepen 
cooperation between countries that could easily develop hostile relationships.   
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Finally, the third framework consists of alliances and institutions related to German 
security – NATO and the European Union.  As was discussed in the previous section, Germany 
has traditionally regarded NATO as a primary channel for influencing the United States.  
Concurrently, Germany has been investing in the web of relationships in the European Union, 
which Mueller characterizes as “of pivotal importance to German security:  it creates a network 
of common interests between Germany and those countries it has warred with throughout much 
of modern history, most of all France.”455  Building the European Union, and its developing 
European Security and Defense Policy, is seen by Germany as an effort to lessen dependence in 
security matters on the United States.  As Rudolf has argued, a major lesson that Germany 
learned from the 1999 Kosovo War was that “the European Union must increase its capability to 
act autonomously in the process of preventing and managing crises in Europe so that Europe 
gains real equity (wirkliche Gleichberechtigung) with the United States.”456
 
Despite this interest in promoting a common European identity, most German 
policymakers acknowledge that “a strong Europe cannot be built on the basis of opposition to the 
United States.”457  The German defense policy guidelines of May 2003 reaffirm this traditional 
premise:  “The transatlantic partnership remains the foundation of our security. Also in the 
future, there will be no security in and for Europe without the United States.”458  Joschka 
Fischer, the former German foreign minister, made a special effort in 2003 to reassure 
Washington that the future Europe will not seek to rival the United States.459   
 
Moreover, even though former Chancellor Schroeder was very vocal in his criticism of 
the United States policy in Iraq – for example, he made opposition to the war the centerpiece of 
his re-election campaign in the summer of 2002,460 and he worked closely with France and 
Russia to mount a campaign to deny the United States the backing of the UN Security Council461 
-- much of it was for domestic consumption, given how unpopular the war was with the German 
public.   
 
Indeed, for the most part, German policies have been quietly supportive of the US.  First, 
the Schroeder government did nothing to restrain the US from using its military infrastructure in 
Germany during the Iraq war.462  Moreover, German intelligence agents in Baghdad provided the 
US military with Saddam Hussein’s plan for the defense of Baghdad the month before the 2003 
US invasion began.463 (The German public’s response to this disclosure has been 
overwhelmingly negative, as they view it as a breach of the public trust, because of the German 
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government’s implied promise that it would not be involved with US war.464)  Third, Germany 
supported the US and its coalition partners in Iraq, including training Iraqi police and troops, 
albeit outside of Iraq, and writing off $5 billion in debt owed to Germany by Iraq.465  Fourth, 
Germany has deployed greater numbers of German troops to Afghanistan, and recently 
announced it would send troops to help police the Lebanon cease-fire, to help free up US 
soldiers.466
 
 Analysts differ about how closely Chancellor Angela Merkel will align with the United 
States.  On the one hand, Ulrike Guerot, a Berlin-based fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 
argues that the Merkel government coalition agreement includes a “clear commitment to 
improving relations with the United States” and a “strong reorientation towards NATO,” which 
could leave the European Union’s security initiatives “somewhat in the shadows.”467  On the 
other hand, Karen Donfried argues that the “Merkel government will need political capital to get 
through [economic] reforms that many Germans fear will threaten specific social welfare 
benefits.”  Given the “inescapable constraint” of anti-American public opinion in Germany, “the 
new government will likely be cautious in expending its limited capital on getting closer to 
Washington.”468  The Economist agrees with Donfried’s perspective, arguing that “Americans 
overestimate what Ms. Merkel can deliver,” given that Germany is unlikely to increase its 
defense spending, favors multilateralism and remains “un-persuaded by Mr. Bush’s charm 
offensive.” As Karsten Voigt, the German government’s coordinator of German-American 
cooperation, argues, “the cold war is over, so Germany is inherently less dependent on 
America.”469     
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APPENDIX 5:  ACRONYM LIST 
 
ABM  Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
APEC  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum  
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BBC  British Broadcasting Company 
BMD  Ballistic Missile Defense 
BTWC  Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
CCP   Chinese Communist Party 
CFE  Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty 
CTBT  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
CWC  Chemical Weapons Convention 
DoD  U.S. Department of Defense 
DOE  U.S. Department of Energy 
DPRK   Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
DTRA  Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
EU  European Union 
FBIS  Foreign Broadcast Information Service 
G-8  Group of Eight 
GNEP  Global Nuclear Energy Program 
GWOT Global War on Terrorism 
HIV   human immunodeficiency virus 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICC  International Criminal Court 
IRGC  Islamic Republic Guard Corps  
ISNA  Iranian Students News Agency 
MTCR  Missile Technology Control Regime 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NFU  no-first-use policy 
NMD  National Missile Defense 
NNSA  National Nuclear Security Administration 
NPR  Nuclear Posture Review 
NPT  Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
NSS  National Security Strategy 
NWS  nuclear weapons state 
PLA     China’s People’s Liberation Army 
PRC  People’s Republic of China 
QDR  Quadrennial Defense Review 
RMA  Revolution in Military Affairs 
RRW  Reliable Replacement Warhead 
SAIC  Science Applications International Corporation 
SCO  Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SDI  U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) 
SDP  Social Democrat Party 
SORT  Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty  
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
UN  United Nations 
US  United States 
WMD   weapons of mass destruction 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
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